Search

Begin New Search Topic Armed Conflict Political Geography Middle East

71. THE APPLIED STATE OF VIOLATION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICTS: YAZIDI WOMEN DURING THE ISIS WAR IN IRAQ

Author:
Roza Omer Hamadamin, Nor Anita Abdullah, and Mohd Zakhiri Md. Nor
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
On 3 August 2014, fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attacked the Yazidi minority of Sinjar in Kurdistan-Iraq. The Yazidi community was the main target of ISIS fighters, including Yazidi women. The ISIS group has committed violence against Yazidi women in several ways. This study aims to show the crimes committed by the group ISIS against Yazidi women and to highlight the problem of violence against women in war through recent living examples, such as women in the ISIS war between 2014-2017. The second part of this study identifies the legal deficiencies related to the regulations that guarantee the protection of women's rights in Iraq. Through a content analysis approach, qualitative methodologies are used. Also, based on a thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews, this paper found that the Yazidi women and girls have been subjected to the most heinous crimes involving international crimes. Furthermore, despite various legal provisions in Iraqi laws and the constitution relating to protecting women's rights, these laws have several legal deficiencies. The Iraqi legal authority has not attempted to guarantee sufficient protection for women's rights in armed conflicts.
Topic:
Human Rights, Women, Islamic State, Armed Conflict, Human Rights Violations, and Yazidis
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

72. Taiz Siege Continues as Talks Face Roadblocks – The Yemen Review, June 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
A truce between the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the armed Houthi movement was extended on June 2 and has largely held, despite intermittent violence and unresolved issues from the original agreement. While the truce has succeeded in limiting violence and facilitated the reopening of Sana’a airport, negotiations over the besieged city of Taiz have devolved into recriminations, fueling concerns that the armed Houthi movement will renege on its commitment to reopen access to the city. UN-facilitated negotiations on lifting the blockade of major roads into the city continued into July. Yemen’s economic performance over the month of June was characterized by familiar patterns of fuel shortages and renewed depreciation of the rial in government-held territory. The slide was halted by news of a further US$400 million in pledged Saudi financial support, announced as Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alami visited Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced billions of dollars in economic support since the PLC took over executive responsibilities in early April, though it is unclear how much has been delivered as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are demanding institutional and governance reforms before allowing the Yemeni government to access most of these funds. Renewed fuel shortages in the south precipitated familiar scenes of long lines at petrol stations. Anger over price hikes and power outages during the height of summer, combined with a perceived failure of the government to implement timely economic reforms, sparked demonstrations in Aden and other areas of southern Yemen. The demonstrations overshadowed Al-Alami’s otherwise fruitful tour of regional capitals, where he secured promises of various forms of support from Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar.
Topic:
Economy, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

73. Government Instability Overshadows Truce – The Yemen Review, July 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and the Southern Transitional Council boiled over in Shabwa in July, as political disputes over security posts devolved into clashes between their affiliated forces. Government efforts to assuage the parties were unsuccessful, setting the stage for a battle over the capital, Ataq city, in early August. The Shabwa tensions overshadowed agreement on a two-month extension of the UN-brokered truce between the government and the armed Houthi movement, though sporadic violations continued. A proposed six-month extension fell apart over disagreements on road reopenings, air travel and payment of public sector salaries. The Presidential Leadership Council announced a cabinet reshuffle at the end of the month, replacing the heads of four ministries. The new appointees were all southerners, approved by the STC, in a nod to the substantial power wielded by the movement. The government also appointed new governors of Hadramawt and Socotra; the latter is the STC’s top man on the island. Meanwhile, Houthi authorities continued to profit handsomely from the exorbitant cost of fuel in areas they control while also attempting to convince consumers that the Saudi-led coalition is to blame for sky-high prices at the pump.
Topic:
Leadership, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

74. Showdown in Shabwa Shakes Government – The Yemen Review, August 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and UAE-backed groups in Shabwa erupted into open conflict in August, with the Giants Brigades and STC-aligned Shabwa Defense forces driving Islah-aligned military and security forces from the governorate. The expulsion of Islah from Shabwa and the STC’s subsequent takeover of much of neighboring Abyan governorate raised questions about the ability of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to resolve tensions between anti-Houthi parties and the nature of any future peace deal. Despite being extended on August 2, the UN-brokered truce between the government and the Houthi movement saw its first major violation later in the month when Houthi forces attempted to take control of the last major government-controlled road out of Taiz city, prompting widespread international condemnation and the government’s withdrawal from UN-facilitated talks in Amman. Although the pledged Saudi-Emirati financial aid to the government remains stalled, the exchange rate in government-held territory has remained relatively stable, with the rial even appreciating somewhat following PLC head Rashad al-Alimi’s visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in the middle of the month. Despite this, and news of the resumption of grain shipments from Ukraine under a UN-backed deal, issues remain around food price affordability and fuel availability.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

75. Truce Expires as Internal Divisions Deepen – The Yemen Review, October 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The truce between the internationally recognized government and the armed Houthi movement, in place since April, was allowed to expire without renewal on October 2. The UN-facilitated agreement engineered the longest period of relative peace of the war. September saw intensive negotiations to extend and expand the truce, and optimism was high throughout the month, but talks broke down when the Houthis made an eleventh-hour demand for the payment of additional military salaries. Efforts to revive the agreement continue, and talks continue over public sector salaries, the reopening of roads, and flights out of Sana’a airport. There was no major resumption of hostilities after the truce expired, though low-level clashes remain frequent. The Southern Transitional Council continues to expand its control in the south. Following last month’s battle for Shabwa, the group has begun a nominally counter-terrorist campaign against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Abyan, and has engineered demonstrations and protests again the presence of Islah-affiliated forces in Hadramawt. Yemen’s dual currencies remained stable over the course of the month. The government continued its efforts to secure a long-promised funding package from UAE and Saudi Arabia, though the latter has now renewed an agreement to provide fuel for Yemen’s power plants. A fuel crisis in Houthi territory brought recriminations from both sides but was averted with the import of additional supplies. Seasonal rains in Yemen continue to cause massive flooding, which claimed a number of lives this month. The UN announced that it has secured enough pledged funds to begin the salvage of the FSO Safer, a deteriorating oil storage vessel posing a massive environmental risk in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Currency, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Weather
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

76. Houthis Target Southern Ports – The Yemen Review, October 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The UN-backed truce between the Houthi movement and the internationally recognized government was allowed to expire on October 2. Efforts to secure its further extension failed following a last-minute demand by Houthi negotiators to add military and security personnel to a payroll of public sector employees. The breakdown of the talks was followed by mutual recriminations, even as Saudi Arabia and the Houthis exchanged delegations on October 14, ostensibly to visit prisoners of war and discuss an exchange. Later in the month, the Houthis targeted two oil ports on Yemen’s southern coast with drones, striking the port of Nushayma in Shabwa on October 18-19 and the port of Al-Dabba in Hadramawt on October 21. The drone attacks followed warnings by senior Houthi official Mahdi al-Mashat that foreign energy companies were “looting Yemen’s sovereign wealth” and should cease operations. Though the facilities were undamaged, the attacks have disrupted exports as foreign ships stay away from Yemen’s coast. On October 31, Canadian oil producer Calvalley Petroleum Ltd. announced a suspension of oil production at Block 9 in Hadramawt due to the “current extremely challenging situation” and a lack of oil storage capacity. In response to the Houthi drone attacks, the government’s National Defense Council officially designated the Houthi movement a terrorist organization on October 23. It is unclear what ramifications the designation will have, as the government currently lacks a mechanism with which to enforce compliance. Saudi Arabia has privately urged caution to prevent derailing ongoing peace talks.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Drones, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Port
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

77. Govt Agrees Financial Aid as Houthis Target Oil Sector – The Yemen Review, November 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Hopes faded that the expired truce would be revived in November, as Houthi authorities dug in their heels over maximalist demands that caused the talks’ collapse and then upped the ante with a series of drone and missile attacks on southern ports. The attacks crippled oil and gas revenues, though International Monetary Fund, Saudi, and Emirati support has given the government the lifeline it needs for now. Following the international financial agreements, the government-run Central Bank of Yemen in Aden moved to increase its oversight of banking data. Though there has been no return to full-scale war, intense if low-level clashes were seen in Taiz, Lahj, and Hudaydah. Reports persisted of back-channel Houthi-Saudi talks, but they appear to have stalled for now over Houthi demands for salary payments. The talks could become problematic for the government if they go beyond the question of the truce and extend to a unilateral settlement, which would be contrary to its interests. Divisions continued to wrack the Presidential Leadership Council, whose head Rashad al-Alimi was the sole member to spend significant time in Aden when he returned in early December after a regional tour that included Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. The STC-Islah dispute, which has been at the heart of PLC wrangling, eased up slightly under UAE and Saudi pressure as their priority shifts to preventing a fiscal collapse after the Houthi strikes on oil facilities. This led to Alimi removing a key Islah military official in Hadramawt governorate, where STC-led protests were threatening to descend into violent clashes. The PLC’s Tareq Saleh strengthened his position as the scion of the Saleh family, leading government-backed celebrations to mark the death of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2017. The opening of Al-Mokha airport raises the importance of his UAE-backed National Resistance forces, which guard a critical section of the Red Sea coast.
Topic:
Oil, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Financial Aid
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

78. Addressing the Crushing Weight of Yemen’s Public Debt

Author:
Sana'a Center Economic Unit
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For decades prior to the ongoing conflict, Yemen had been vulnerable to recurring budget deficits due to a lack of meaningful fiscal reform, high recurrent expenditures – mainly public sector salaries and fuel subsidies – and an overdependence on oil revenues. While foreign debt obligations remained low, the debt market was poorly diversified, with treasury bill holders narrowly concentrated within the banking sector and government bonds held almost exclusively by public pension funds. The escalation of the ongoing conflict in 2015 has had a profoundly negative impact on Yemen’s debt position. Large-scale oil exports ceased, leading to a collapse in public revenues, while banks and pension funds stopped purchasing government debt instruments. Management of the public debt became bifurcated between rival central bank administrations in Aden and Sana’a, both of which suspended payments on foreign and domestic debt obligations. Unable to receive interest payments, public debt holders faced a liquidity crisis, leaving banks unable to honor customer obligations and threatening their solvency, while pension funds have struggled to support retirees. On January 25-27, 2021, senior Yemeni experts and professionals convened virtually for the 7th Development Champions Forum (DCF), as part of the Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative, to discuss the evolution and structure of Yemen’s public debt, the dynamics during the conflict that have led to its colossal expansion, and the macroeconomic risks it poses. This was followed a week later with a briefing for international stakeholders on February 2. These discussions formed the basis for the research presented in this paper and its recommendations for addressing Yemen’s public debt crisis. Addressing the Crushing Weight of Yemen’s Public Debt - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/18247
Topic:
Budget, Economy, Armed Conflict, and Public Debt
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

79. Fragmentation nation: How Europeans can help end the conflict in Yemen

Author:
Helen Lackner
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
For eight years, Yemen has suffered a civil war, whose conduct has been exacerbated by outside powers, principally Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side, while Iran has supported the other. Yemen is a politically, socially, geographically, and religiously fragmented country, including within the two broad areas controlled by the internationally recognised government and the Houthis respectively. Saudi Arabia and the UAE may soon decrease their military interference in Yemen – but their exit could expose divisions in both government and Houthi areas. Yemen was poor before the conflict, but a corrupt war economy has now taken hold, strengthening an array of local power holders, while the Yemeni people slip into ever-deeper destitution. Short-term measures introduced with the support of the international community have failed to stabilise the situation. Europeans should take a longer-term approach to Yemen. They should promote the country’s cause in their diplomacy with Gulf Arab states and make a commitment to economic support, a values-based approach, and an emphasis on human rights in Yemen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North Africa, and United Arab Emirates

80. Multifaceted Challenges: The political dimension of the physicians’ crises in the region

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Although the difficulties’ health personnel face, are quite similar to those of workers in other fields, the political dimensions of physicians ’crises in the region have increased remarkably. Medical doctors are kidnapped in some hotbeds of several Arab armed conflicts to provide treatment for some Militia members, in addition to their indirect involvement in military confrontations in Northeastern Syria through Turkey. Moreover, there is a gap between the medical syndicate and the political authorities regarding the actual number of COVID-19 cases, which was quite evident in Turkey. Medical doctors in some states of the region suffer from delayed payment of their salaries as a result of the decline in oil prices as well as the decline in the financial budgets of their countries. This leads to what is known as the ‘brain drain’, in addition to their contracting diseases such as the coronavirus due to their presence on the front lines confronting the epidemic with short medical supplies. The lives of medical doctors in some countries are endangered, as they get exposed to repeated attacks by community members due to the absence of adequate security measures. The crises of medical doctors in the region are by no means a recent phenomenon, but their features evolve according to different regional conditions and the emergence of transnational epidemics. The Middle East reflects a variety of crises that physicians are exposed to, particularly in hotbeds of tension.
Topic:
Health, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Syria