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11. Hedging as a Survival Strategy for Small States: The Case of Kuwait

Author:
İsmail Numan Telci
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Strategic hedging has not been studied adequately in Middle Eastern countries. This study is an attempt to include hedging into the analysis of a small state’s foreign policy choices. It contends that the hedging strategy can be applied to small states because of its confrontation at three levels: international, regional and sub-regional. It is argued that Kuwait has pursued a hedging policy by taking possible shifts in the global and regional power distribution and the lasting regional security dilemma into consideration. By strengthening military cooperation with China and Turkey, Kuwait has aimed to hedge the risks that could arise from the rise of China and Turkey in the Gulf, the US’ retrenchment from the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia’s aggressiveness. The main purpose of this strategy is analysed as a move to empower the regional alliance with Turkey, ensuring Kuwait’s security and warding off potential risks from the changing dynamics of the Middle East.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Hedging
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, Kuwait, and Gulf Nations

12. Mongolia's Response to Increasing U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry in Asia

Author:
Alicia Campi
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr Alicia Campi, President of the Mongolia Society, explains that “The [“Third Neighbor”] policy was reinterpreted in content and meaning to include cultural and economic partners as diverse as India, Brazil, Kuwait, Turkey, Vietnam, and Iran. With increased superpower rivalry in its region, Mongolia has expanded this basic policy.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Turkey, India, Mongolia, Asia, Kuwait, Brazil, North America, and United States of America

13. Kuwait: A Changing System Under Stress

Author:
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen and Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Washington Institute has been sponsoring a series of discussions about sudden succession in the Middle East. Each session focuses on scenarios that might unfold if a specific ruler or leader departed the scene tomorrow. Questions include these: Would the sudden change lead to different policies? Would it affect the stability of the respective countries involved, or the region as a whole? What would be the impact on U.S. interests? Would the manner of a leader's departure make a difference? The discussions also probe how the U.S. government might adjust to the new situation or influence outcomes. This essay, seventh in the series, discusses Kuwait, a small, oil-rich country surrounded by big neighbors with which relations have often been uneasy. Its leader, Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, is ninety years old and apparently in fragile health. His immediate heir, half-brother Nawaf, is not much younger at eighty-two. More important, perhaps, Nawaf lacks the current emir's adeptness as a diplomat. In a Gulf region experiencing sharp tensions, Sabah's exit will remove a much-needed node of stability. Whoever ultimately takes the helm will have a substantial legacy to uphold.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Succession, and Monarchy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Kuwait, and Gulf Nations

14. Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building

Author:
Marina Henke
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are “paid” to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Regional Cooperation, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Kuwait, Vietnam, Korea, and Somalia

15. Stabilizing and Reconstructing Iraq: A Challenging Path Ahead

Author:
Michael Pregent and Jonas Parello-Plesner
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Iraq has militarily defeated the terrorist organization ISIS. This is the good news, which was also underlined at the recent Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS meeting in Kuwait on 13 February 2018 held in conjunction with the Kuwaiti Reconstruction Conference for Iraq. Yet the task ahead is as daunting as any military campaign. Now Iraq needs to rebuild and to heal its communities to foster an inclusive national identity. Challenges remain, from funding continuing stabilization efforts to the even larger resources needed for reconstruction over the coming years. According to announcements made at the Iraqi reconstruction conference in Kuwait, donors have pledged a decent amount, around $30 billion, although $88 billion was touted as the desired amount by the Iraqi Government. The Gulf countries and Turkey are becoming new large donors. The private sector also showed significant interest, although corruption is still a major concern, which the Iraqi government seeks to address. Continued stabilization is making it possible and desirable for internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes. Over 3 million Iraqis have returned, but more await in camps or temporary accommodations. Equally important is reconciliation. The UN is working with the Iraqi government to implement this at the national level. Baghdad and Erbil should pursue continued dialogue and concrete steps forward, including on the thorny issue of Kirkuk, in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution. Inclusiveness for Sunnis is important, both during reconstruction and before and after elections, as their disenfranchisement helped produce fertile soil for ISIS. Yet reconciliation should not be only top-down, and local community efforts undertaken by Iraqi civil society organizations are essential. Reconstruction funding should be tied to government reforms and more importantly, to tangible progress on reconciliation and political accommodation efforts. A novel aspect of the conference was the US administration’s new approach to burden-sharing in the aftermath of the ISIS presence in Iraq. President Trump wants to build infrastructure at home in the US and has tweeted dismissively about the $7 trillion the US has already spent in the Middle East. The United States will not disburse public funding for reconstruction, which is seen as nation-building, although it remains among the top contributors to humanitarian and stabilization assistance and will provide loans to private companies. Yet even such investments could pose additional risk for American companies because of sanctions against Iran, whose economic presence is felt in several important sectors. Instead, the US encouraged international institutions and others to step up, and Saudi Arabia, for example, contributed $1.5 billion. Leading up to the conference, the US facilitated a diplomatic reconciliation process between Iraq and Saudi Arabia for outstanding debts owed to Riyadh. The conference also gave Prime Minister Haider al Abadi a strong platform for brandishing his vision of a united Iraq, although some areas, particularly in the Sunni parts of the country, still feel excluded from reconstruction planning. Still, it is an open question whether that positive vision is enough to bring him another governing coalition following the Iraqi parliamentary elections in May. The continued presence of American military forces is increasingly a topic of contention in the elections.
Topic:
International Relations, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Reconstruction, Radicalization, Islamic State, Humanitarian Intervention, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Kuwait, and United States of America

16. The difficult promise of economic reform in the Gulf

Author:
Karen E. Young
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman—are in a period of profound change, both economic and social. The economic changes are a long overdue reaction to natural resource revenue dependency in their fiscal policies, while the social changes are a reaction to compounded migration and demographic shifts. The resilience of Gulf political economies will be defined by the ability to change both fiscal governance and policies of inclusion. Inclusion, in the context of Gulf political economies, means social protection for vulnerable groups, but it also means access to compete in a rule-based economy. The promise of economic reform, therefore, is a promise to reconfigure relations between citizen and state, and to renegotiate the provision of benefits to citizens in the form of subsidies of fuel, electricity, and water, as well as generous health and education services. And there will be taxes and new fees on everything from toll roads to sugary drinks to tobacco, and employment fees for foreigners. In exchange, citizens are promised—in some way—a retreat of the state from its predatory control over economies, though not its control over the political space and activism. Nonetheless, for many political economies of the GCC, the opening of opportunities in private ownership and investment in the sale of state assets—such as power and water plants, ports, and airports, as well as schools and hospitals—poses a challenge to the state’s track record in the provision of services. These privatizations also pose a risk to a constituency unaccustomed to fees-based service and corporate liability. Will citizens accept services from private entities at cost? Will citizens jump at the opportunity to own new companies that meet the needs of their compatriots for profit? And, perhaps most importantly, who will be left behind? The concept of resilience is often used in the literature on economic development to describe how governments can protect both citizens and their economies from external shocks, whether in the form of natural disasters, black swan events, or dramatic policy shifts. The regulatory environment and the capacity of the state to react and respond to different needs of its population, especially vulnerable groups, are key. For Gulf states, the current reform agenda is not so much a shock as a delayed reaction to a problem identified long ago. Diversification from oil-based revenue is necessary, and population growth has created an oversupply of candidates for public-sector employment that is not very productive. Generating growth has to shift, in its source and its deployment among a larger and more diverse population. The Gulf states have created their own middle-income development trap. This paper offers a wide-ranging analysis of some aspects of the reform agenda underway across the GCC. It explores specific case analyses of challenges facing individual countries (Saudi Arabia and Oman), and the organization of the GCC as a whole. It also addresses subsidy reform, the introduction of taxes and fees, and some experimental policies related to regulating labor markets and encouraging citizens to move out of public-sector employment.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Cooperation Council

17. The Gulf Monarchies' Armed Forces at the Crossroads

Author:
David B. Roberts
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Something is happening with the military forces of the Arab monarchies in the Gulf. Traditionally, the armed forces of the Gulf monarchies played an incidental role when it comes to securing the states. The ultimate fighting power of the monarchies was relatively unimportant; rather, the monarchies’ security was derived from international relations that were sometimes founded on, and often sustained and fed by, ongoing military sales. But, for some monarchies at least, this is changing. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now deploying their own forces in hitherto unseen kinetic ways, as in Yemen, indicating that they genuinely seek their own fighting power. In the midst of the Gulf crisis, Qatar has doubled down on defense procurement both to boost its military and to increase its international entanglements. Meanwhile, Oman and Kuwait continue their methodical military procurement, as is Bahrain, in addition to assiduously following Saudi Arabia’s regional policies to boost relations with Riyadh.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Governance, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Middle East, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Gulf Nations

18. Rejuvenating the U.S. Partnership with Kuwait

Author:
Hardin Lang, Alia Awadallah, and John Craig
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
For more than a quarter century, Kuwait has served as a key strategic partner for the United States in the Middle East. It hosts more than 15,000 U.S. military personnel, leads the Middle East in providing humanitarian assistance, and plays an important diplomatic role in the region. The country is also home to the Gulf’s only elected parliament. In recent years, however, Kuwait has experienced an unusual degree of political, economic, and social turbulence that has led some to question the long-term viability of its domestic power-sharing arrangements.1 Beginning in 2011, Kuwait was rocked by the aftershocks of the Arab uprisings; the collapse of oil prices; and a public struggle over the royal line of succession. Most recently, the emir dissolved the legislature in October 2016 and announced snap elections after members of parliament disrupted the government’s austerity agenda.2 Those elections returned opposition parliamentarians in force to the National Assembly.3 Tensions between the government and the opposition continue to rise, but they do not yet pose a serious challenge to Kuwait’s long-term stability or the U.S.-Kuwaiti bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Kuwait, North America, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

19. ARAB STUDIES JOURNAL VOL. XXIII, NO. 1

Author:
Sherene Seikaly
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Arab Studies Journal
Institution:
Arab Studies Institute
Abstract:
The rapid changes that the people of the Arab world have witnessed in the last four and a half years have been revolutionary. In its initial instances this wave of change was a euphoric experience. From the far east of the Arabian Peninsula to the far west of Morocco, many transgressed generational, sectarian, gender, and class divides to break the barrier of fear. They unified to publically and collectively call for popular sovereignty. They marched on various squares, neighborhoods, and roads demanding bread, freedom, and social justice. They led us to the unknown territory of hope. As the bids for popular sovereignty became louder and stronger, and people placed their lives and bodies in the line of fire, these Arabs posed a fundamental challenge to what observers had admonished as apathetic and moribund. Politics outside the confines of a militant Islamism and a calcified authoritarianism seemed possible. Perhaps at last, Arabs could step out of the identity debate on authenticity, to demand the basics: economic redistribution and freedom from state brutality. Perhaps at last, observers could finally step out of the closed circle of debate that 11 September 2001 and the war on terror escalated to new heights: essentialism on the one hand and apologetics on the other. In a sense, the ontological non-choice between militant Islamism and militant authoritarianism mirrors the epistemological trap that can do little more than eulogize politics.
Topic:
Islam, Religion, Arab Spring, Christianity, War on Terror, Gulf War, Iraq War, Militant Islam, Nakba, and Orientalism
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Kuwait, Palestine, Algeria, North Africa, Lebanon, and Kurdistan

20. Indo-Israel Relations and the Iranian Factor

Author:
Amir Sajedi
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Center for Strategic Research (CSR)
Abstract:
India and Israel share many common characteristics such as having emerged from a colonial past of the British Empire, and having a parliamentary system which encompasses moderate and radical forces. In spite of this shared background, for nearly four decades, India did not show interest in establishing complete diplomatic relations with Israel, and in general supported and voted for defense of the Palestinians and the Arab Middle-Eastern governments and for condemnation of Israel in world bodies such as the United Nations. However the broad changes in the world stage arising in the 1990's such as the break-up of the Soviet Union, the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent crisis in the Middle-East, the rise of the price of oil, the reduction in the remittances sent back to India by the returning Indian workers from Arab countries, and also the change of the political climate in India, the increase in support for the right wing (B J P) all changed the direction of the attitudes of most Indian politicians towards Israel. But developing Indo-Israel relations does not affect Indo- Iran's relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Iran, India, Israel, Kuwait, and Palestine