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1. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda is expected to be re-elected

Author:
Corinne Deloy
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 12 May, Lithuanians will go to the polls for the 1st round of the presidential election. The outgoing head of state, Gitanas Nauseda, is running for re-election. Among his main rivals is Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte (Union of Fatherland-Christian Democrats, TS-LKD). The two candidates already faced each other in the 2nd round of the previous presidential election on 12 and 26 May 2019. 6 other candidates are in the running for this election. If none of them receives more than 50% +1 vote on 12 May, a 2nd round will be held on 26 May.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe and Lithuania

2. Assessing Success Through Party Label Durability: A Comparative Study of the Democratic Party of Albania and the Homeland Union of Lithuania

Author:
Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This study provided a theoretical framework explaining center-right opposition parties’ evolution in former Eastern Europe. It answered why post-communist center-right parties lacked consistent success and either became marginalized, altered their ideologies, or ceased to exist in the long run. By taking the Democratic Party of Albania as one of the exceptions to the rule and comparing it to the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats, we showed the discrepancy with much of the other center-right parties. We followed a most different systems design, where the dominant center-right party of Albania and the dominant one in Lithuania were compared. Although much different in history, political culture, and institutions, they had similar successful trajectories as dominant center-right parties. We argued that the success of these parties depends upon the durability of party labels as a critical determinant of a party’s success historically, which takes priority over party strategy, mobilization power, social base, and the behavior of the center-right party toward political institutions. Overall, we emphasized party labels as cues of party identification and success.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Lithuania, and Albania

3. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

4. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will spend much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region? Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Security Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Netherlands, Iceland, and Baltic States

5. From “Forward ­Presence” to ­“Forward Defense”: Germany Must Strengthen ­NATO’s Northeastern Flank in Lithuania

Author:
Aylin Matlé
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Issues of deterrence and defense along NATO’s northeastern flank have been a greater focus of NATO members since the ­Russian attack on Ukraine began. Particularly in the Baltic States, there is a determination to protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory against a possible Russian attack. To prevent such a ­scenario, NATO is making military adjustments to which Germany will have to increase its contribution.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, and Germany

6. Industrial Policy for a New Growth Model: A Toolbox for EU-CEE Countries

Author:
Alexandra Bykova, Rumen Dobrinsky, Richard Grieveson, Maciej J. Grodzicki, and Doris Hanzl-Weiss
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
The EU member states of Central Eastern Europe (EU-CEE) have experienced rapid convergence in the decades following their EU accession, and have built up strong export-oriented manufacturing sectors boosted by foreign direct investment inflows. While this growth model has brought many positives, there are indications that it is hitting its limits. Endogenous limits to EU-CEE’s growth model are exacerbated by exogenous challenges of the ‘twin’ (green and digital) transitions, and the fallout of the pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine. This reinforces the imperative for EU-CEE to transition to a more innovation-driven, new growth model, enabled by a comprehensive industrial policy. However, the EU-CEE countries have not only lacked a stable and strategic approach to industrial policy in their development paths, but also find themselves in a unique position due to EU membership. As a result, innovation and industrial policies are underdeveloped in the region. Based on an in-depth analysis of the industrial landscape and the industrial policy environment of the region, we propose eight pillars for creating a EU-CEE version of the entrepreneurial state.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Czechia

7. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

8. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

9. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

10. The Sino-Lithuanian Crisis: Going beyond the Taiwanese Representative Office Issue

Author:
Konstantinas Andrijauskas
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The year 2021 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Lithuania. Instead of commemorative events and customary lofty rhetoric, the bilateral relationship rapidly plunged to a level rarely seen in either country’s foreign policies since the end of the Cold War. Sino-Lithuanian relations remain de facto downgraded to the level of chargé d’affaires, Lithuania’s physical embassy in Beijing is empty, while the southernmost Baltic state continues to withstand China’s multidimensional campaign of diplomatic, discursive and, most importantly, economic pressure. The principal cause behind this diplomatic crisis was the opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in mid-November 2021. This Briefing will argue, however, that there were other important reasons behind the current state of affairs that had been accumulating over the course of two years. The opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in mid-November 2021 triggered an unprecedented diplomatic crisis between the People’s Republic of China and Lithuania. China resorted to massive economic coercion measures to pressure Vilnius, such as the freezing of bilateral trade. European multinational companies also reported that Beijing blocked their exports because of Lithuanian components in their products. In late January 2022, the European Union (EU) launched a case at the World Trade Organization against China over discriminatory trade practices against Lithuania. The current crisis must be understood in the broader context of the degradation of the relations between China and Lithuania, but also the EU, since 2019. As such, this crisis is symptomatic of the developing trend in the relationship between the EU and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and WTO
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania