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651. Private Security Companies and the Imperfect Reach of the United States Criminal Justice System

Author:
Christopher M. Kovach
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
Mercenaries are dangerously unreliable. According to Machiavelli, employing mercenaries or foreign troops “limited freedom of action and created dependence on other powers.” Yet for the first time in its history, and despite cautionary words against condottieri, the United States is relying heavily on private firms to provide security services in an unstable environment. In fact, not since the seventeenth century has there been “such a reliance on private military actors to accomplish tasks directly affecting the success of military engagements.” But military excursions to foreign soil raise perennial issues related to the imposition of order, discipline, and training, the foundations upon which commanders traditionally build successful campaigns.
Political Geography:
United States and Iraq

652. Perception, Memory, and Partisan Polarization on the Iraq War

Author:
Gary C. Jacobson
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
GARY C. JACOBSON analyzes four surveys designed to investigate partisan polarization on the Iraq war. He finds that modes of motivated reasoning, including motivated skepticism and selective perception, selective memory, and selective exposure, contributed strongly to the emergence of the unusually wide differences of opinion on the war.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Iraq

653. Colin Powell: American Power and Intervention From Vietnam to Iraq

Author:
Christopher Paul
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Colin Powell had a remarkable career of public service, serving ten Presidents, beginning with his commission into the Army in 1958 under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. His career as a senior official is most noteworthy: “ Of the seven seats on the National Security Council (NSC) he has held three ” (p. 2). This career provided him with an unparalleled level of intimacy with the recent history of U.S. military intervention. “ In one capacity or another, Powell was involved in almost all major American military engagements over the past four decades ” (p. 197).
Political Geography:
Iraq and America

654. Iraq After the Election: Meeting the Challenges of 2010

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Paralysis by democracy : lack of national unity government Lack of government effectiveness and capacity at every level Remnants of insurgency and possible revival Sectarian and ethnic challenges Budget crisis, crippled economy, loss of foreign aid Halt in progress in developing Iraqi security forces Coming US withdrawal Uncertain neighbors
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

655. U.S. led privatized counterinsurgency operations in conflict zones: One mistake followed by another blunder

Author:
Shantanu Chakrabarti
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Calcutta
Abstract:
On 18th July 2010, in one of the deadliest single terrorist strikes in Iraq this year, nearly forty three persons were killed and many were left seriously injured. The prime target of the latest terror strike were the members of the so called 'Sunni Awakening' Movement, consisting of motley groups of Sunni tribesmen of Iraq who have been recruited and used by the US army and the Iraqi administration as vigilante groups to target the insurgency groups and Al Qaeda operatives within the country since 2006. Similar Shiite vigilante groups have also been propped up in Iraq primarily to target Shiite insurgency groups like the Al Mahdi. Though such terror strikes in conflict ridden Iraq and Afghanistan have almost become incidents of everyday occurrence, the recent attack signifies another ominous trend- the American efforts to extend their version of a privatized counterinsurgency war, oblivious to the associated dangers and long term implications in areas where such strategy is being implemented.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Sectarianism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Arabia

656. Security Is More Than "20" Percent

Author:
Ronald Neumann
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Security is only 20 percent of the solution; 80 percent is governance and development." "There is no military solution to insurgency." These and similar statements have rightly refocused counterinsurgency doctrine and popular thinking away from purely military solutions to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet these catchphrases have become substitutes for deeper consideration of the role of security in the current conflicts and in insurgency in general, hiding some important points and leading to assumptions that are an insufficient basis for policy.
Topic:
Development and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Iraq

657. Adjusting to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Author:
Robert Hoekstra and Charles Tucker Jr.
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Drawing on the lessons learned from coalition interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, by mid-2004, a consensus developed within the executive branch, Congress, and among independent experts that the U.S. Government required a more robust capacity to prevent conflict (when possible) and (when necessary) to manage “Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations [SROs] in countries emerging from conflict or civil strife.”
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo

658. Leaving the Civilians Behind: The "Soldier-diplomat" in Afghanistan and Iraq

Author:
Edward Burke
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The militarization of aid in conflict zones is now a reality and is likely to increase exponentially in the future. Stability operations are critical to the success of any viable counterinsurgency strategy. Yet in much of Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian officials working alone have proven incapable of successfully distributing and monitoring stabilization funds or implementing associated operations; thus, they have required close cooperation with the military. Many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries have not adequately addressed deficiencies in models of civil-military cooperation, with severe repercussions for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some government development agencies complain that the delivery of aid by the military can exacerbate the targeting of civilian aid workers. Highlighting the failure of civilian agencies to cooperate effectively with the military may provide temporary vindication to skeptics within the NGO community, but such criticism does not solve the critical dilemma of how to deliver reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to the most violent parts of Afghanistan and Iraq or other nonpermissive environments.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and NATO
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Iraq

659. Organized Crime in Iraq: Strategic Surprise and Lessons for Future Contingencies

Author:
Phil Williams
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
After the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States encountered a series of strategic surprises, including the hostility to the occupation, the fragility of Iraq's infrastructure, and the fractious nature of Iraqi politics. One of the least spectacular but most significant of these surprises was the rise of organized crime and its emergence as a postconflict spoiler. This development was simply not anticipated. Organized crime in Iraq in the months and years after March 2003 emerged as a major destabilizing influence, increasing the sense of lawlessness and public insecurity, undermining the efforts to regenerate the economy, and financing the violent opposition to the occupation forces. In 2003, the theft of copper from downed electric pylons made the restoration of power to the national grid much more difficult. In 2008, the capacity to generate funds through criminal activities enabled al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to continue resisting both the U.S. military and the Iraqi government. Moreover, with the planned U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, organized crime in the country will continue to flourish by maintaining well established crime-corruption networks. It might also expand by exploiting the continued weakness of the Iraqi state.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States and Iraq

660. Building a Civilian Lessons Learned System

Author:
Bernard Carreau and Melanne Civic
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In addition to the problems of building and maintaining an effective civilian presence in Afghanistan and Iraq is the matter of developing institutional knowledge in the civilian agencies—what works and what does not work in the field. The task is all the more daunting because civilian agencies do not have a core mission to maintain expertise in stabilizing war-torn countries, particularly those experiencing major counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. Yet the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Departments of Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and other agencies have been sending personnel to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fragile states for several years now. The agencies have relied on a combination of direct hires, temporary hires, and contractors, but nearly all of them have been plagued by relatively short tours and rapid turnarounds, making it difficult to establish enduring relationships on the ground and institutional knowledge in the agencies. The constant coming and going of personnel has led to the refrain heard more and more frequently that the United States has not been fighting the war in Afghanistan for 8 years, but rather for just 1 year, eight times in a row.
Topic:
Development and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq