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2. Persistent Perils: Illicit MANPADS in the MENA Region
- Author:
- Matt Schroeder
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- Since 1970, armed groups have hit dozens of civilian aircraft with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), killing more than 1,000 civilians. The international community has taken numerous steps to reduce illicit proliferation, but armed groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continue to acquire and use these systems. Persistent Perils: Illicit MANPADS in the MENA Region—a new Report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment In North Africa (SANA) project—provides an in-depth analysis of the proliferation of MANPADS in North Africa and the Middle East from 2015–23. Drawing on imagery and data collected since 2015 to identify the type, model, generation, and country of design/manufacture of illicit MANPADS in the region, the Report assesses the implications of recent proliferation patterns for regional security and international norms and agreements.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Armed Forces, Weapons, Trafficking, and MANPADS
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and North Africa
3. Changes in the military deployment of the United States and their implications for Israel’s wars in the region
- Author:
- Eytan Gilboa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- At the start of the Gaza War, President Biden warned Iran and its proxies against launching an all-out attack on Israel and sent aircraft carriers to the region to clarify his intentions. The withdrawal of the Gerald R. Ford carrier from the Mediterranean could be interpreted as a sign of American weakness, diminish deterrence of Iran, and undermine US mediation efforts in Lebanon.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Deterrence, Regional Security, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America
4. After a year of war, Hamas is militarily weakened — but far from ‘eliminated’
- Author:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- One year after the onset of the current crisis in the Middle East, following Hamas’ deadly attack on southern Israel on 7 October, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vow of “complete victory” and the “elimination” of Hamas as a threat to Israel1 remains unfulfilled. While Israeli officials claim that Hamas no longer exists as a military force in Gaza, ACLED data show that Hamas still retains some operational capabilities and continues to engage with Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Hamas has also escalated its military activities in the West Bank. With the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently having shifted focus to confronting Hezbollah in the north and no ceasefire in Gaza in sight, Hamas continues to remain a significant actor in Palestine despite its now-diminished military capabilities and the significant humanitarian toll on Palestinians in Gaza.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Hamas, Humanitarian Crisis, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
5. Syria: Which groups have been fighting each other and where?
- Author:
- Muaz Al Abdullah
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- Despite the recent coordination between opposition groups in the Military Operations Command (MOC) coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the future shape of Syria remains uncertain due to historical hostilities and ongoing divisions among the different armed groups throughout the country. ACLED data highlights previous confrontations between these groups since April 2020, when the territorial control of the country was frozen (see maps below). Although Islamic State fighters no longer control territory in Syria, their interactions with key actors — including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — remain an important dimension of the conflict.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Armed Conflict, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
6. Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran
- Author:
- Mona Saif
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate (in part) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due to the growth of its relation with the Houthi.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Houthis, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Yemen
7. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?
- Author:
- Emile Roy
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Yemen
8. The Muqawama and Its Enemies: Shifting Patterns in Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Activity in Iraq
- Author:
- Luca Nevola and Miran Feyli
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The post-2003 security landscape in Iraq has seen the proliferation of dozens of militias identifying with Shiite Islam. Many of these actors are integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – a paramilitary group established in 2014 to counter the Islamic State and later incorporated into the Iraqi state forces – and have strong relations with the Iranian regime and its security apparatus.1 These Iran-backed groups include prominent militias such as Kataib Hizbullah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and Haraka Hizbullah al-Nujaba (HHN), as well as a number of recently formed ‘facade groups’ like Ashab al-Kahf and Qasim al-Jabarin. Such facade groups are generally assumed to operate on behalf of KH, AAH, and HHN (see graph below). These groups are notable for portraying themselves as the Muqawama, or the ‘resistance’ against the United States and other foreign forces.
- Topic:
- Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Militias
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, and Middle East
9. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy
- Author:
- Daniel Depetris
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
10. The Lebanon Human Rights Report: Punting on Accountability?
- Author:
- David Schenker
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- When the U.S. State Department issued its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices last week, the document’s assessment of Lebanon’s track record in 2022 stood out for its significant elisions. Although the comprehensive nature of these reports generally makes them a valuable tool for accountability, their diplomatically sensitive content is sometimes colored by an administration’s perceived exigencies regarding a given bilateral relationship. The fact that Lebanon’s report largely avoids some of the country’s more controversial human rights issues therefore seems more than coincidental. Whatever the case, the omissions are a missed opportunity for facilitating just the type of accountability Lebanon needs to pry itself out of its current morass.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Armed Forces, Economy, and Accountability
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon