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11. How the EU Lost in Libya

Author:
Spyros Plakoudas
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
In 2019, the Libyan Crisis entered a new (and more violent and messy) phase in which outside powers (for example, Russia) intervened and impacted on developments on the ground (politically and militarily) in a profound way. These actors capitalized on the EU’s half-hearted (and thus ineffective) efforts to stabilize the country after Gaddafi’s fall and, by mid-2020, succeeded in effectively ousting the EU from its near abroad; they have dominated developments ever since.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Libya, and North Africa

12. Egypt-Turkey Relations Towards Libya: Political and Economic Dimensions

Author:
Abdulrahman Al-Fawwaz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Egypt and Turkey makeup about half of the whole population of the Middle East and are the two leading nations in the eastern Mediterranean, including Iran as a whole. Both countries are now recognized as the two most tremendous modern military forces in the Middle East. Besides, Cairo and Ankara are major Muslim centers: the Al-Azhar Mosque in Egypt is the largest Islamic University in the world and a significant feature of Egyptian soft power; the historical association between Turkey and the last Islamic Caliphate is viewed in the region with great nostalgia. Given these similarities, a deep rivalry between the two countries exists around the world, while Ankara and Cairo have increasingly prevented overt aggression or conflicts. After the Arab Spring, tensions have intensified and, in effect, impacts Libya, Sudan, and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Along with the increased risk of an overt war between the two nations, the rivalry between Turkey and Egypt also challenges the delicate security of the Middle East. It indicates that it needs an international mediator to answer this thorny problem.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Mediation, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Turkey, Libya, and Egypt

13. The Impact of Covid-19 and Conflict on Middle Eastern Economies

Author:
Paul Rivlin
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy, Paul Rivlin assesses the economic damage caused by COVID-19 particularly in countries in the region experiencing the fallout of ongoing conflicts, and discusses several key trends that will continue to plague these hard-hit states. Ten years after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, war, low oil prices and COVID-19 are affecting the economic situation of the Middle East. Conflicts continue in Syria, Libya and Yemen, while Iraq and Lebanon suffer from the breakdown of government authority. The region appears to be less affected by COVID-19 than others, but that may be because data on infections and deaths is incomplete.
Topic:
Economy, Conflict, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria

14. Straddling Liminality and Active Engagement: Understanding Mobilization Patterns of the Libyan Diaspora

Author:
Houda Mzioudet
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The NATO campaign to unseat long-time Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 was met largely with support by Libyans living in exile. Many had not set foot in their country in decades – some not even since 1969, the year Gaddafi carried out his coup d'état against King Idris I – and in diaspora they formed a close-knit community of intellectuals, doctors, professors, artists, politicians, and other civil society activists who acted as an opposition force to the regime. With the tragic unfolding of what started as the Libyan uprising in 2011, which morphed into a protracted civil and proxy war, the Libyan diaspora has enlarged to include new categories of activists and political actors seeking refuge abroad but also new socio-economic groups who are fleeing the deteriorating economic and security conditions. Yet despite this diversification in the profiles of those in diaspora, the conflict has never undermined the efforts of Libyans in exile to rebuild a semblance of a community that can mobilize for promoting peace and reconciliation. Building on the rich networks that were made with Western and Arab policymakers during the long years of exile, the Libyan diaspora, which has never been a monolithic entity, has been able to contribute to changes that have occurred in the country since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. This study explores the formation of Libyan exile communities since 2011, the different relationships they harbor vis-à-vis the homeland, and some of the different roles they have assumed in building the imagined community and in participating in the rebuilding of the country. Through exploration of the nature of the diaspora and its geographical distribution, and with particular focus on those in Tunisia vs. those in the UK and US, the study assesses the diasporic character of Libyans in exile. The research finds that issues related to peacebuilding, reconciliation, and the empowerment of women and minority groups act as nodal points for diasporic Libyans who, despite their different ideological, cultural, and tribal affiliations, can find common ground when discussing the future of post-Gaddafi Libya.1 Yet, in exploring the work of Libyan diaspora organizations and contextualizing the different waves and destinations of exodus, the research also observes quite different patterns of diaspora mobilization. More precisely, the research finds that the relationships between those in diaspora and the Libyan homeland differ according to relationship, as do the political opportunity structures, which have an implication on the type of mobilization that occurs. In this way, Libyans in diaspora in Tunisia – who maintain patterns of circular mobility and often harbor hopes of return, and who perceive more threats if engaged in political mobilization – tend to either remain under the radar or to engage through the activities and frameworks of international organizations located in Tunis. On the contrary, those in Western capitals have been able to cultivate relationships with foreign policymakers and international organizations for advocacy and lobbying purposes in favor of transitional processes. In all cases, though, direct political participation of Libyans in diaspora in homeland politics has faced a number of institutional, legal, and perceptional barriers, which nonetheless show signs of being able to be overcome through shared belonging to the Libyan imagined community. Based on structured and semi-structured interviews with four members of the Libyan diaspora, an online questionnaire distributed through a popular Libyan podcast series, a conversation with the Libyan podcast series’ creator and my attendance of two Zoom conferences of a Libyan diasporic organization, and drawing on existing statistical data as well as a qualitative review of social media content of Libyan exile groups, carried out between September 2019-January 2021, the study provides an assessment of how members of the Libyan diaspora relate to the homeland and to each other, and how these relationships contribute to different patterns of mobilization. The study concludes with a few recommendations to Libyan and international policymakers regarding how best to support the Libyan diaspora in the implementation of their efforts designed to promote reconciliation, peacebuilding, institutional reform, and transitional justice for Libya.
Topic:
NATO, Development, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Transitional Justice, Conflict, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

15. Conflicts, Pandemics and Peacebuilding: New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform in the MENA Region

Author:
Andrea Cellino, Annalisa Perteghella, Thomas Guerber, Paola Magri, Ranj Alaaldin, Jerome Drevon, Jalel Harchaoui, Irene Constantini, Eleanore Ardemagni, and Annalisa Perteghella
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic is not only a health challenge. In the MENA region, against the backdrop of protracted conflicts, instability, and an overall deterioration in socio-economic conditions, the coronavirus crisis adds another layer of vulnerability and has already had long-lasting repercussions on human security across the region. Moreover, as hybrid actors take on an important role as security providers amid the pandemic in a context of limited or absent oversight, risks associated to a lack of accountability, ethno-religious discrimination, human rights abuses and gender-based violence grow. While classical approaches to security provision tend to portray non-state actors and the State as inherently at odds, the complexity of a rapidly evolving security landscape throughout the region should trigger a revision of the very concept of effective governance. Against this backdrop, how should Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategies and programmes adapt? What lessons can be drawn from selected case studies such as Iraq, Libya, and Yemen?
Topic:
Conflict, Peace, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, and North Africa

16. The Politics of Pandemics. Evolving Regime-Opposition Dynamics in the MENA Region

Author:
Karim Mezran, Annalisa Perteghella, Nadereh Chamlou, Gawdat Bahgat, Abbas Kadhim, Hafsa Halawa, Yahia Mohamed, Lemine Mestek, and Emadeddin Badi
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic could not have come at a worse time, as many countries in the MENA region remain engulfed in vicious internal conflicts or must cope with structural socio-economic distress and popular dissent. In many respects, such a context and many of its problems resemble those that formed the backdrop for the Arab Spring in 2011. Exactly like what happens with humans, who are hit the hardest when presenting pre-existing conditions, MENA states have been impacted because of their own pre-existing conditions. In this sense, the Covid-19 pandemic has laid bare all the vulnerabilities and deficiencies of these states’ structures, and has aggravated pre-existing political, social, and economic shortcomings. How has the pandemic impacted state structures? What is its effect on organized protests and spontaneous popular movements? What are the possible long-term consequences?
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Arab Spring, Conflict, Protests, COVID-19, and Elites
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Libya, Algeria, North Africa, Egypt, and Gulf Cooperation Council

17. After the Storm: Post-Pandemic Trends in the Southern Mediterranean

Author:
Andrei Kortunov, Paola Magri, Ines Abdel Razek, Andrey Chuprygin, Chiara Lovotti, Matteo Villa, Elena Corradi, Ivan Bocharov, and Ruslan Mamedov
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The Mediterranean region has faced a significant number of challenges that have stemmed from turbulent events taking place on its Southern shores: conflicts and instability, the migration crisis, disruptions of regional value chains, souring regional relations, and foreign power interferences that have severely affected the region. The Covid-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on the Southern Mediterranean, but the health crisis had ambiguous effects on the underlying economic, social, and political trends of the region. It has exposed and exacerbated much of the previous sources of tension and, obscured many of them as public attention moved towards facing the public health emergency. Will the Covid-19 pandemic spur governments and civil societies to action? Or will it just serve as another smokescreen behind which to hide the region's longstanding problems?
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Migration, Terrorism, Conflict, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Libya, Palestine, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, and Mediterranean

18. Paradox of Relations: Russian - Turkish Relations in the Syrian and Libyan Fronts

Author:
Dania Koleilat Khatib and Aref Bijan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Over the last few years, Russia has emerged as a significant power broker and military actor in the Middle East. Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis since 2015 has revived its relations with neighboring countries. This increase in Russia's activity has led to convergence and divergence with other countries in the region. One of those countries is Turkey, which had cooperated at times and had differences at times with Russia in the Middle East, especially in the Syrian and the Libyan crises. Ankara and Moscow are fully engaged in the global competition trying to increase their power and influence. They face off in Syria and Libya. In Syria, Turkey supports the rebels in the North West while Russia supports the Assad regime. In Libya, Turkey supports the Government of National Accord (GNA) while Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA). Their relation becomes more intricate as both parties got involved in the Caucus, a region of prime importance to both countries. In the vicinity of Russia, the oil route goes Tbilisi-Baku ending up in Ceyhan Turkey. While Turkey supports Azerbaijan, Russia supports Armenia. The Caucus crisis showed how the two countries are rivals that are ready to accommodate each other on a quid pro quo basis. The cease happened concurrently with a partial withdrawal of Turkey from some posts in the North West in Syria. Was there an agreement between Erdogan and Putin in this regard? There are no proofs; however, the various events that are happening from the Caucus to North Africa suggest that those two powers are rivals that are ready to accommodate each other. To add to that, the American retrenchment has encouraged the two powers to flex their muscles in the region. Therefore, given the developments in the region, this article has tried to examine the paradox of Russian-Turkish relations and their strategy in Libya and Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Libya

19. Economic Interests, Political Conflicts, and External Interferences: The Complex Interlocking of the Libyan Crisis

Author:
Karim Mezran and Alessia Melcangi
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the last days of September 2020, Libya’s oil industry seemed to be on the verge of restarting its production after Gen. Khalifa Haftar announced the reopening of the oil fields and terminals that he had occupied and closed in the course of his offensive against Tripoli. The main damage caused by Haftar’s blockade is the dramatic plummet of oil production to less than 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) from the previous 1.2 million. The importance of the oil and gas industry in Libya cannot be underestimated since it is the main driver of the Libyan economy and accounts for about 60% of the country’s GDP. Oil production revenues and the dividends from oil sales are one of the main causes of the conflict that has been continuously ravaging the country since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011. The announced reopening represents good news that bodes well not only for a real resumption of political talks between the warring parties, but also for a more general improvement of the economic and social condition in the country, which is now on the verge of collapse. After the January 2020 blockade, the quick shutdown of oil sales led to a budget collapse: In April 2020, oil production data showed a drop of more than 80% with a loss of more than $10 billion in oil revenues. The economic impact of this stoppage directly hit the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC), preventing the company from fulfilling contracts with international oil companies. After so many years of civil war, it has become evident that competition among various actors is principally over the country’s resources and control of its financial institutions. According to the 2015 UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement, the Tripoli government headed by Fayez Sarraj retains control of the Tripoli-based NOC and oversees the allocation of state funds deposited in the Tripoli-based Central Bank — these are the two channels through which oil revenues can flow legally and the only two institutions recognized by the UN Security Council. Haftar and the Eastern government accuse Tripoli of mismanaging hydrocarbon revenues and state funds, using them to fund militias backing the Government of National Accord (GNA), and failing to carry out reforms to stabilize the economy. For this reason, the Eastern authorities demand a change of leadership in both institutions: The Central Bank and the NOC. Indeed, the problem for Haftar has always been that he controlled oil production, but not oil revenues. After almost a year locked in a stalemate, the situation on the battlefield was reversed in April 2020. Thanks to Turkey’s military support, the GNA was able to counterattack and defeat the Haftar-controlled Libyan National Army (LNA) and push them back to the gates of the city of Sirte near the “oil crescent,” a coastal area home to most of Libya’s oil export terminals. The ceasefire proposed by the GNA at the end of August 2020 and accepted by the Tobruk parliament and its spokesman, Aguila Saleh, has restarted the political dialogue between the conflicting parties. Meanwhile, the malcontent of the population in both Tripoli and Benghazi, due to the deterioration of living conditions and lack of economic reforms, led to protests and demonstrations in both cities.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Economy, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

20. Libya and the COVID-19 Lifecycle: From Distraction to Dissidence

Author:
Anas El Gomati
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
COVID-19 has changed the world and the way we live it, establishing something of a “new normal” as states and societies battle the pandemic and learn to accommodate its multidimensional effects. For Libyans’ living in the midst of conflict, normality and a new normal are difficult to determine. The economy, healthcare system and everyday lives of Libyans’ have been far from normal as a result of the 18-month conflict sparked by General Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to overthrow the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. However, the pandemic and its dynamism has had an impact far beyond the everyday lives of citizens. The lifecycle of the pandemic has had a major impact on the conflict itself. It first served to distract international powers from their diplomatic obligations and peace building in Libya, acting as a cover for local factions and their foreign sponsors to intensify the conflict during the initial global shockwave of the pandemic at the beginning of 2020. Towards the end of 2020, however, the pandemic compounded socio-economic and political pressures in Libya, sparking national demonstrations and dissidence towards the rival factions, leading to political resignations and renewed diplomatic negotiations in the process.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economy, Conflict, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa