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2. Autonomy Curbed? Kurdish Oil Exports Hit Snags from Turkey and Baghdad
- Author:
- Joshua Krasna
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- For the past three months, the Kurdish region in northern Iraq and its government, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have been facing one of the most serious challenges in the two decades of its formal existence. The pipeline through which it exports some 400,000 barrels of oil a day (b/d) – 10 percent of the overall Iraqi exports and 0.5 percent of global production – has been closed since March 25, at an estimated cost of close to a billion dollars a month (approximately $30 million daily). The KRG has depended on income from oil exports for some 80 percent of its budget. The stoppage came after a decade-long arbitration between the Government of Iraq (GOI) and Turkey by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce was decided in March in Iraq’s favor. Turkey was ordered to cease loading Kurdish oil without GOI supervision, and to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in owed fees (Baghdad had demanded $30 billion). Baghdad had claimed that use of the pipeline from northern Iraq to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey by the Kurds without GOI consent was in violation of a bilateral agreement between the two countries from 1973, the annex of which states Turkey would only buy oil from Iraq’s state-owned oil marketer.
- Topic:
- Oil, Economy, Exports, and Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
3. How to Stop Iraqi Kurdistan’s “Bleeding”
- Author:
- Bilal Wahab
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- In a recent letter to President Biden that was soon reinforced by three U.S. lawmakers, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government expressed his alarm over the region’s survival. Noting that the KRG is “bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically,” he laid the blame on Baghdad’s “dishonorable campaign” against Erbil. Barzani has a point—federal authorities have indeed been undoing the KRG’s hard-won autonomy in the years since the Islamic State fell and the Kurds launched an unsuccessful independence bid. Most notably, Baghdad has recentralized policymaking in the capital and blocked Kurdish oil exports amid a decade-old dispute over energy management. Yet Barzani’s narrative does not tell the whole story. The United States has long supported Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy, security, and development, fostering greater stability and pro-American sentiment. At the same time, however, Washington has overlooked the KRG’s vulnerabilities—namely, the internal divisions, corruption, and democratic backsliding that have diminished Erbil’s reliability and brought on the current existential crisis. The United States has a strategic interest in continuing to promote a stable and prosperous KRG, but it cannot do so without addressing the region’s internal problems.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Politics, Autonomy, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan
4. Religious Accommodation through Non-Territorial Autonomy: Assessing the Relevance of Islamic Doctrine and Traditions in Contemporary Times
- Author:
- Muhammad Mushtaq
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Review of Human Rights
- Institution:
- Society of Social Science Academics (SSSA)
- Abstract:
- It appears that the growing religious diversity in the developing and developed worlds will pose a serious challenge in the near future. However, religious minorities are surprisingly understudied in the literature on the politics of accommodation. Similarly, far less emphasis has been placed on non-territorial autonomy, which has the potential to deal with territorially dispersed religious minorities. It is argued that the Ottoman millet system based on Islamic values was the first non-territorial arrangement that successfully accommodated religious differences for centuries. Therefore, this paper reviews the Islamic doctrine and traditions pertaining to religious accommodation in general and the Ottoman millet system, in particular, to examine if the case offers any valuable insights into the scheme of religious autonomy in modern times.
- Topic:
- Islam, Religion, Minorities, Autonomy, Ottoman Empire, Tradition, Accommodation, and Millet System
- Political Geography:
- Middle East
5. Making Sense of Risky Haredi Behaviors in Israel During the Covid-19 Pandemic
- Author:
- Ferit Belder
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- Covid-19 not only posed a threat to the bodies of individuals or their mental health but also disrupted routines that are re-producing certain communities every day. This is particularly the case for communities with already securitized identities such as the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) society in Israel. Its authentic narrative, routines and practices that had been sustained thanks to their decades-long autonomy within the state, faced a substantial challenge when the state-led pandemic measures arrived in Haredi towns. This article seeks to explain the Haredi non-compliance with certain pandemic instructions like closing religious and educational centers, through the conceptual lens of an ontological security approach. It argues that the ontological security concerns of the Haredi leadership hampered them from fully complying with the state-led pandemic measures, even at the expense of risking the lives of individual Haredim.
- Topic:
- Public Health, Autonomy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
6. The Future of the Kurdistan Region after the Defeat of ISIS and the Failure of the 2017 Independence Referendum
- Author:
- Pishko Shamsi
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- In 2017, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq held an independence referendum, which triggered severe backlash, including the loss of control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The backlash from the independence referendum prompted the regional government (Kurdistan Regional Government) to urgently shift policy and re-engage with Baghdad. Since then, the region has recovered politically and has implemented a pragmatic strategy to revitalize the economy and internal affairs. The KRG also launched diplomatic initiatives to restore relations with Iran and Turkey, and has pursued a policy of neutrality to manage the Region’s myriad of crises. Moreover, the KRG has pursued tactical alliances with Iraqi political parties to secure short-term gains, including the resumption of budget transfers from Baghdad. The KRG’s deal-making with Baghdad, however, has fallen short of translating into a sustainable policy, and many of the gains are fragile and dependent on Baghdad’s changing political scene. Without a long-term strategy, the KRG’s new leadership is unlikely to be able to deliver much needed institutional reforms to help curb corruption, improve governance, and enhance transparency in public affairs. And while the KRG has committed to reform politically, it remains unclear if it will bring about meaningful change and address structural challenges, such as entrenched crony networks, rentier economics, and partisan control over the public sector and security forces.The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.
- Topic:
- Islamic State, Autonomy, and Referendum
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan
7. In Search of a Semi-Autonomous Region in Northeastern Syria
- Author:
- Kenneth R. Rosen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- It is possible to conflate the development of an autonomous region of northern Iraq with one in northeastern Syria; as a colleague on this forum noted recently, the Kurds in northeastern Syria have suffered, and continue to suffer, greatly. But while they are allies who “by, with, and through” have helped to bring ISIS down to a regional crumb in an ever-growing platter of fractured groups, what the United States owes or can offer the Syrian Kurds is much different than what was secured in the early days of the 1990s in Iraq, in the midst Saddam's massacres of Kurds.
- Topic:
- Politics, Syrian War, Autonomy, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, Kurdistan, and Rojava
8. Declaration of Autonomy: The Gradual Erosion of Authority in South Yemen
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- In light of competing interests and calculations, the situation in south Yemen could unfold along various trajectories, but the determining factor will be the extent to which the STC takes its commitment to the Riyadh Agreement seriously.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Yemen
9. The Syrian National Army (SNA): Structure, Functions, and Three Scenarios for its Relationship with Damascus
- Author:
- Omer Ozkizilcik
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The Syrian National Army (SNA) is officially part of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and responds to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Abdurrahman Mustafa, the President of the SIG, and Selim Idris, the Minister of Defense, oversee the SNA. Idris is also the Chief of Staff of the SNA. The SNA is then further divided into legions and factions. The commanders of the three key legions of the SNA, namely Muataz Raslan, Mahmud el-Baz, and Abu Ahmad Nour, are responsible for all of the factions of their legion. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh legions are organised under the National Liberation Front (NLF). Each faction commander is officially under the legion’s command, though each legion’s number of factions vary, and each legion commander makes decisions as a representative of their legion in coordination with Selim Idris, the commanders of the other legions, and the council. The council is made up of SNA faction leaders who each maintain their own autonomous area and thus can exercise significant power. Therefore, most decisions need explicit or at least tacit approval from them. The SNA’s Chief of Staff and the MoD have different offices operating autonomously from the factions of the SNA and only respond to Selim Idris. The SNA is additionally composed of eight offices (figure 1): The media office, the military court office, the military police, the guidance counselors’ office, the finance office, the administration and organisation office, the operational office, and the training office.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Leadership, and Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
10. Partial Local Autonomy in Southern Syria: Conditions, Durability, and Replicability
- Author:
- Alexander Decina
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- In July 2018, Daraa Governorate, once home to an array of rebel groups and local governance councils, supported by significant international assistance, was partially recaptured by the Government of Syria (GoS). Through a combination of force and negotiations, the GoS has restored control over key routes and infrastructure, although a number of former rebel groups have retained limited autonomy in their own communities. Since then, poor security and economic conditions, inadequate services, and competition between and among GoS security actors and former opposition factions have challenged the status quo in Daraa, but, by and large, the situation has held. These negotiated outcomes – and the GoS’s willingness to accept them – were predicated upon multiple factors, including the relatively moderate nature of southern opposition factions, Russian and Israeli military postures, and the historical connections of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in Daraa. While lessons learned from the south are important, the particular conditions and outcomes i
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Local, and Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria