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31. Iran and the Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Alistair Taylor and Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On this week's episode, MEI's Editor in Chief Alistair Taylor talks to Iran Program Director Alex Vatanka about Iran and the Israel-Hamas war. As fighting rages in Gaza and the prospects for regional escalation continue to mount, Iran will remain a critical actor to watch. It is not only Israel’s main regional foe but also the leading provider of military aid and training for Hamas. Given the centrality of Iran in this latest Middle Eastern war, understanding how Tehran views the conflict and its endgame will be critical.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Escalation, Military Aid, Regional Politics, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

32. Will the Israel-Hamas Truce Be Extended?

Author:
Gerald Feierstein, Brian Katulis, and Rachel Dooley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing titled 'Will the Israel-Hamas Truce Be Extended?' on Wednesday, November 29, 2023, featuring former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and MEI Distinguished Senior Fellow Amb. Gerald Feierstein as well as MEI Vice President of Policy Brian Katulis. The briefing delved into the evolving dynamics arising from the temporary pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas, along with the potential for an extended truce and the release of more hostages and prisoners.
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and Truce
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

33. Teach-In on Gaza

Author:
Race and Rights (CSRR) Center for Security
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Teach-In on Gaza
Topic:
Human Rights, History, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Palestinians, and Blockade
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

34. Starr Forum: The Israel-Hamas conflict: Expert perspectives on the ongoing crisis

Author:
Marsin Alshamary, David Kirkpatrick, Peter Krause, Steven Simon, and Evan Lieberman
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Speakers: Marsin Alshamary on the regional impact. Alshamary, MIT PhD '20, is an assistant professor at Boston College, and an expert on religion, civil society and social movements in the Shi’a Middle East. David Kirkpatrick on Hamas’s strategy. Kirkpatrick is a staff writer for The New Yorker and has worked for more than two decades as a reporter for the New York Times. Peter Krause on the historical context and Israeli strategy. Krause, MIT PhD '11, is an associate professor of political science at Boston College, and an expert on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. Steven Simon on US policy. Simon, a former Robert E Wilhelm Fellow at CIS, served as the National Security Council (NSC) senior director for the Middle East and North Africa during the Obama Administration and as the NSC senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House. Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa at MIT and the director of the Center for International Studies (CIS).
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Hamas, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

35. Emile Bustani Seminar: "The Egyptian army in the 1967 Six-Day War: Lessons for the present"

Author:
Khaled Fahmy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Few events in modern Middle Eastern history were as central as the Six-Day War of 1967. Surpassed in its significance probably only by the Nakba of 1948, the Naksa, or “setback,” as the 1967 war was euphemistically called, saw Israel inflicting a decisive defeat on three of its Arab neighbors combined. Of all the belligerent countries, Egypt was the most deeply affected. Its army was obliterated; its territory occupied; its leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, once the undisputed leader of Egypt and the Arab World, was a broken man; and Nasserism was dealt a death blow. This talk looks closely into the performance of the Egyptian army in Sinai over the 36 hours of combat. It argues that while the defeat was inevitable, given Israel’s military, diplomatic and economic superiority, the scale, speed and depth of the Egyptian army’s defeat requires a close look at civil-military relations. Specifically, it looks at how the Egyptian army, starting from 1961, had deviated from its military mandate and encroached on all aspects of the economy, creating what was termed “a state within a state”. The paper also tracks the fatal steps undertaken by Abdel-Hakim Amir, the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, to snatch control of the army from Nasser, so much so that by the outbreak of the war in June 1967 Nasser was ignorant of his army’s true capabilities. The talk concludes by drawing comparisons with the present-day army under President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and asks to what degree the current army’s preoccupation running its economic empire has affected its fighting capabilitie
Topic:
History, Armed Conflict, Military, and Six-Day War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North Africa, and Egypt

36. Israel and the United States Did Not See the 1973 War Coming

Author:
Zaki Shalom
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Israel’s mistaken pre-war assumptions about the 1973 War caused it to fail to foresee the potential outbreak of a war with Egypt and Syria. What were these calculations based on and why did the United States follow suit? In early October 1973, Israeli intelligence agencies began to receive information regarding Egypt’s (and Syria’s) intention to launch a war against Israel in the coming days. The timing of the expected offensive was not yet known. Only in the early morning of October 6, 1973, would a highly reliable intelligence agent of the Mossad inform Israeli authorities that war would begin in the late afternoon hours. The exact time was not mentioned, but for one reason or another the Israelis believed the Egyptian military offensive would begin at 6:00 pm. Concurrently, Egypt began to deploy massive military power along the Suez Canal, very close to Israel’s military forces on the other side of the canal. The war broke out at 2:00 pm—four hours before the expected time.
Topic:
Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, Military, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and United States of America

37. Miscalculations and Legacies: A Look Back at the 1973 War Half a Century On

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The October 1973 War is bound to continue to fascinate historians and many others for a long time to come. There are countless dimensions to the last of the Arab-Israeli interstate wars. The obvious military aspects of the war alone are worth thousands of pages. Then there is the superpower dimension, given that the 1973 War was the first conflict of the new period of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is also a leadership angle, since none of the three leaders of the United States, Egypt, and Israel were around during the 1967 War and each felt they were now being tested. There are also the public domestic dynamics and decision-making struggles each country faced, alongside other countries with various levels of engagement like Syria and Jordan. Moreover, there is the role of regional players before, during, and after the war. Needless to say, historians of the war will remain busy for quite some time. I will explore two of these many dimensions: first, an example of the miscalculations within the United States, Israel, and Egypt that impacted the war and second, the legacies of the 1973 War that cannot be separated from the miscalculations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Armed Conflict, Henry Kissinger, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt

38. The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza

Author:
Nir Arielli, Jacob Stoil, and Mary Elizabeth Walters
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
While the current Israeli military operation seeks to degrade the military capabilities of Hamas, the Israeli government has not put forward a coherent plan for what should happen to the Gaza Strip once the operation is over. The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip. An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border. An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks. Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial. Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control. Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages. Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reconstruction, Peacekeeping, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

39. Al-Aqsa Flood: The Collapse of Israeli Deterrence and Attempts to Restore It

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The Palestinian resistance dealt a significant blow to the Israeli occupation, leading Israel to retaliate by launching an aggressive campaign on Gaza with full Western support. The objective was to eradicate Hamas and establish a pro-Israel authority in Gaza. However, several factors may impede this outcome, as seen in comparable conflicts.
Topic:
Occupation, Deterrence, Hamas, Armed Conflict, October 7, and Al-Aqsa Flood
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

40. Israel Is Doing Exactly What Hamas Wants It to Do

Author:
Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The conflict between Hamas and Israel is a tragedy in a world already rife with too many crises. Hamas’s massive attack on Israel, predominantly targeting families and children, cannot be justified by the prolonged history of Israel’s occupation of Palestine, no matter how brutal and indifferent the approach to the fate of Palestinians may have been. Just yesterday, a hospital in the north of the Gaza Strip was bombed, causing the loss of hundreds of lives. The ongoing blame game between the two parties further illustrates the deepening hostilities, no matter who is ultimately found to be responsible. In carrying out this attack, Hamas never believed it would overthrow the Israeli state by military force. Rather, it has followed a well-worn playbook of terrorist organizations that aim to provoke excessive retaliation by military and state forces, fostering further grievances and creating a broader base of civil resistance and strife. This basic strategy has been followed by terrorist groups as diverse as the Red Army Faction, Irgun and the Stern Group, and Al-Qaeda. The State of Israel is now, unfortunately, following this playbook, responding with lethal actions in the Gaza Strip. The degree of shock and outrage in Israeli society cannot be overestimated—the more than 1,400 dead are, in proportion to Israel’s size, the equivalent of more than 45,000 dead in the United States. Yet, its response is disproportionate and knowingly breaches international humanitarian law. Israel has demanded that one million Palestinians evacuate their homes and has cut off energy, food supplies, medical supplies, and water to the Gaza Strip. In this piece, Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally discuss what should the international community do to prevent an irreversible downward spiral in both societies, in the conflict between them, and in the spillover to the rest of the world?
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza