Netanyahu insists on violating the rules of engagement established since 7 October 2023, relying on military solutions to achieve his political goals and Israel's strategic objectives. However, this can only be realised if the link between Palestinian resistance in Gaza and its external support fronts is severed.
Topic:
Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu, Armed Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Rules of Engagement
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, and Lebanon
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Dr. Selin Nasi discusses how Erdogan has limited Turkey's relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by openly supporting Hamas in recent months.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
The proposal that the Biden administration attributes to Israel does not promise an end to the war, much less Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. While claiming to support the proposal, Prime Minister Netanyahu also asserts that “we have maintained the goals of the war, first of them the destruction of Hamas.” Is this consistent with the proposal? It is. How?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Hamas, Ceasefire, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America
The Middle East Institute hosted an on-the-record briefing on current Israel-Hamas cease-fire negotiations and likely outcomes in the coming days and weeks.
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Ansar Allah, known as the “Houthi movement,” has conducted attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea since October 2023. This event is now known as the “Red Sea Crisis.” Classifying Ansar Allah as merely an Iranian proxy, or categorizing its actions as a mere response to the conflict in Gaza and support for Hamas, inadequately explains these attacks. This article uses the cultural topography method to analyze the culture of the movement and provide alternative motivations for the attacks, such as consolidating domestic support and crafting a strong national appearance. The article concludes that Ansar Allah’s attacks on the Red Sea are more motivated by the belief they will yield pragmatic and material benefits for the movement rather than ideological or cultural overlap with Palestine or Iran.
Topic:
Houthis, Hamas, Shipping, Regional Politics, 2023 Gaza War, and Ansar Allah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Gaza
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
For years, the Gaza Strip has been of secondary importance, with the General Staff focusing primarily on the northern front and Iran. This focus has come at the expense of intelligence gathering, building operational plans, and operational attention to Gaza.
The toing and froing of proposals and counterproposals for a ceasefire in Gaza has been going on for months now. The talks between the Israeli government and Hamas, however, have never really been about numbers: how many hostages to release, which ones, in return for how many and which prisoners, and how many days of truce. The sticking point is another: Hamas calls for the end of the war, and the Israeli government for the end of Hamas. This means that, in reality, the stand-off is all about the “day after”. How can a government be established in Gaza that ensures freedom and development on one side, and security on the other one?
And yet, that’s what no one has been working on. While most mediators admit by now that Hamas will not be destroyed, in the ceasefire talks the issue of the “day after” continues not to be factored in.
The Palestinian reconciliation agreement signed in Beijing on 22 July[1] did not attract much attention. It is easy to understand why. Many agreements like it have been signed between Fatah and Hamas since the 1980s and have not been implemented. What is different about this agreement? The difference does not lie in the prospects for reconciliation, which may materialise or ultimately fail like its predecessors, but rather in the contents to which the Hamas movement has agreed. In other words, the novelty is not in the reconciliation but in Hamas’s modified positions.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Hamas, and Reconciliation
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
One year after the onset of the current crisis in the Middle East, following Hamas’ deadly attack on southern Israel on 7 October, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vow of “complete victory” and the “elimination” of Hamas as a threat to Israel1 remains unfulfilled. While Israeli officials claim that Hamas no longer exists as a military force in Gaza, ACLED data show that Hamas still retains some operational capabilities and continues to engage with Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Hamas has also escalated its military activities in the West Bank. With the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently having shifted focus to confronting Hezbollah in the north and no ceasefire in Gaza in sight, Hamas continues to remain a significant actor in Palestine despite its now-diminished military capabilities and the significant humanitarian toll on Palestinians in Gaza.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Hamas, Humanitarian Crisis, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In a significant development, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran on 31 July in an attack attributed to Israel,1 just a day after Israel claimed responsibility for the death of a top Hezbollah commander in the south of Beirut. Following the 7 October attacks that killed around 1,200 Israelis, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have killed dozens of Hamas senior figures and commanders during their intense campaign in Gaza. But also beyond Gaza, Israel has targeted senior figures of Hamas and other allied members of the ‘axis of resistance.’ The recent events mark the latest in a series of at least 34 Israeli attacks that have led to the death of at least 39 commanders and senior members of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran in the past 10 months (see graph and map below).
Topic:
Extrajudicial Killings, Assassination, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War