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1331. Government Instability Overshadows Truce – The Yemen Review, July 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and the Southern Transitional Council boiled over in Shabwa in July, as political disputes over security posts devolved into clashes between their affiliated forces. Government efforts to assuage the parties were unsuccessful, setting the stage for a battle over the capital, Ataq city, in early August. The Shabwa tensions overshadowed agreement on a two-month extension of the UN-brokered truce between the government and the armed Houthi movement, though sporadic violations continued. A proposed six-month extension fell apart over disagreements on road reopenings, air travel and payment of public sector salaries. The Presidential Leadership Council announced a cabinet reshuffle at the end of the month, replacing the heads of four ministries. The new appointees were all southerners, approved by the STC, in a nod to the substantial power wielded by the movement. The government also appointed new governors of Hadramawt and Socotra; the latter is the STC’s top man on the island. Meanwhile, Houthi authorities continued to profit handsomely from the exorbitant cost of fuel in areas they control while also attempting to convince consumers that the Saudi-led coalition is to blame for sky-high prices at the pump.
Topic:
Leadership, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

1332. Showdown in Shabwa Shakes Government – The Yemen Review, August 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and UAE-backed groups in Shabwa erupted into open conflict in August, with the Giants Brigades and STC-aligned Shabwa Defense forces driving Islah-aligned military and security forces from the governorate. The expulsion of Islah from Shabwa and the STC’s subsequent takeover of much of neighboring Abyan governorate raised questions about the ability of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to resolve tensions between anti-Houthi parties and the nature of any future peace deal. Despite being extended on August 2, the UN-brokered truce between the government and the Houthi movement saw its first major violation later in the month when Houthi forces attempted to take control of the last major government-controlled road out of Taiz city, prompting widespread international condemnation and the government’s withdrawal from UN-facilitated talks in Amman. Although the pledged Saudi-Emirati financial aid to the government remains stalled, the exchange rate in government-held territory has remained relatively stable, with the rial even appreciating somewhat following PLC head Rashad al-Alimi’s visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in the middle of the month. Despite this, and news of the resumption of grain shipments from Ukraine under a UN-backed deal, issues remain around food price affordability and fuel availability.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

1333. Truce Expires as Internal Divisions Deepen – The Yemen Review, October 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The truce between the internationally recognized government and the armed Houthi movement, in place since April, was allowed to expire without renewal on October 2. The UN-facilitated agreement engineered the longest period of relative peace of the war. September saw intensive negotiations to extend and expand the truce, and optimism was high throughout the month, but talks broke down when the Houthis made an eleventh-hour demand for the payment of additional military salaries. Efforts to revive the agreement continue, and talks continue over public sector salaries, the reopening of roads, and flights out of Sana’a airport. There was no major resumption of hostilities after the truce expired, though low-level clashes remain frequent. The Southern Transitional Council continues to expand its control in the south. Following last month’s battle for Shabwa, the group has begun a nominally counter-terrorist campaign against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Abyan, and has engineered demonstrations and protests again the presence of Islah-affiliated forces in Hadramawt. Yemen’s dual currencies remained stable over the course of the month. The government continued its efforts to secure a long-promised funding package from UAE and Saudi Arabia, though the latter has now renewed an agreement to provide fuel for Yemen’s power plants. A fuel crisis in Houthi territory brought recriminations from both sides but was averted with the import of additional supplies. Seasonal rains in Yemen continue to cause massive flooding, which claimed a number of lives this month. The UN announced that it has secured enough pledged funds to begin the salvage of the FSO Safer, a deteriorating oil storage vessel posing a massive environmental risk in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Currency, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Weather
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

1334. Houthis Target Southern Ports – The Yemen Review, October 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The UN-backed truce between the Houthi movement and the internationally recognized government was allowed to expire on October 2. Efforts to secure its further extension failed following a last-minute demand by Houthi negotiators to add military and security personnel to a payroll of public sector employees. The breakdown of the talks was followed by mutual recriminations, even as Saudi Arabia and the Houthis exchanged delegations on October 14, ostensibly to visit prisoners of war and discuss an exchange. Later in the month, the Houthis targeted two oil ports on Yemen’s southern coast with drones, striking the port of Nushayma in Shabwa on October 18-19 and the port of Al-Dabba in Hadramawt on October 21. The drone attacks followed warnings by senior Houthi official Mahdi al-Mashat that foreign energy companies were “looting Yemen’s sovereign wealth” and should cease operations. Though the facilities were undamaged, the attacks have disrupted exports as foreign ships stay away from Yemen’s coast. On October 31, Canadian oil producer Calvalley Petroleum Ltd. announced a suspension of oil production at Block 9 in Hadramawt due to the “current extremely challenging situation” and a lack of oil storage capacity. In response to the Houthi drone attacks, the government’s National Defense Council officially designated the Houthi movement a terrorist organization on October 23. It is unclear what ramifications the designation will have, as the government currently lacks a mechanism with which to enforce compliance. Saudi Arabia has privately urged caution to prevent derailing ongoing peace talks.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Drones, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Port
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

1335. Govt Agrees Financial Aid as Houthis Target Oil Sector – The Yemen Review, November 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Hopes faded that the expired truce would be revived in November, as Houthi authorities dug in their heels over maximalist demands that caused the talks’ collapse and then upped the ante with a series of drone and missile attacks on southern ports. The attacks crippled oil and gas revenues, though International Monetary Fund, Saudi, and Emirati support has given the government the lifeline it needs for now. Following the international financial agreements, the government-run Central Bank of Yemen in Aden moved to increase its oversight of banking data. Though there has been no return to full-scale war, intense if low-level clashes were seen in Taiz, Lahj, and Hudaydah. Reports persisted of back-channel Houthi-Saudi talks, but they appear to have stalled for now over Houthi demands for salary payments. The talks could become problematic for the government if they go beyond the question of the truce and extend to a unilateral settlement, which would be contrary to its interests. Divisions continued to wrack the Presidential Leadership Council, whose head Rashad al-Alimi was the sole member to spend significant time in Aden when he returned in early December after a regional tour that included Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. The STC-Islah dispute, which has been at the heart of PLC wrangling, eased up slightly under UAE and Saudi pressure as their priority shifts to preventing a fiscal collapse after the Houthi strikes on oil facilities. This led to Alimi removing a key Islah military official in Hadramawt governorate, where STC-led protests were threatening to descend into violent clashes. The PLC’s Tareq Saleh strengthened his position as the scion of the Saleh family, leading government-backed celebrations to mark the death of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2017. The opening of Al-Mokha airport raises the importance of his UAE-backed National Resistance forces, which guard a critical section of the Red Sea coast.
Topic:
Oil, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Financial Aid
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

1336. Addressing the Crushing Weight of Yemen’s Public Debt

Author:
Sana'a Center Economic Unit
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For decades prior to the ongoing conflict, Yemen had been vulnerable to recurring budget deficits due to a lack of meaningful fiscal reform, high recurrent expenditures – mainly public sector salaries and fuel subsidies – and an overdependence on oil revenues. While foreign debt obligations remained low, the debt market was poorly diversified, with treasury bill holders narrowly concentrated within the banking sector and government bonds held almost exclusively by public pension funds. The escalation of the ongoing conflict in 2015 has had a profoundly negative impact on Yemen’s debt position. Large-scale oil exports ceased, leading to a collapse in public revenues, while banks and pension funds stopped purchasing government debt instruments. Management of the public debt became bifurcated between rival central bank administrations in Aden and Sana’a, both of which suspended payments on foreign and domestic debt obligations. Unable to receive interest payments, public debt holders faced a liquidity crisis, leaving banks unable to honor customer obligations and threatening their solvency, while pension funds have struggled to support retirees. On January 25-27, 2021, senior Yemeni experts and professionals convened virtually for the 7th Development Champions Forum (DCF), as part of the Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative, to discuss the evolution and structure of Yemen’s public debt, the dynamics during the conflict that have led to its colossal expansion, and the macroeconomic risks it poses. This was followed a week later with a briefing for international stakeholders on February 2. These discussions formed the basis for the research presented in this paper and its recommendations for addressing Yemen’s public debt crisis. Addressing the Crushing Weight of Yemen’s Public Debt - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/18247
Topic:
Budget, Economy, Armed Conflict, and Public Debt
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

1337. Fragmentation nation: How Europeans can help end the conflict in Yemen

Author:
Helen Lackner
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
For eight years, Yemen has suffered a civil war, whose conduct has been exacerbated by outside powers, principally Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side, while Iran has supported the other. Yemen is a politically, socially, geographically, and religiously fragmented country, including within the two broad areas controlled by the internationally recognised government and the Houthis respectively. Saudi Arabia and the UAE may soon decrease their military interference in Yemen – but their exit could expose divisions in both government and Houthi areas. Yemen was poor before the conflict, but a corrupt war economy has now taken hold, strengthening an array of local power holders, while the Yemeni people slip into ever-deeper destitution. Short-term measures introduced with the support of the international community have failed to stabilise the situation. Europeans should take a longer-term approach to Yemen. They should promote the country’s cause in their diplomacy with Gulf Arab states and make a commitment to economic support, a values-based approach, and an emphasis on human rights in Yemen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North Africa, and United Arab Emirates

1338. Don’t Fear Vacuums: It’s Safe To Go Home

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran,” President Biden said this July in defense of his administration’s continued commitment to the Middle East.1 His comments reflect a widely held misconception: that a U.S. military exit from the Middle East would empower U.S. adversaries, and thus somehow make Americans less secure.2 U.S. leaders and pundits have expressed similar fears about the danger of creating vacuums by leaving Syria, Afghanistan (before U.S. exit of course), and even Africa, where only smatterings of U.S. troops are stationed.3 Vacuum fears also fuel more general warnings against surrendering influence in the developing world. Chinese investments via its Belt and Road Initiative—a massive set of infrastructure-development loans—for example, are said to exploit a vacuum the United States should compete to fill. Chinese trade in South America, or Russian port calls there, are said to reflect a failure to exert U.S. influence.4 The burgeoning idea behind these claims is that “great power competition,” which once seemed a useful rationale for exiting conflicts and lingering endeavors of the global war on terror, demands winning an open-ended, ill-defined contest for influence with Russia and China in the greater Middle East and developing world, or what is now sometimes called the global south.5 Vacuums that could be said to follow a U.S. exit—not the terrorists or insurgents U.S. forces were deployed to fight—are the new justification for staying.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

1339. Post-Kemalism and the Future of Turkish Governance – Nicholas Danforth

Author:
Nicholas Danforth
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Disillusionment with Erdoğan and the AKP after 2013 has reshaped the study of Turkish politics and history, leading scholars to focus on new themes and new periods. Comparative approaches, political economy and a newfound interest in the Cold War have offered a more nuanced understanding of Turkish authoritarianism. Post-Kemalism remain more popular in the U.S. and Europe than in Turkey.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1340. Turkey’s 2023 Election: Which Candidates Can Defeat Erdoğan at the Polls?

Author:
İştar Gözaydın and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Turkey will go to the polls at the latest in June 2023 to elect both the President and the parliament. These elections could bring to an end the period in which the AKP has ruled by means of various unofficial coalitions. The 2019 municipal elections also showed that it was possible for the opposition to defeat authoritarian regimes through elections, thereby showing voters how essential it was for them to join forces. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to be playing all his cards to win this election, which should come as no surprise, given that he is both a shrewd politician and an ‘election machine’. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has advantages, but also disadvantages that put him in the weakest position of all the current candidates. This has been confirmed by multiple polls. Ekrem Imamoglu’s judicial conviction on 14 December 2022, and the fact that this verdict paves the way for his ban from politics, has completely changed his candidacy case. Mansur Yavaş’s nationalist background, and the fact that he still uses former MHP cadres in the staff of the municipality, may cause the Kurdish political movement to maintain distance from him if he is a candidate. Turkey’s 2023 election depends on what the οpposition does to anticipate the moves Erdoğan makes to stay in power.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East