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1171. Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: What's the Connection?

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
It is widely speculated in the media that the relationship between the Shi'a government of Iran and the Sunni insurgent group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, is a hostile one, primarily because of the sectarian differences between the two. However, there is clear evidence of Iranian support for another Sunni group, the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is worth investigating the potential links between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iranian regime, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGCQF). The dossier below contains articles, press releases, and Defense Department briefings from the last year that consider the nature of this relationship. While it may not present a definitive explanation of the connection between these groups, it does suggest possible links exist between the groups and the sectarian grounds for dismissing the relationship are likely too simplistic. The most relevant passages have been highlighted in yellow.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Taliban

1172. From the ‘‘Red Juggernaut’’ to Iraqi WMD: Threat Inflation and How It Succeeds in the United States

Author:
Jeffrey M. Cavanaugh
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
JEFFREY M. CAVANAUGH analyzes the process of ‘‘threat inflation’’ in the United States by examining three positive cases and one negative case of threat inflation since 1945. He concludes that successful threat inflation and hawkish policies stem from the interaction of several factors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1173. Iraq's Three Civil Wars

Author:
Juan Cole
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
All war situations are a little bit opaque, but from reading the Iraqi press in Arabic, I conclude that there are three major struggles for power of a political and violent sort. What’s striking is how little relevant the United States is. It is a superpower, and it is militarily occupying the country, but it appears most frequently to be in the position of going to the parties and saying, “Hey, guys, cut it out. Make nice. Please.” It’s odd that it should be so powerless in some ways, but let me explain. Then, there’s a war for Baghdad. This is the one that Americans tend to know about because the U.S. troops are in Baghdad, and so it’s being fought all around our guys, and we are drawn into it from time to time. The American public, when it thinks about this war, mainly thinks about attacks on U.S. troops, which are part of that war because the U.S. troops were seen by the Sunni Arabs as adjuncts to the Shiite paramilitaries, and they have really functioned that way. Most American observers of Iraq wouldn’t say that the U.S. is an enabler of the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps paramilitaries of these Shiite fundamentalist parties, but you could make the case that, functionally speaking, that’s how it’s worked out. The U.S. has mainly taken on the remnants of the Ba’ath party, the Salafi jihadis, and other Sunni groups, and has tried to disarm them, tried to kill them, and has opened a space for the Shiite paramilitaries to claim territory and engage in ethnic cleansing and gain territory and power. So that battle between the Sunni Arabs and the Shiite Arabs is going on in Baghdad, is going on in the hinterlands of Baghdad, up to the northeast to Diyala Province, and then south to Babil and so forth. And finally, as if all that weren’t enough, there is a war in the north for control of Kirkuk, which used to be called by Saddam “Ta’mim Province”. Kirkuk Province has the city of Kirkuk in it and very productive oil fields, in the old days at least. Kirkuk is not part of the Kurdistan Regional Authority, which was created by melding three northern provinces together into a super province; however, the Kurdistan Regional Authority wishes to annex Kirkuk to the authority. Regional governments are super-provinces or provincial confederations. Try to imagine what happened—Iraq had 18 provinces in the old days, but it now has 15 provinces and one regional authority. It would be as though Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana got together, erased their state borders, elected a joint parliament and a prime minister, and then told the Federal leaders in Washington that if they would like to communicate with any of those states, they need to go through the regional prime minister, and by the way, we’re not sending any more money to Washington. And don’t even think about keeping federal troops on our soil. So, this is what the Kurds have done. They’ve erased the provincial boundaries that created one Kurdistan government that had -- it has its own military. They’re giving out visas independent of Baghdad. They’re inviting companies in to explore for oil independent of Baghdad. They’re the Taiwan of the Middle East. They’re an independent country. They just don’t say that they are because it would cause a war.
Topic:
Civil War, Religion, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

1174. Does the “Surge” Explain Iraq’s Improved Security?

Author:
Jon R. Lindsay
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Sen. John McCain has long advocated “sustained and substantial” troop increases,1 attacking Sen. Barack Obama’s position on drawing down forces. Obama for his part recently stated that the surge has “succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated” and “beyond our wildest dreams.”2 Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi- National Corps Iraq during the surge, told a Heritage Foundation audience in March 2008, “I think it’s safe to say that the surge of Coalition forces—and how we employed those forces—have broken the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq.”3 While the surge was quite controversial in its inception,4 it now seems that “success has a thou- sand fathers.” Indeed, since the deployment starting in January 2007 of an additional 30,000 troops (five addi- tional Army brigades primarily in and around Baghdad and 4,000 Marines in Anbar Province, rising to a high-water mark of 171,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by October 2007), the drop in vio- lence has been remarkable. From December 2006 to August 2008, monthly insurgent-initiated attacks have dropped from over 5,600 to 800, U.S. troop fatalities from 112 to 23, and Iraqi civilian fatalities from 3,500 to 500. Even though we’re hardly out of the woods, the troop surge is clearly correlated with a major decrease in violence.5 Correlation, of course, is not causation. Lt. Gen. Odierno is right to highlight the employment of surge forces in addition to the increase in their numbers. The renewed focus on providing security to the Iraqi population—by pushing troops out of sprawling Forward Operating Bases and proactively controlling movement within major cities—has truly been a change for the bet- ter. Nevertheless, there are factors above and beyond additional troops and better counter-insur- gency tactics that may account for the drop in violence. These include the Sunni Awakening movements that emerged in Anbar province prior to the surge, the tragic efficacy of sectarian killing in 2006, the Shia Mahdi Army cease-fire announced and renewed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and operations by other U.S. organizations not associated with the surge.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1175. Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout

Author:
Brian Fishman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph Felter, Peter Bergen, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report is the second to assess the demographics, procedures, finances, and leadership of al-Qa`ida’s foreign fighters, especially those currently fighting in Iraq. It analyzes al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) operations from spring 2006 to summer 2007 and includes almost 600 AQI personnel records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, AQI contracts for suicide bombers, AQI contracts for fighters leaving Iraq, narratives written by al-Qa`ida’s Syrian smugglers, and AQI financial records.
Topic:
Radicalization, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

1176. Iranian Strategy in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means” assesses Iran’s strategy to project influence in Iraq and the means it uses to do so. This report addresses Iran’s dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran’s political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. This report provides an overview of Iran’s multi-faceted efforts to pursue its national interests by influencing the political and security dynamics in Iraq from the Iranian Revolution to the present day. Although the report describes Iran’s direct and indirect lethal aid to surrogates in Iraq since the U.S. led invasion, it ultimately concludes that U.S. policy focuses on Iranian lethal aid to Iraqi militias at the expense of countering Iran’s primary mode of power projection in Iraq: support of Iranian-affiliated Iraqi political parties. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends.
Topic:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Quds Force, and Jaysh al-Mahdi
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

1177. Getting the fundamentals right: Rising to the humanitarian challenge in Iraq

Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
While horrific violence dominates the lives of millions of ordinary people inside Iraq, another kind of crisis, also due to the impact of war, has been slowly unfolding. Up to eight million people are now in need of emergency assistance. This figure includes: four million people who are 'food-insecure and in dire need of different types of humanitarian assistance' more than two million displaced people inside Iraq over two million Iraqis in neighbouring countries, mainly Syria and Jordan, making this the fastest-growing refugee crisis in the world.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

1178. Obstinate or obsolete? The US alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
William T. Tow and Amitav Acharya
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian National University Department of International Relations
Abstract:
The longstanding US security network of bilateral alliances in the Asia–Pacific, also known as the 'San Francisco System', has reached a historical crossroads. Its purpose is becoming more questionable as the United States, its allies and friends and other key Asian security actors engage in an increasingly complex set of regional security relationships. This paper argues that while the San Francisco System will not be dissolved over the near-term, it must adapt to rapidly changing structural and politico-economic conditions in the region if its utility is to be sustained and its eventual conversion into a more relevant and effective network of Asia–Pacific order-building. It argues that 'alliance mutuality' is the essential element in any such conversion process.
Topic:
International Relations and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, South Asia, and Australia/Pacific

1179. Is The “Surge” Working? Some New Facts

Author:
Michael Greenstone
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new da ta file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge's impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets' assessment of Iraq's future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and War
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

1180. Iraq Trip Report

Author:
Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack
Publication Date:
08-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
From July 17-25 we travelled extensively in central, western and nor thern Iraq. The trip was sponsored by the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) command and so afforded unparalleled access to U.S. and Iraqi military personnel. We spoke at length with the four principal American division commands in those sectors, as well as nearly half of the brigade commanders and their staffs, as well as several battalion and even company commanders. We also met with senior U.S. personnel from the Detainee Forces command, and from the training command known as MNSTCI, as well as a number of Iraqi police and army officers. Similarly, MNF-I saw to it that we were able to meet with key civilian personnel in a variety of PRTs/EPRTs, the U.S. Ambassador, the President's Special Envoy, the CIA station, the US AID mission, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. Both through our own contacts and those of the military, we also were able to meet with a number of the senior most members of the current Iraqi government (including President Talabani, Vice President 'Abd al-Mahdi, Foreign Minister Zebari, Deputy Prime Minister Salih, and National Security Adviser ar-Rubaie).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East