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81. The EU-Turkey Visa Liberalization Saga: Lessons from the European Neighborhood

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Ayşe Tuba Uslu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
This policy paper co-authored by Ioannis Grigoriadis, Senior Research Fellow of ELIAMEP and Head of its Turkey Programme, and Ayşe Tuba Uslu, Senior at the Department of International Relations of Bilkent University, lays out the main challenges for the successful conclusion of the Visa Liberalization Dialogue (VLD) between the European Union and Turkey. It examines the impact of democratic backsliding, the decline of the rule of law, fundamental rights and divergence in the legal framework regarding organized crime and anti-terrorism on the VLD and highlights the mistrust that has developed between the parties. Through a comparison between Ukrainian, Georgian, Moldovan and Turkish VLDs, it aims to highlight how the VLD could come to a successful conclusion.
Topic:
Human Rights, Migration, Rule of Law, Visa, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Middle East, Georgia, and Mediterranean

82. Will the EU’s positive agenda on Turkey amount to anything more than wishful thinking?

Author:
Amanda Paul
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
One year on, it remains to be seen whether the EU’s positive agenda (PA), an effort to establish a new modus vivendi with Turkey, will bear fruit. Turkey is one of the EU’s most important neighbours and a crucial partner on numerous issues, including migration, counterterrorism, energy and trade. Yet relations have always been challenging, with honeymoon periods few and far between. Bickering and animosity have become the norm. In 2020, escalating disputes in areas from human rights to maritime claims and military interventions brought the relations to a major crisis. Looking ahead, Ankara’s domestic and foreign policy ahead of crucial elections in 2023 (or earlier), the Cyprus problem, Germany’s leadership change, the 2022 French presidential election and Paris taking over the EU Council Presidency will all impact relations. Amanda Paul gives a concise state of play of EU-Turkey relations, what we can expect and what should be avoided, and areas for improvement. While Turkish membership of the EU seems highly unlikely, neither Ankara nor the EU is ready to call it quits. With no functioning accession process, EU–Turkey relations need a new framework that reduces the chances of further rupture and creates a new dynamic. Implementing the PA should be the starting point of this framework. In which case, the EU should consider the following four recommendations: green-light the talks to update the Customs Union; enhance migration dialogue; continue support for Turkish civil society and independent journalism; and revitalise foreign policy dialogue. 2022 will likely be a testing year. If the two parties are to move away from years of distrust and muddling through, they will have to exhibit political will and acquire a truly strategic vision for the future.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Migration, European Union, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Mediterranean

83. Turkey-Greece: From Maritime Brinkmanship to Dialogue

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In mid-2020, Turkey and Greece put their Mediterranean fleets on high alert, dramatically raising tensions in their long-running dispute over air, water, rock and now seabed gas deposits as well. Talks have been frustrating but remain the best way to contain the risk of conflict.
Topic:
Maritime Commerce, Territorial Disputes, Water, Maritime, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Greece, and Mediterranean

84. A Limited Partnership: Russia-China Relations in the Mediterranean

Author:
Jim Townsend, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, David Shullman, and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The last several years have seen a worrisome increase in tensions in the Mediterranean involving age-old rivals such as Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, as well as increased involvement from newer players like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and China, or returning players in the case of Russia. Many analysts have noted an increase in power struggles between some of these actors in the region. It is against this backdrop of competition that observers have questioned whether the Mediterranean will become a new arena for increased collaboration between China and Russia. In the last several years, the two countries have increased their presence and influence in the Mediterranean, creating opportunities for growing cooperation at odds with U.S. interests and objectives in the region. As the authors have argued in previous CNAS research, the increasing depth of Russia and China’s partnership creates challenges for U.S. interests and increases the risk that both countries pose to the United States. For this reason, the United States should not write off Russia-China relations as just an uncomfortable or unnatural partnership. But nor should Washington seek to counter their cooperation in every dimension of their partnership or compete intensely in every region.1 The alignment between Russia and China presents a comprehensive challenge; addressing it will require policymakers to prioritize and address their cooperation in the areas likely to pose the greatest threats to U.S. interests, and conversely, avoid focusing on areas of lesser concern. The Mediterranean is a region where U.S. policymakers should not overstate the potential for Russia-China cooperation, nor the significance of the implications of their partnership. As Russia and China have increased their activities in the Mediterranean, they have done so largely through parallel and complementary efforts, rather than explicit cooperation. Russia and China share an interest in dividing the European Union and NATO and increasing their own image and influence in the region, especially at the expense of the United States’ influence. However, the Mediterranean is not a priority for Russia or China; the two countries have divergent priorities in the region, and they pursue these priorities differently, limiting the common ground for active engagement between them. Russia has prioritized its security presence and relationships, while Beijing is focused on advancing its economic interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Mediterranean

85. Post-Covid-19 EU-Southern Neighbourhood Trade Relations

Author:
Katarzyna Sidlo, Esmat Mostafa Kamel, Hussein Suleiman, and Guillaume Van der Loo
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) is a key trade partner, both in terms of goods and services, for the countries in its Southern Neighbourhood (SN): Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestine,[1] Jordan and Lebanon.[2] The economic (and otherwise) relationship between the two partners is governed by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs), which came into force from the early to mid-2000s. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has, however, affected the trade exchange between the two, just as it has an adverse impact on trade globally. As pointed out in the second chapter of this policy study, one of the sectors of great importance to both the EU and the SN is agri-foods. Despite a general drop in merchandise trade, the agri-food exports from the EU actually increased globally by 0.5% during the first 10 months of the pandemic compared to the same period the year before, up to €151.8 billion. In the case of the SN, exports of agri-foods during the first three quarters of 2020 (year-on-year) grew particularly strongly in the case of Morocco (27.2%) and Algeria (20.3%) and decreased most visibly in the case of Lebanon (-37.9%). As for exports from the EU to the SN, during the same period a particularly impressive growth was witnessed in the case of Tunisia (40.3%) but the value of agri-food imports of Morocco also went up (8.4%). Trade in services, as analysed in chapter three, was hit more severely than trade in goods and declined significantly in all countries in the region during the first months of the pandemic. For Morocco, for instance, during the first three quarters of 2020 it plummeted by almost 60% (year-on-year). Because of lockdowns and travel bans, the tourism sector was among the hardest hit, even though the countries in the SN are mostly visited by travellers from nearby markets: the SN region or Europe – in 2019 the latter constituted between 29.4% (Tunisia) and 68.2% (Morocco) of all arrivals (after excluding nationals of SN countries who live abroad). As a result, tourism revenues plummeted (in Palestine, for instance, by an estimated 68%) and a significant number of people were made redundant; before the pandemic, between just under 6% (Algeria and Israel) and nearly 20% (Lebanon) of all (formally employed) workers were employed in the travel and tourism sector. The disturbances outlined above have adversely impacted food security in the region, as initial data presented in chapter four suggests. While isolating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on food security is difficult, as many other factors – such as bad harvest due to weather conditions in Morocco – were in play in 2020, the pandemic clearly affected both supply of and demand for foodstuffs. Some countries were more affected than others, as has already been mentioned above in the case of agri-food trade with the EU. At the same time, the impact on food security within the countries was also far from homogenous, with refugees (e.g., due to loss of work in informal sector) and poorer households – spending a bigger share of domestic budget on increasingly more expensive food products – more often forced to adopt emergency livelihood coping strategies, such as limitation of daily calory intake. Looking towards the post-COVID-19 trade relations, as outlined in chapter one of this study, the EU’s post-pandemic recovery plans and trade strategy review offer a new momentum for the SN countries to strengthen and modernise their framework for trade relations with the EU, to capitalise on potential re-shoring and near-shoring trends in EU and global value chains, and to promote (intra-) regional economic integration. However, the envisaged Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) currently under negotiation with Tunisia and Morocco may not be the most realistic option at this stage. A more gradual approach based on sectoral agreements could be adopted in the short- to medium-term instead, leading to a DCFTA-like model of trade integration. Moreover, in order to strengthen the (intra-)regional economic and value chain integration, modernisation of the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Convention should remain a priority. Finally, the modernisation of EU-SN trade relations should be linked and integrated into the broader (and longer-term) plans for EU-Africa trade relations, with an eye on the “continent-to-continent Free Trade Area” in the long run. Internally, governments in the SN should prioritise development of high productivity service sectors and work towards curbing their reliance on tourism and transportation. In order to achieve that goal, improving the quality of their institutions is as important as upgrading telecommunications infrastructure or adopting incentives such as tax breaks. More broadly, speeding up digital transformation would both facilitate servicification and reduce costs associated with merchandise trade.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

86. A Euro-Mediterranean Green Deal? Towards A Green Economy In The Southern Mediterranean

Author:
Julia Choucair Vizoso
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The transition to a green economy requires nothing short of a major, structural transformation of economic models, domestic and global. The scale and pace of the change needed and the high level of uncertainty require bold commitments, cooperation, innovation and experimentation across sectors, stakeholders and countries – a fierce challenge for the globe, well beyond the shores of the Mediterranean. Each chapter in this study includes domain-specific and country- specific findings and proposes recommendations on how to accelerate the green economy in the particular context. Due to the social, economic and political heterogeneity in the region, it is obvious that a “one size fits all” solution is not suitable. Nonetheless, common findings and recommendations do emerge across the case studies.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Green Technology, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

87. Central Banks at the Frontline of the COVID-19 crisis: Weathering the Storm, Spurring the Recovery. A View from the Mediterranean Countries

Author:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
On 28 June 2021, the Banco de España, the Central Bank of Tunisia, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), organised the VI Conference of Mediterranean Central Banks. After the success of the last five Conferences held in Barcelona (2014, 2017), Rabat (2015), Tunis (2018) and Madrid (2019), this sixth edition counted with the first-ever participation of 10 Central Banks from the Mediterranean region, which were represented by their Governors, and the presence of high-level representatives of the European Central Bank. With the aim to foster a comprehensive dialogue on the economic and financial situation of the Mediterranean region, this VI Conference allowed organisers and participants to take a very important step forward in the ambition to strengthen cooperation ties and enhance knowledge-sharing among partner Mediterranean central banks, which is of outmost importance especially in times of crisis.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Finance, and Banking
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

88. Socioeconomic Impacts of Climate Change in the Mediterranean

Author:
Octavi Quintana
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The Mediterranean Basin enjoys very at- tractive geographical, climatic, and cultural features. It hosts a high-density population mainly in the coastal areas, of over 500 million people which has doubled in the last 40 years, and it is still increasing at a high pace. The region faces severe threats including water stress, impaired food production, food security, desertification, severe pollution to mention just a few. These threats have been exacerbated in the last decades by increased demography, migration to urban areas, tourism (the first tourist destination in the world), and very importantly, climate change. The Mediterranean suffers from an increase of temperature 20% higher than the world average. It is a real hotspot of climate change. The present monography, sponsored by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), addresses the socioeconomic impact of climate change. There are a lot of studies on the biophysical impact of climate change. Its socioeconomic impact has been less studied probably because of its complexity. Important knowledge gaps do exist. The purpose of gathering knowledge on the socioeconomic impact of climate change is to advise decision-makers on the difficult decisions to be taken to mitigate and adapt to climate change in a region facing severe threats that climate change only exacerbates. For decision-makers, the socioeconomic impact is more relevant than the biophysical impact of climate change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Pollution, and Socioeconomics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

89. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

90. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean