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1. Israel, Hamas, and the Burdens of History

Author:
Michael J. Reimer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The violence of the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent retaliatory war on Gaza have reignited historical collective traumas and existential fears among Jewish-Israelis, the Jewish Diaspora, and Palestinians
Topic:
Diaspora, Trauma, Hamas, Palestinians, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Gaza

2. Hamas’s Narrative of 7 October and the Impossibility of Ignoring It

Author:
Menachem Klein
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Hamas’ barbaric attack on 7 October and Israel’s ruthless retaliation against Hamas and Gaza Strip residents are unprecedented shocking events in their severity, repercussions and impact on both peoples’ collective memory. Only few of those Israelis who agreed that Hamas underwent a political change since 2017[1] – when it issued its Document of General Principles and Policies[2] – still maintain that view. Similarly, Western government officials who engaged in direct or indirect dialogue with Hamas claim that the crimes it committed on 7 October were driven by its adherence to a fundamentalist Islamic ideology inspired by ISIS.
Topic:
Hamas, Narrative, Collective Memory, and October 7
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

3. The Ongoing Genocide in Gaza

Author:
John Cherian
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
There seems to be no end in sight to the genocidal war being waged in the Gaza Strip. As the new year dawned, more than 22,835 Gazans, the majority of them children and women, have been killed by the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF).1 The true mortality rates are, of course, much higher as at least 7,000 Palestinians remain buried under the rubble.2 In three months of fighting, one out of every 10 persons living in Gaza has been killed. As international humanitarian organisations and local eyewitness accounts have testified, the Gaza civilians were intentionally targeted by the Israeli military. The deaths of civilians and the damage to civilian infrastructure were not due to collateral damage in the fight between Israel and the Palestine militias in Gaza. After the 7 October 2023 Hamas military attack along the highly fortified border with Israel that had resulted in the deaths of 1,200 residents, Israeli leaders and top army generals had publicly vowed to hit the people of Gaza ‘with fire and brimstone’, quoting Old Testament prophets. It was the worst humiliation the Israeli army had suffered in more than 50 years. There were open calls to ‘ethnically cleanse’ Gaza and the rest of the occupied territories so that Israel could realise its long-held dream of an ‘Eretz Israel’ (Land of Israel) extending from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, addressing the Israeli parliament shortly after the bloody onslaught on Gaza began, promised to fulfil ‘the prophecy of Isaiah’. The prophecy, a part of the Bible’s ‘Book of Isaiah’, speaks about the creation of a Greater Israel extending from the Nile River to the Euphrates River. In a later speech, Netanyahu said that Israel was on ‘a holy mission’ in Gaza while invoking another Old Testament story of Amalek. According to the Hebrew Bible, the kingdom of Amalek was the arch-enemy of the Israelites. Amalek was the grandson of Esau, the eldest son of Isaac. Esau is believed to be the father of Edomites, a Semitic tribe often in conflict with the Jews. According to the biblical story, God had ordered his ‘chosen people’, the Israelites, to completely obliterate the Amalekites. No Western leader condemned this blatantly ‘genocidal’ statement by the Israeli Prime Minister. Juan Cole, an American academic and expert on West Asian politics, has charged the Netanyahu government of declaring ‘a holy war of annihilation of civilians in Gaza’.3 The Israeli President, Isaac Herzog, had earlier asserted that there were ‘no innocent civilians’ in Gaza. The Israeli Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, vowed to ‘eliminate everything’ in Gaza. The Israeli government’s ‘genocidal intent’ has become even more evident after three months of war. The number of people killed in the war on Gaza has exceeded the casualty figures of three previous major Arab–Israeli wars. In 1948, the year Israel was recognised as an independent state, around 15,000 Palestinians were killed as they were forcibly dislocated from their ancestral land. More than 20,000 people were killed when Israel invaded Lebanon to remove the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Yasser Arafat from the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Genocide, Atrocities, Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu, Armed Conflict, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
Middle East, India, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

4. The EU’s Response to the Gaza War Is a Tale of Contradiction and Division

Author:
Martin Konečný
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Since the Hamas attacks on October 7 and the start of Israel’s retaliatory offensive in the Gaza Strip, European Union (EU) member states have broadly split into three camps. At one end are those who have professed to stand “on the side of Israel”, flying its flag on government buildings, backing its military campaign, and avoiding criticism even after the Israeli army flattened most of Gaza and killed thousands of Palestinian civilians. The Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary stand out in this camp, followed by Germany. At the other end of the spectrum are governments that proclaim to stand “on the side of peace” and, while strongly condemning Hamas, have been calling for a ceasefire and openly criticizing Israel for violating international humanitarian law. Belgium, Spain, and Ireland are the most vocal members of this moderate camp, followed by France and several others. The third, middle camp, is made up of those who are somewhere in between the first two groups: siding with Israel but in less absolute terms than the first camp. It would be wrong to label the moderate camp as “pro-Palestinian”. The fact is that there is no pro-Palestinian camp at the level of EU governments: none of them has hoisted Palestinian flags or primarily condemned the Israeli occupation or its devastating Gaza offensive, as many countries in the so-called Global South have done. The only vocal exception may be Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister Yolanda Díaz of the leftwing Sumar party who has denounced “Israeli apartheid” and called for sanctions and an arms embargo against Israel. However, her statements do not represent the position of the government as a whole.
Topic:
European Union, Hamas, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

5. Security and Peace After the War in Gaza

Author:
Ibrahim Awad
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Is the two-state solution feasible? In order to pursue such a policy, the international community must be able to overcome three main points of contention: Israeli occupation, the creation of a Palestinian state, and the role of Hamas
Topic:
Security, Self Determination, Refugees, Hamas, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Two-State Solution
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

6. Hamas, ISIL, and Israel: An Exercise in Comparison

Author:
Ayman Zaineldine
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
One of Israel’s main responses to the October 7 attacks was to declare that “Hamas is ISIL,” and that the world should thus unite in support for Israel to eliminate it. But others are not sure, and ask whether Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, and its practices as an occupying power, is even more worthy of global sanction
Topic:
Islamic State, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

7. Palestine: Public Opinion Report 2023, Part 1

Author:
Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Domestically, AB8 Shows most Palestinians did not support Hamas on the eve of October the 7th war; but the war led to a significant rise in Hamas’ popularity and a significant decline in the standing of the PA leadership among the Palestinians. The war also led to a significant rise in support for armed struggle in the West Bank. Nonetheless, after the eruption of the war, Hamas did not gain a majority support in either Gaza or the West Bank and support for the two-state solution did not decline These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side. The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement. This report is the first in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB. It addresses two important issues covered by AB8: the domestic balance of power in the Palestinian territories and the state of Palestinian-Israeli relations. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these two topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in two of its regular polls, one conducted before AB8 and one after it. The poll conducted after AB8 came several weeks after the launch of Hamas’ October the 7th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Hamas, October 7, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

8. An International Peace Conference in the Aftermath of the Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Arie Kacowicz
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip might evolve in the next few weeks into its ‘third stage’, following the aerial bombardment and the massive ground operation undertaken by the IDF into a low-intensity warfare and the establishment of buffer zones with or without a limited Israeli military presence in the enclave. The way the war is being prosecuted will determine the range of political options in its aftermath. Despite the reluctance of the current Israeli government to engage in any substantial long-term political discussion about the “day after” in terms of any significant blueprints or scenarios, it is imperative to draw a coherent road map regarding the feasible diplomatic options for the immediate and long-term perspectives regarding Israel’s exit from Gaza in the aftermath of the war, including the political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Taking into consideration the lack of political willingness and/or ability of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace after the war, the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic political repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), this paper examines the possible role and functions that an International Peace Conference (IPC) might fulfil in granting domestic and international legitimacy and the drawing of a coherent road map leading to de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, any IPC should also address the larger political issue regarding the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of the fulfillment of UNGA Resolution 181 (1947) and the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, following UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), 1850 (2008), and 2334 (2016). The policy paper draws on historical precedents from other conflicts, as well as reflecting on examples and experiences from the Arab-Israeli conflict, first and foremost the relevant and successful example of the Madrid Conference of October 1991. The major insight to be drawn is that an IPC is a necessary but not sufficient political diplomatic ingredient in the road map leading to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war in the immediate term, as well as to peace negotiations towards the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State alongside Israel.
Topic:
Negotiation, Peace, Hamas, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

9. The Gaza War: Military Quagmire, Political Labyrinth

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
As the Israeli conflict in Gaza marks its third month, Israel has been unable to achieve military decisiveness. The resolution of the hostage issue and the administration of the Strip remain uncertain. Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions, leading to an expansion in the circle of those opposing Israel.
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

10. The Day After: Competing Visions for the Future of the Gaza Strip

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Proposals for Gaza's future post-war vary from direct reoccupation to resistance factions' control, with an intermediary suggestion of local authority under the Palestinian Authority, supported by Arabs. The pivotal factor is the resistance's ability to defeat the occupation.
Topic:
Governance, Reconstruction, Occupation, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Palestinian Authority, 2023 Gaza War, and Armed Resistance
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza