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171. Iran: The U.S. Brings Maximum Pressure to the UN

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? A U.S. resolution seeking to extend UN arms restrictions on Iran beyond their October 2020 expiration failed at the Security Council. Washington has asserted that it will claim the right to unilaterally restore UN sanctions, which were terminated as part of the 2015 nuclear agreement. Why does it matter? Any U.S. attempt to reimpose sanctions will be controversial, given the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and likely to create deadlock at the Security Council. The administration’s goal is clear: kill the deal or make it that much harder for a successor administration to rejoin it. What should be done? The remaining parties to the deal should be united in resisting Washington’s efforts, as should other Security Council members. They should essentially disregard a U.S. “snapback” – restoring sanctions – as ineffectual, obstruct attempts to implement it and discourage Iran from overreacting to what will end up being a symbolic U.S. move.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Sanctions, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

172. Calibrating the Response: Turkey’s ISIS Returnees

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Turkey has to deal with thousands of citizens who travelled to join ISIS and have now returned. Of the few convicted, many will soon be released from jail. Others are under surveillance. The fate of the rest is murky. Why does it matter? ISIS’s diminished stature and measures adopted by the Turkish authorities have spared Turkey from ISIS attacks for more than three years. But while the threat should not be overplayed, it has not necessarily disappeared. That Turkish returnees turn their back on militancy is important for national and regional security. What should be done? Ankara’s approach toward returnees or others suspected of ties to jihadism relies mostly on surveillance and detention. The government could consider also offering support for returnees’ families, alternatives for youngsters at risk of being drawn into militancy and support for returnees released after serving ISIS-related jail time.
Topic:
Human Rights, Law Enforcement, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

173. Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
With the Syrian regime’s offensive in Idlib paused, the time is now for a deal sparing the rebellion’s last stronghold the full wrath of reconquest. The parties should pursue an improved ceasefire including the regime, Russia, Turkey and the Islamist militants entrenched in the province. What’s new? A Russian-backed Syrian regime offensive against rebel-held Idlib halted when Russia and Turkey negotiated a ceasefire in March. Turkey is sending reinforcements, signalling a military response to what it deems a national security threat. For now, this step may dissuade Russia from resuming the offensive, but the standoff appears untenable. Why does it matter? Successive Russian-Turkish ceasefires in Idlib have collapsed over incompatible objectives, diverging interpretations and exclusion of the dominant rebel group, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is UN-sanctioned and considered by Russia and others a terrorist organisation. A Russian-backed regime offensive to retake Idlib likely would result in humanitarian catastrophe. What should be done? All actors should seek a more sustainable ceasefire – optimally including HTS, notwithstanding legitimate concerns about the group – that avoids the high military, political and humanitarian price of another offensive. Turkey should push HTS to continue distancing itself from transnational militancy and display greater tolerance for political and religious pluralism.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, Syrian War, Islamism, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

174. Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Federal forces now patrol Kirkuk, the diverse, oil-rich province disputed between the central and Kurdish regional governments. The arrangement is unsettling communal relations, with Kurds feeling excluded. With outside help, Baghdad and Erbil should design a joint security mechanism including a locally recruited multi-ethnic unit. What’s new? In October 2017, the Iraqi army restored central government control over the disputed Kirkuk governorate and its oil fields in the country’s north. Since then, multiple federal forces including paramilitaries have policed the area. The new arrangement reassured the province’s Arabs and Turkmen but left local Kurds feeling abandoned. Why did it happen? The federal government’s move into Kirkuk was triggered by a Kurdish independence referendum staged the previous month, which raised Baghdad’s concerns that the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil would declare Kurdish statehood and annex Kirkuk, other disputed territories and their petroleum riches. Why does it matter? Finding an equilibrium that satisfies Kirkuk’s three main ethnic groups by ensuring that none dominates the security apparatus at the others’ expense is a fundamental condition for the area’s stability. Only such a configuration will ensure peaceful coexistence and help prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State. What should be done? With international support, Baghdad and Erbil should establish joint security management in Kirkuk that includes a locally recruited multi-ethnic force under federal command. This arrangement would help protect the area from renewed insurgency, contribute to intercommunal peace and lay the foundations for an eventual settlement of Kirkuk’s status in Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Oil, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kirkuk

175. Pulling Lebanon out of the Pit

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
An uprising of unprecedented scope has rocked Lebanon as the country’s economy tumbles deeper into recession. Poverty and unemployment could lead to violent unrest. Donors should put together an emergency package but condition further aid upon reforms to tackle corruption, a major grievance driving protest. What’s new? The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Lebanon’s economy, which was already slowly imploding, has brought it to the brink of total collapse. Since October 2019, popular protests have pushed for greater accountability from an elite that, having engorged itself, seems incapable of instituting critical reforms. Why does it matter? The accumulation of crises is driving ever greater numbers of Lebanese into absolute poverty. While the lockdown is gradually easing, the loss of jobs and purchasing power triggered new protests that are turning violent and may prefigure the disintegration of state capacity and institutions. What should be done? Lebanon will need emergency external assistance to ward off the worst social consequences of the crisis. Beyond that, external actors and donors seeking to help the country exit the crisis should focus on efforts geared at rooting out corruption and clientelism.
Topic:
Corruption, Poverty, Protests, Crisis Management, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

176. The Urgent Need for a U.S.-Iran Hotline

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Naval incidents in the Gulf have spotlighted the danger that a U.S.-Iranian skirmish could blow up into war. The two sides have little ability to communicate at present. They should hasten to design a military-to-military channel to lower the chances of inadvertent conflagration. What’s new? Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have repeatedly brought the two sides to the brink of open conflict. While neither government seeks a full-fledged war, a string of dangerous tit-for-tat exchanges amid mounting hostile rhetoric underscores the potential for a bigger military clash. Why does it matter? Due to limited communication channels between Tehran and Washington, an inadvertent or accidental interaction between the two sides could quickly escalate into a broader confrontation. The risk is especially high in the Gulf, where U.S. and Iranian military vessels operate close to one another. What should be done? The U.S. and Iran should open a military de-escalation channel that fills the gap between ad hoc naval communications and high-level diplomacy at moments of acute crisis. A mechanism facilitated by a third party might contain the risk of conflict due to misread signals and miscalculation.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

177. The Middle East between Collective Security and Collective Breakdown

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
For years, Gulf powers have mulled the notion of regional dialogue to calm existing crises and head off new ones. Today, with several active Middle Eastern conflicts, all sensitive to rising U.S.-Iran tensions, it is an idea whose time has come. What’s new?* Middle East tensions spiked in the past year following attacks on oil tankers and Saudi oil facilities, the U.S. killing of a senior Iranian commander and Iranian military retaliation. Some of Washington’s allies, losing confidence the U.S. will reliably extend military protection, have started making cautious diplomatic overtures to Iran. Why does it matter? While these tentative steps toward de-escalation are welcome, they risk being inadequate, particularly in the absence of regular, high-level communication channels among potential conflict actors. Existing UN-led mechanisms for resolving individual conflicts, such as Yemen, are worthwhile but insufficient to lessen region-wide tensions. What should be done? Diplomatic efforts are needed to both de-escalate tensions and make progress toward resolving regional conflicts. Gulf actors, supported by external stakeholders, should consider launching an inclusive sub-regional dialogue aimed at reducing the risk of inadvertent conflict by opening new communication channels.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

178. Turkey Wades into Libya’s Troubled Waters

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Turkish intervention in Libya’s war stopped the besieged Tripoli government from collapsing. But fighting with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces has since escalated, threatening a protracted conflict. Both Ankara and Haftar’s regional backers should urge their allies toward a return to negotiations and a ceasefire. What’s new? In January, Turkey stepped up military support to Libya’s UN-backed government of Prime Minister Faiez Serraj, stalling an offensive by forces allied with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Its foray, underpinned by its own strategic, political and economic interests, has further complicated the already multi-layered Libyan crisis. Why does it matter? Turkey’s intervention has neither de-escalated the conflict nor yielded productive negotiations between rival political and military factions. It has instead exposed a different risk: the more outside actors provide military hardware and fighters to their respective Libyan allies, the longer the conflict may last and the deadlier it may become. What should be done? As Turkey’s intervention appears not to be producing a ceasefire or a return to negotiations, and since no outside actor is likely to back out unilaterally, Ankara should engage with other external players involved in the conflict to explore potential compromises regarding their respective interests in Libya and beyond.
Topic:
Military Intervention, Conflict, Negotiation, Crisis Management, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Libya

179. Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon have thought many times about going home but in the end deemed the risks too great. Donors should increase aid allowing the Lebanese government to continue hosting the Syrians, so that any decision they make to leave is truly voluntary. What’s new? Pressure on Syrian refugees in Lebanon to return home is rising. Although Syria remains unsafe for most, refugees are trickling back, escaping increasingly harsh conditions in Lebanon and hoping that the situation will improve back home. Procedures that clarify refugees’ legal status are making return more plausible for some. Why does it matter? While even a small number of successful repatriations represents positive news, conditions are too dangerous for mass organised returns. Yet the Syrian government and some Lebanese political factions increasingly insist that it is time for large-scale returns to begin. What should be done? Donors should plan for many refugees to stay for many years, and provide support to help Lebanon meet Syrians’ needs, ease the burden on Lebanon’s economy, and reduce friction between refugees and their Lebanese hosts. The Lebanese government can take additional administrative steps to ease voluntary returns.
Topic:
Government, Refugees, Syrian War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

180. The Spread of COVID-19 in the Middle East - Problems and Challenges

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The novel coronavirus (COVID 19) and its side-effects have transformed the contemporary world. Since the pandemic is just now starting, no one really knows what the world will be like after the virus. However, we can confidently say that there will be serious changes as a result of which our planet will no longer be what it was prior to the spread of this virus. These changes naturally concern the Middle East as well. Much like the majority of other states, Middle Eastern countries were also mostly unprepared to meet the pandemic. Many of the governments in the region could not or did not take the impending threat seriously when the virus was spreading in China. Due to this, at the initial stage many governments simply covered up or ignored the facts of the virus spreading in their countries. A little later these governments were forced to admit the existence of the problem, yet they mostly blamed their political rivals for the creation and spreading of the virus. Such an attitude was facilitated by the fact that conspiracy theories are rather popular among Middle Eastern societies and governments. Covering up and disregarding the problem later produced a boomerang effect for these countries and their citizens. Most of the Middle Eastern governments went on to introduce radical measures (closing places of prayer where mass gatherings take place). However, in many cases these measures were already too late in coming – the coronavirus had spread throughout the entire Middle East. At the same time, the spread of the virus in the Middle East is further facilitated by the faulty healthcare system, the lack of doctors, the low level of education, unending civil wars, conflicts and a large number of refugees as well as the desire of governments to hide the actual data as much as possible (for example, according to the official Syrian statistics, only one person was infected with the novel coronavirus before March 25 while the Assad regime introduced a curfew in the capital city of Damascus in order to combat the illness. According to independent sources, the novel coronavirus has already spread all over Syria and there are casualties, too). At the same time, many Middle Eastern states lack sufficient medical equipment in order to analyze and fully document persons who have contracted the virus.
Topic:
Health, Governance, COVID-19, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Middle East