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241. Strategic Pretence or Strategic Defence? Britain, France and the Common Security and Defence Policy after Libya

Author:
Julian Lindley-French
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With British and French aircraft undertaking most of the air operations over Libya and some fiftyfive years on from the Suez debacle, historical irony abounds. On November 2 2010, London and Paris agreed the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty1 (see box below). On the face of it the accord is by and large military-technical: to develop co-operation between British and French Armed Forces, to promote the sharing and pooling of materials and equipment including through mutual interdependence, and leading to the building of joint facilities. This it is hoped will promote mutual access to each other's defence markets, through the promotion of industrial and technological co-operation. But what has the treaty to do with the European Union (EU) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)? Does the treaty mark the first step on the road to regalvanising Europe's strategic defence or is it simply the strategic pretence of two aging, failing powers unable to accept a world that has moved on?
Topic:
NATO, Democratization, Regime Change, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Britain, France, Libya, Arabia, and North Africa

242. Bosnia: Crisis Averted?

Author:
Kenneth Morrison
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
While the ghosts of the 1992-95 Bosnian war have been invoked by political elites in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries as a justification for the need to provide humanitarian intervention in Libya, the political situation in Bosnia barely merited mention. Indeed, while the focus has been fixed on the events in the Middle East and North Africa, Bosnia's problems have incrementally but steadily worsened.
Political Geography:
North Atlantic, Bosnia, Middle East, Libya, and North Africa

243. The Middle East is in Transition—to What?

Author:
Marina Ottaway
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Insight Turkey
Institution:
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
Abstract:
The Arab world has been changed irreversibly by the popular uprisings that started in early 2011. The long period of dormancy that enveloped the Arab world has come to an end. The uprisings have been triggered in all countries by similar mixes of economic hardship and lack of civil and political rights. But we should not expect the uprisings to lead to similar changes in all countries. Already, three different patterns are emerging. In Tunisia and Egypt, the presidents have been overthrown by members of their own regime, including the military; they are now trying to limit the extent of change and to transform a potentially revolutionary process into one of reform from the top. In Yemen and Libya, the challenge to the leaders has turned into a challenge to the survival of the state itself: the two countries have no institutions that can persist if the presidents are ousted. In other countries affected by protest, the regimes have been trying to subdue the protest through a mixture of populist concessions, cautious reforms introduced from the top, and the occasional use of force.
Political Geography:
Libya, Yemen, Arabia, and Egypt

244. NATO After Libya

Author:
Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
NATO's sea and air mission in Libya is the first major military engagement undertaken since the global financial crisis. With European NATO allies drastically reducing their defense spending, there were legitimate fears as to whether they could still afford to respond to such complex crises. Reports early on that the operation lacked sufficient strike capabilities reinforced these fears. But the unprecedented speed, scale, and sustained pace of execution of Operation Unified Protector tell a different story. As of early May, the pace of air sorties had remained high since the beginning of the operation, and strikes had accounted for just under half of those sorties. When requirements changed as Muammar al-Qaddafi's forces altered their tactics, NATO allies provided more of the high-precision strike capabilities that the commanders needed. Meanwhile, more than a dozen ships have been patrolling the Mediterranean Sea and enforcing the UN arms embargo. The mission in Libya has revealed three important truths about military intervention today. First, to those who claimed that Afghanistan was to be NATO's last out-of-area mission, it has shown that unpredictability is the very essence of security. Second, it has proved that in addition to frontline capabilities, such as fighter-bombers and warships, so-called enablers, such as surveillance and refueling aircraft, as well as drones, are critical parts of any modern operation. And third, it has revealed that NATO allies do not lack military capabilities. Any shortfalls have been primarily due to political, rather than military, constraints. In other words, Libya is a reminder of how important it is for NATO to be ready, capable, and willing to act. Although defense is and must remain the prerogative of sovereign nations, an alliance that brings Europe and North America together requires an equitable sharing of the burden in order to be efficient. Downward trends in European defense budgets raise some legitimate concerns. At the current pace of cuts, it is hard to see how Europe could maintain enough military capabilities to sustain similar operations in the future. And this touches on a fundamental challenge facing Europe and the alliance as a whole: how to avoid having the economic crisis degenerate into a security crisis. The way Europe responds to this challenge could determine its place in the global order and the future of security.
Topic:
NATO
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, Libya, and North America

245. Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?

Author:
Daniel W. Drezner
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As the U.S. military intervenes in Libya, a fierce debate has erupted over the possible existence of an Obama doctrine, with a chorus of foreign policy observers bemoaning the United States' supposed strategic incompetence. Last fall, the columnist Jackson Diehl wrote in The Washington Post, "This administration is notable for its lack of grand strategy -- or strategists." In The National Interest this January, the political scientist John Mearsheimer concluded, "The root cause of America's troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War." The economic historian Niall Ferguson took to Newsweek to argue that alleged U.S. setbacks in the Middle East were "the predictable consequence of the Obama administration's lack of any kind of a coherent grand strategy, a deficit about which more than a few veterans of U.S. foreign policymaking have long worried." Even the administration's defenders have damned it with faint praise. The National Journal's Michael Hirsh argued that "the real Obama doctrine is to have no doctrine at all. And that's the way it's likely to remain." Hirsh, at least, meant it as a compliment. But is it true that President Barack Obama has no grand strategy? And even if it were, would that be such a disaster? The George W. Bush administration, after all, developed a clear, coherent, and well-defined grand strategy after 9/11. But those attributes did not make it a good one, and its implementation led to more harm than benefit. Grand strategies are not nearly as important as grand strategists like to think, because countries tend to be judged by their actions, not their words. What really matters for great powers is power -- national economic and military strength -- and that speaks loudly and clearly by itself. Still, in times of deep uncertainty, a strategy can be important as a signaling device. In these moments, such as the present, a clearly articulated strategy matched by consistent actions is useful because it can drive home messages about a country's intentions to domestic and foreign audiences.
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Libya

246. The Syrian People's Slow-motion Revolution

Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Syrian uprising has defied conventional expectations and patterns established elsewhere in the region from the outset. It happened, first of all, and to many that in itself was surprising enough. The regime was not alone in believing in a form of Syrian exceptionalism that would shield it from serious popular unrest. Once the uprising began, it did not develop quickly, as in Egypt or Tunisia. Although it did not remain peaceful, it did not descend into a violent civil war, as in Libya, or sectarian affair, as in Bahrain. To this day, the outcome remains in doubt. Demonstrations have been growing in impressive fashion but have yet to attain critical mass. Regime support has been declining as the security services' brutality has intensified, but many constituents still prefer the status quo to an uncertain and potentially chaotic future. What is clear, however, is the degree to which a wide array of social groups, many once pillars of the regime, have turned against it and how relations between state and society have been forever altered.
Topic:
Democratization
Political Geography:
Middle East, Libya, Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia

247. The Iranian and Saudi Regimes Must Go

Author:
Craig Biddle
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Objective Standard
Institution:
The Objective Standard
Abstract:
As political uprisings and civil wars rage in the Middle East, and as America's self-crippled efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda and the Taliban limp on, the need to identify and eliminate the primary threats to American security becomes more urgent by the day. As you read these words, the Islamist regime in Iran is sponsoring the slaughter of American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan,1 funding Hamas and Hezbollah in their efforts to destroy our vital ally Israel,2 building nuclear bombs to further “Allah's” ends,3 chanting “Death to America! Death to Israel!” in Friday prayers and political parades,4 and declaring: “With the destruction of these two evil countries, the world will become free of oppression.”5 The U.S. government knows all of this (and much more), which is why the State Department has identified the Islamist regime in Iran as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism” in the world.6 Meanwhile, the Islamist regime in Saudi Arabia is funding American-slaughtering terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban,7 building mosques and “cultural centers” across America, and flooding these Islamist outposts not only with hundreds of millions of dollars for “operating expenses” but also with a steady stream of materials calling for all Muslims “to be dissociated from the infidels . . . to hate them for their religion . . . to always oppose them in every way according to Islamic law” and, ultimately, “to abolish all traces of such primitive life (jahiliyya) and to reinforce the understanding and application of the eternal and universal Islamic deen [religion] until it becomes the ruling power throughout the world.” The Saudi-sponsored materials further specify that those who “accept any religion other than Islam, like Judaism or Christianity, which are not acceptable,” have “denied the Koran” and thus “should be killed.”8 None of this is news, at least not to the U.S. government. The Saudis' anti-infidel efforts have been tracked, documented, and reported for years. As the Rand Corporation concluded in a briefing to a top Pentagon advisory board in 2002, “The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot-soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader.”9 What is the U.S. government doing about these clear and present dangers? Nothing. Following the atrocities of 9/11, America has gone to war with Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya, but it has done nothing of substance to end the threats posed by the primary enemies of America: the regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Instead, the Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, continues the policy of seeking “negotiations” with the Iranian regime and calling the Saudi regime our “friend and ally.” This is insanity. And it is time for American citizens to demand that our politicians put an end to it. The Iranian and Saudi regimes must go. And in order to persuade American politicians to get rid of them, American citizens must make clear that we won't settle for anything less. Of course, the Obama administration is not going to take any pro-American actions against either of these regimes. But Americans can and should demand that any politician—especially any presidential candidate—seeking our support in the 2012 elections provide an explicit statement of his general policy with respect to Iran and Saudi Arabia. And we should demand that the policy be along the following lines . . .
Topic:
Islam and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, America, Libya, and Saudi Arabia

248. Editorial: 60 Years since the First European Community – Reflections on Political Messianism

Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Abstract:
The European construct has played a decisive role in the history of the last 60 years. It has created the framework for post-war reconstruction and has ingeniously provided the inspiration and mechanisms for a historical reconciliation between nations which hitherto had gone to war with each other – the horrors of which surpass even the worst of today's excesses – in every generation for the previous two centuries. This cannot but give inspiration and a sliver of hope in the face of our own intractable conflicts. The European Coal and Steel Community, the 60th Anniversary of which we mark this year, incorporated the Schuman Declaration and combined peace and prosperity in its blueprint, whereby peace was to breed prosperity and prosperity was to consolidate peace. It has all worked out splendidly – revisionist history notwithstanding. Europe has also been a catalyst (not more) – at times the 'prize' – for the achievement and subsequent consolidation of democracy, first in Greece, Spain and Portugal, and later across Eastern Europe.
Topic:
Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Libya

249. The Audacity of the Texaco/Calasiatic Award: René-Jean Dupuy and the Internationalization of Foreign Investment Law

Author:
Julien Cantegreil
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Abstract:
The Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic awards refer to concession contract provisions and a political context that are now obsolete. Thus, this article argues on the one hand that the award on the merits, delivered in January 1977, provides an unparalleled opportunity to survey almost every facet of the world of international investment arbitration of the past. On the other hand, the award must nevertheless also be read as forward-looking. By fostering a shift from the traditional hegemony of national jurisdiction in international investment law to the internationalization of international contracts, the article underlines that the award on the merits remains the finest example of René-Jean Dupuy's long-lasting contribution to international law doctrine. By way of conclusion, it suggests that it provides the very best expression and point of entry into Professor Dupuy's understanding and shaping of what he coined 'la communauté'.
Topic:
Government and International Law
Political Geography:
Asia, Libya, California, and Arabia

250. Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania

Author:
Cédric Jourde
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Until recently, the Sahel (as-Sahil), literally the “shore” of the Saharan “sea,” rarely made headlines. Nevertheless, the expanding nexus of illicit trafficking and transnational Islamist terrorism—and the increasingly serious risk this poses to stability in the region and to international security—is attracting growing attention. These concerns will likely mount as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attempts to use the window of opportunity presented by the Arab Spring to reestablish itself in North Africa while transitional governments there devote much of their energy to rebuilding state institutions. In turn, an unstable North Africa, especially Libya, could further exacerbate insecurity in the Sahel as unsecured weapons and trained mercenaries filter their way into the region.
Topic:
Security, Crime, and Narcotics Trafficking
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, Arabia, and Mauritania