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221. Watching from the Sidelines: Israel and the Syrian Uprising

Author:
Ehud Eiran
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Israel has been generally quiet regarding the recent turmoil in Syria, a reflection of the issue\'s relative low priority, as well as Israel\'s limited influence on internal Syrian matters. Israel\'s preferred outcome would be a stable Syrian regime that disassociates itself from the “axis of resistance,” poses no bilateral threats, and controls the border area—though Israel sees no clear path for achieving these aims. The view in Israel is that the basic structure of deterrence still holds vis-à-vis Syria and the regime—even in its desperate circumstances—is unlikely to provoke Israel in dramatic ways.
Topic:
Security and Regime Change
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Arab Countries, and Syria

222. Towards a regional security regime for the middle east

Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The SIPRI Middle East Expert Group met four times over an 18-month period to consider how a regional security regime might be developed. The principal points of this report are:Further progress in the Middle East peace process would create a suitable political climate for consideration of a regional security regime.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Peace Studies, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

223. Policy Concerns of Low Fertility for Military Planning in South Korea

Author:
Elizabeth Hervey Stephen
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The South Korean military currently is the sixth-largest in the world. But years of low birth rates have resulted in declining numbers of young men available for military service, and the country now faces the pressing question of how to ensure national security in the face of inevitable troop reductions. Some options for offsetting this shrinking recruit pool (such as increasing fertility, increasing immigration, and increasing the number of women in the military) might seem obvious, but the complex economic, social, and cultural reality of South Korea make them unlikely to be embraced. The best focus for immediate action is to stabilize or increase service terms and to encourage development and implementation of high-tech security systems. While the recruit pool appears nearly adequate at present, South Korea must act quickly to develop the leaner, more diverse, and more technologically based military necessary for the country to maintain a viable military force.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Israel, Asia, and South Korea

224. The Non-Western Challenger? The Rise of a Sino-Centric China

Author:
Andreas Bøje Forsby
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
What are the implications of China's rapid rise for international order? This report seeks to answer the question from an identity perspective. The key argument is that China is currently undergoing an identity shift towards Sino-centrism, that is, a self-centering tendency to turn narrative attention towards the internally generated, specifically Chinese hallmarks associated with China's civilizational past and cultural heritage.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Culture
Political Geography:
China and Israel

225. Nuclear Policy Gridlock in Japan

Author:
Jacques E.C. Hymans
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Prior to the Japanese earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster of March 11, 2011, international observers frequently posed the question of whether Japan might convert its large stockpile of plutonium into nuclear weapons. Since March 11, their main question has shifted to whether Japan will decide to exit from the nuclear energy field altogether.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Natural Disasters, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Japan and Israel

226. The Reform of Israeli Checkpoints: Outsourcing, Commodification, and Redeployment of the State (La réforme des checkpoints israéliens : externalisation, marchandisation et redéploiement de l'Etat)

Author:
Shira Havkin
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Since 2006 the checkpoints along the borders of the West Bank and the Gaza strip have been reorganized and equipped with a new technological platform. They are now managed by private security firms. The instigators of these reforms speak of the "civilianization" of the checkpoints and justify their program on economic, organizational and humanitarian grounds. This detailed study of the concrete means by which the management of the Israeli checkpoints has been outsourced and commodified enables one to establish links between the evolution of Israeli society in terms of the relationship between the State, the market and society and the actual changes in the operation of the occupation. It would appear that this is not a case of the State receding in the face of market forces in a zero sum game. Rather it is the redeployment in a neoliberal context of the State in which it has adopted the uniquely Israeli layering of the public and the private, the national and the international, the State and civil society.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Human Rights, Science and Technology, Occupation, Neoliberalism, and Borders
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and West Bank

227. Hitting a moving target: Implications of Japan's missile defence

Author:
Kristian Kurki
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The ballistic missile defence (bmd) has been promoted as a means to counter the security concern posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear programmes. While these could threaten Japan in theory, the likelihood of an attack by North Korea is negligible as the consequences of such an action would compromise the survival of the North Korean regime. Conversely, an exaggerated response to North Korea's missile programme increases the risk of even further unpredictable provocations by North Korea. Other regional actors, especially China and even Russia, may counter Japan's increased defence readiness with even greater military presence in the region, leading to an exacerbation of regional tension. bmd, and intensified defence measures at large, will contribute to a perpetuation of rivalry between Japan and its East Asian neighbours, restricting Japan's diplomatic manoeuvrability and reducing its future policy options towards consolidating a regional security architecture. bmd should not be seen as a test case in the validity and future integrity of the us-Japanese defence alliance. Disparate political and cultural traditions aside, shared economic interests and values suffice to ensure the continuity of the alliance, which is not as fragile as recent media reports have suggested.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Japan, Israel, East Asia, and North Korea

228. The Israeli Exception

Author:
John Feffer
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy In Focus
Abstract:
North Korea and Israel have a lot in common. Neither is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and both employ their nuclear weapons in elaborate games of peek-a-boo with the international community. Israel and North Korea are equally paranoid about outsiders conspiring to destroy their states, and this paranoia isn't without some justification. Partly as a result of these suspicions, both countries engage in reckless and destabilizing foreign policies. In recent years, Israel has launched preemptive strikes and invaded other countries, while North Korea has abducted foreign citizens and blown up South Korean targets (including, possibly, a South Korean ship in late March in the Yellow Sea).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, South Korea, and North Korea

229. An Arms Control Process for the Middle East

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Arms transfer to the Middle East are not the sole cause of the regional problems. In fact the acquisition of arms has been the product of the unresolved political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other conflicts in the region. Over the past five decades there have been a number of arms control proposals and attempts for the Middle east. One main weakness of these proposals was that they were not integrated into a political process. The continued Arab-Israeli conflict made it practically impossible to formulate and implement formal arms control agreements, resulting in a failure from the beginning. Therefore, in any move towards arms control and regional security in the region, the linkage between both conventional and non-conventional weapons and the ongoing peace process must be made. A peaceful solution to the Arab –Israeli conflict should proceed alongside any arms control negotiations, specially in the establishment of a Weapons of Mass destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the region. It is quite evident that peace cannot be achieved while still being threatened by a weapons of mass destruction capability of a neighboring country, nor can a WMDFZ be achieved without the context of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. This has been recognized by the Obama administration as being a “vital national security interest of the United States”. The position of many countries in the region is that they find it difficult to enter serious arms control negotiations until some form of regional peace is fully established. This stems from their perception that nations in the region still consider military force as the only viable source to achieve their policy objectives. The danger from this underlying reasoning, if perceived as the only alternative to preserving a regional security balance, is that it could give rise to an uncontrollable arms race and to a parallel proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any massive rearmament will surely create an unrestricted arms race in the Middle East which will automatically be accompanied by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The fear is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could give rise to states announcing a so-called “in-kind” deterrence or “the right to retaliate in kind”. Unless controlled this arms race will give rise to another military conflict with catastrophic human and environmental consequences.
Topic:
Security and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

230. The Best Defense?

Author:
Abraham D. Sofaer
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
After 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush announced his determination to do whatever was necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States. Following the lead of several countries that had recently come to similar conclusions after their own bitter experiences -- including India, Israel, Japan, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom -- the United States tightened its immigration laws; increased the protection of its borders, ports, and infrastructure; criminalized providing "material support" for terrorist groups; and tore down the wall between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, which had crippled counterterrorist efforts for decades. Washington did not authorize preventive detention, as other countries had, but it used other measures to hold persons against whom criminal charges could not be brought -- thereby preventing terrorist attacks. The U.S. government also led or joined various international efforts aimed at warding off new dangers, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, through which over 70 states cooperate to interdict the movement of nuclear materials across international borders. But the Bush administration's call for preventive action went further: it endorsed using force against states that supported terrorism or failed to prevent it. This was a particularly controversial position, since using (or threatening to use) preventive force across international borders is generally considered to be a violation of international law: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and most international legal authorities currently construe the United Nations Charter as prohibiting any use of force not sanctioned by the UN Security Council, with the exception of actions taken in self-defense against an actual or imminent state-sponsored "armed attack."
Topic:
Security and United Nations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Washington, Israel, and Spain