981. Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don’t Know
- Author:
- Peter Krause
- Publication Date:
- 02-2007
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Troop levels in Iraq have been one of the most hotly contested issues om American foreign policy over the past three years, from debates over the initial deployment in 2003 to those surrounding the troop surge in 2007. The Bush administration has faced significant criticism for ignoring the conventional wisdom regarding the number of soldiers required to secure Iraq, and recent attempts to change course in this area are seen by some as too little, too late. Specifically, the Pentagon’s deployment of only 120,000 American troops for the invasion and the decision by Paul Bremer, U.S. Administrator in Iraq, to disband the Iraqi army and police has kept the ratio of security forces to Iraqi civilians well below the 20 per 1,000 seen as the basic ante required to play the high stakes stabilization game. Many supporters of higher troop levels blame these missteps for the emergence of the robust insurgency and the coalition’s failure to defeat it. But where exactly does the 20 per 1,000 figure come from, how strong is the evidence sup- porting it, and what steps are being taken to assess and improve the conventional wisdom in this area? While the answer to the first part of the question is relatively accessible, the latter are more difficult. They address a daunting problem, but unveil a disconnect between the objectives and methods of policy and social science.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Iraq War, and Troop Deployment
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Middle East, and North America