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1. A New Era of US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Joshua Nezam
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper offers concrete policy recommendations and institutional tools for the incoming Biden administration and Congress to revise policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Deterring North Korea will remain a focus of the alliance, but prioritizing denuclearization must no longer monopolize the alliance’s political capital nor paralyze its global potential. The US and South Korea must clarify how shared values translate into policy convergence in security, economy, and technology domains to rediscover relevance in an era of multidimensional structural competition with China. Even without a comprehensive nuclear agreement with North Korea, the near-term priority must be to revitalize the regional security architecture to uphold extended deterrence to South Korea and Japan while institutionalizing a process of managing tensions and capping North Korea’s most destabilizing capabilities. Lastly, Congress must deliberate a viable path toward risk reduction and peace with Pyongyang while advocating for transformational change through advocacy for human rights and freedom of information.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
North America, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

2. 2020 Report on American Attitudes Toward the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Troy Stangarone and Juni Kim
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
KEI’s 2020 Report on American Attitudes Toward the Korean Peninsula focuses on U.S. views on relations with South Korea, U.S. awareness of South Korean brands and cultural products, and views on North Korea and was conducted by YouGov. The results reveal that while Americans have a favorable view of South Korea and about half are supportive of maintaining U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula, few Americans watched or listened to Korean cultural products in the last year. Americans also view North Korea as one of the three critical challenges for the United States, but fewer than 1-in-3 approve of the administration’s handling of North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Politics, Culture, Public Opinion, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
North America, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

3. The lessons of the Annual Crisis

Author:
Ilya Dyachkov
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
Occasional escalations on the Korean Peninsula each time are hotly debated in mass media, but can hardly surprise experts. Typically, difficult periods start in spring and there are several reasons for that. Exactly at this time the United States and the Republic of Korea usually conduct a joint exercise. This fact cannot but bother the DPRK. By the way, the scale of the maneuvers becomes larger every year: for instance, the personnel can practice such operation as seizure of Pyongyang. One more reason is connected with the actions and statements of North Korea itself. The North Korean missile launches, making Seoul and Tokyo nervous, usually “fall” exactly on May or April.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

4. Korean Détente: A Threat to Washington's Anachronistic Military Presence?

Author:
Doug Bandow
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The recent summit meeting between South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il raises the prospect that the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula may at last be coming to an end. Although the latest effort at détente could ultimately abort as did similar initiatives in the 1970s and early 1990s, North Korea's dire economic straits probably leave the Stalinist state little choice this time but to open itself to the outside world and seek trade and investment from its prosperous, democratic South Korean rival.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Israel, Asia, South Korea, Latin America, and Korean Peninsula

5. Progress on the Korean Peninsula?

Author:
John Feffer
Publication Date:
12-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy In Focus
Abstract:
It was a striking juxtaposition, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il sitting side by side at a display of mass gymnastics in Pyongyang this last October. “Spectacular and amazing,” Albright called the coordinated movements of the 100,000 performers. When a picture of the August 1998 Taepodong rocket launch was displayed, Kim Jong Il confided that it would be his country's first and last such launch. The North Korean leader was a man with whom she could do business, Albright concluded at the end of her visit. The U.S. and North Korea, technically at war for over fifty years, had never before been on quite such cordial speaking terms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and Pyongyang

6. U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: A Second Look

Author:
Michael J. Green, James T. Laney, and Morton I. Abramowitz
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In May, former Secretary of Defense William Perry traveled to North Korea with a comprehensive proposal to increase outside assistance for its isolated and declining Stalinist regime in exchange for steps by the North to reduce its threatening military posture. The Perry proposal was designed to test North Korea's intentions not only to abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework, which aimed to cap Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, but also to stop further missile tests and military provocations. It is unlikely that North Korea will respond positively. The regime has survived for five decades only by maintaining a belligerent stance. Pyongyang has rebuffed South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's unprecedented efforts to improve North-South relations and has continued to produce military tensions, even in the wake of the Perry visit. But it is too soon to give up on a comprehensive package to reduce tensions with North Korea. Despite the illusion of self-sufficiency, or juche, the North is increasingly dependent on outside help to sustain itself. It is possible that over time Pyongyang will find no alternative to greater interaction with the outside world. Barring an increase in threatening North Korean actions, the United States should keep the Perry proposal on the table and continue to support Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement. A second Taepodong missile test by North Korea would not violate any existing North Korean commitments, but it would significantly change the situation in Northeast Asia. We should make every effort to deter a launch, but if one takes place, the United States, Japan, and South Korea will have to examine ways to enhance defense against a different North Korean threat. South Korea should suspend new investment in North Korea and Japan should impose new sanctions and consider restrictions on financial transfers to the North. The United States should lower its diplomatic activity toward Pyongyang, keeping channels open, but forcing North Korea to provide incentives for greater dialogue. A missile launch should not end our attempts at diplomacy or cause us to forget that North Korea's relative military capabilities are in decline, but if a test is conducted business cannot continue as usual. Although a North Korean missile launch would do great damage to political support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the United States, Japan, and South Korea, it should not be a reason for us to abandon our commitments under the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework stands as the major bulwark against a return to the kind of calamitous military steps the United States was forced to consider in 1994 to stop North Korea's nuclear program. Inspections of suspicious underground facilities at Kumchangri in May revealed no North Korean violation of the Agreed Framework. Although we cannot assume from this that Pyongyang has forsaken its nuclear ambitions, we do know that implementation of the Agreed Framework remains the best approach to preventing nuclear weapons development in the North. In the end, there is no easy solution to the intractable North Korean problem. Efforts to reduce tensions and build North-South reconciliation have yielded little. We are strong enough to test inducements for change in the North, but our policy must be based on robust deterrence and close defense cooperation with our allies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, East Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula