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11. UN Human Rights Council Elections for 2020-2022 and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
Today the UN General Assembly elected Armenia, Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Namibia, Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sudan and Venezuela to the Human Rights Council (HRC) for the 2020-2022 term. With the elections of Germany, Japan, Marshall Islands, Netherlands and Republic of Korea, 20 of the 47 Council members during 2020 will also be members of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect in Geneva.
Topic:
Human Rights, Ethnic Cleansing, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:
Japan, Sudan, Indonesia, Poland, Libya, Brazil, Germany, Armenia, United Nations, Venezuela, Korea, Netherlands, Mauritania, Namibia, and Marshall Islands

12. Arms Monitoring in Guinea: A Survey of National Forensic Services

Author:
André Desmarais
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Forensic science institutions have a key role to play—not only in criminal investigations, but also in the broader fight against illicit arms proliferation. However, their ability to play this role depends on their capacities, which are not well understood. A Briefing Paper (originally published in French) on the forensic services in Guinea aims to fill this gap. Building on previous case studies on forensic services in Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, Arms Monitoring in Guinea: A Survey of National Forensic Services by ballistics specialist André Desmarais—co-published by INTERPOL and the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—examines capabilities, limitations, and needs of Guinea’s forensic services. It finds that information on calibres, models, and ammunition types of seized weapons is limited, and that the country lacks a central firearms database. Based on this analysis, the study provides tailored suggestions for areas of improvement, as a way to support Guinea in significantly reducing illicit arms flows.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Crime, and Forensic Science
Political Geography:
Africa, Chad, Guinea, Mauritania, and Niger

13. August 2018 Issue

Author:
Florian Flade, Paul Cruickshank, Matt Levitt, Geoff D. Porter, Jason Warner, and Charlotte Hulme
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Concern is rising over the threat of chemical and biological terror. Last month, the British newspaper The Sunday Times reported that staff at soccer stadiums in the United Kingdom were being advised on how to respond to attacks using poison gas and hazardous substances following concerns that Islamic State-inspired extremists may seek to carry out such attacks on crowded venues. There are signs the group is seeking to export expertise built up in Syria and Iraq. Last summer, an alleged terrorist cell based in Sydney that was in communication with a senior Islamic State controller allegedly plotted to build a poison gas dispersion device to potentially attack crowded places in Australia. As Florian Flade reports in our feature article, this past June, German authorities allegedly thwarted a ricin attack by a Tunisian extremist being advised on how to make the biological agent by an Islamic State-linked operative overseas. Before he was arrested, he was allegedly able to produce a significant quantity of ricin. A threshold had allegedly been crossed. Never before has a jihadi terrorist in the West successfully made the toxin. Our interview this month is with Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, who previously led U.K. and NATO efforts to counter CBRN threats. He warns the huge disruption caused by the “Novichok” attack in Salisbury earlier this year may inspire jihadi terrorists to launch bio-chem attacks. He argues the better informed and prepared the public and emergency responders are, the less likely such attacks will lead to large-scale panic. In late June, European security agencies thwarted a plot allegedly orchestrated by an Iranian diplomat to bomb an Iranian opposition conference near Paris attended by Newt Gingrich, Rudy Giuliani, and 4,000 others. Matthew Levitt outlines how Iranian agents have used diplomatic cover to plot terrorist attacks in Europe over the past several decades. Geoff Porter looks at the terrorist threats facing Mauritania. Jason Warner and Charlotte Hulme provide best estimates for the numerical strength of the nine Islamic State groupings active in Africa. This month, we mourn the loss of Ambassador Michael Sheehan, who worked tirelessly throughout his professional life to protect the United States from terrorism. As the former Distinguished Chair and current Senior Fellow of the Combating Terrorism Center, he inspired a new generation of military leaders and researchers and was a strong champion of this publication. He will be greatly missed.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, and Mauritania

14. A Year after the Start of the Saudi-Emirati Blockade against Qatar. What Are the Consequences for West Africa?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On June 5th 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar and agreed to isolate the Emirate via an air and land blockade. These countries decided to punish Qatar under the pretext of a speech the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, would have made on May 23rd, which reiterated the strong ties between his country and Iran.[1] The situation has been at a deadlock for a year, and Qatar refuses to apply the Emirati and Saudi Arabian list of the 13 demands. The latter mainly include the closure of the Al Jazeera TV station and the Turkish military base on its territory, downgrading diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as a total separation with movements such as Hezbollah or even the Muslim Brotherhood.[2] However, although this crisis only pits Persian Gulf countries against each other, apart from Egypt, both sides have tried to win support. Donald Trump has adopted the stance of the Saudi-Emirati side[3] – but the State Department under Rex Tillerson (2017-2018) has always remained cautious –, Europe remains neutral with no leader daring to choose one side rather than another. The confrontation was particularly marked in West Africa. Four countries in this area – Senegal, Mauritania, Chad and Niger – quickly downgraded their diplomatic relations with Qatar shortly after the start of the crisis. However, their strategy vis-à-vis this wealthy gas Emirate has changed considerably over the last twelve months, as Doha's efforts to obtain new support in the rest of West Africa has started to bear fruit.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, West Africa, Senegal, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Gulf Nations

15. There and Back Again: On the Diffusion of Immigration Detention

Author:
Michael T. Flynn
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
From Mexico to the Bahamas, Mauritania to Lebanon, Turkey to Saudi Arabia, South Africa to Indonesia, Malaysia to Thailand, immigration-related detention has become an established policy apparatus that counts on dedicated facilities and burgeoning institutional bureaucracies. Until relatively recently, however, detention appears to have been largely an ad hoc tool, employed mainly by wealthy states in exigent circumstances. This paper uses concepts from diffusion theory to detail the history of key policy events in several important immigration destination countries that led to the spreading of detention practices during the last 30 years and assesses some of the motives that appear to have encouraged this phenomenon. The paper also endeavors to place the United States at the center of this story because its policy decisions appear to have played an important role in encouraging the process of policy innovation, imitation, and imposition that has helped give rise to today's global immigration detention phenomenon. Nevertheless, many US offshore practices have not received nearly the same attention as those of other important destination countries. More broadly, in telling this story, this paper seeks to flesh out some of the larger policy implications of the externalization of immigration control regimes. Just as offshore interdiction and detention schemes raise important questions about custody, accountability, and sovereignty, they should also spur questions over where responsibility for the wellbeing of migrants begins and ends.
Topic:
Sovereignty
Political Geography:
United States, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Mexico, and Mauritania

16. Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions

Author:
Mathurin C. Houngnikpo
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
A spate of military coups from 2008 to 2010 in Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, and Madagascar raised the specter of a return to military rule in Africa. While the subsequent resumption of civilian government in Guinea and Niger has reduced these concerns, evidence of military influence in politics remains widespread across the continent. This is prominently in view in Egypt where, in the midst of political transition, the military is attempting to maintain a privileged role for itself despite the widespread demands for genuine democratic reform.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Politics, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Africa, Egypt, Guinea, and Mauritania

17. EU engagement in the Sahel: lessons from Somalia and AfPak

Author:
Damien Helly
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
On 19 November, the Council of the EU welcomed the Crisis Management Concept for a possible EU training mission for Mali, paving the way for the launch of a CSDP operation replicating the work done in Uganda with Somali troops. And many in Brussels have started to speak of EUTM Mali, as if EUTM and more generally the EU approach to the crisis in Somalia was a relevant model for action in Mali.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Terrorism, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Uganda, Afghanistan, Africa, Europe, Somalia, Mali, and Mauritania

18. The Drivers of Insecurity in Mauritania

Author:
Anouar Boukhars
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The trans-Saharan region is emerging as a hotbed of instability and insecurity. A confluence of forces, from the revolts in North Africa and the proliferation of weapons to transnational trafficking of illicit goods and terrorist activity led by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, are generating acute interest in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Islam, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Arabia, North Africa, and Mauritania

19. Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania

Author:
Cédric Jourde
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Until recently, the Sahel (as-Sahil), literally the “shore” of the Saharan “sea,” rarely made headlines. Nevertheless, the expanding nexus of illicit trafficking and transnational Islamist terrorism—and the increasingly serious risk this poses to stability in the region and to international security—is attracting growing attention. These concerns will likely mount as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attempts to use the window of opportunity presented by the Arab Spring to reestablish itself in North Africa while transitional governments there devote much of their energy to rebuilding state institutions. In turn, an unstable North Africa, especially Libya, could further exacerbate insecurity in the Sahel as unsecured weapons and trained mercenaries filter their way into the region.
Topic:
Security, Crime, and Narcotics Trafficking
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, Arabia, and Mauritania

20. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Implications for Algeria's Regional and International Relations

Author:
Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Rebranded in 2007, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the latest incarnation of Algerian radical Islamism. Initially focused on attacks with great political resonance against Algerian governmental and military targets, the group has progressively shifted its priorities, alongside its geographical and operational features. In the past few years, the countries of the Sahel region (Mauritania, Malì, Niger, Chad) have been increasingly affected by AQIM's actions. This geographical shift was the result both of a weakening of AQIM within Algeria, due to the tough counter-terrorist measures adopted by the regime, and of the "business opportunities" and the wider operational freedom offered by the Sahelian environment. The aim of this paper is to briefly address a series of questions concerning AQIM's "Sahelization" and its consequences for Algerian foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Islam
Political Geography:
Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania