May 1, 2003 President George W. Bush declares an end to major combat operations in Iraq. The U.S. lost 138 soldiers during the war. Seven U.S. soldiers are wounded when grenades are thrown at an American base in Fallujah, a stronghold for Saddam Hussein loyalists. Earlier, U.S. troops killed 15 civilians at a protest in the city.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Development
During an official visit to Washington DC on September 20th, 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal proclaimed: “US policy in Iraq is widening sectarian divisions to the point of effectively handing the country to Iran…. We fought a war together to keep Iran out of Iraq, now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason…. Iraq is disintegrating.”
Topic:
International Relations
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Washington, Middle East, Arabia, and Maryland
Wartime is scarcely the easiest time for demanding self criticism, but the recent exchanges between the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense over the mistakes the US did or did not make in Iraq have highlighted the fact that the US must both admit its mistakes and learn from them to win in Iraq and successfully engage in the “long war.” The full chronology of what happened in US planning and operations before, during, and immediately after the fight to drive Saddam Hussein from power is still far from clear. It is now much easier to accuse given US leaders than it is to understand what really happened or assign responsibility with credibility.
The US aid effort in Iraq has not accomplished most of its sectoral goals, and more importantly, has not effectively initiated the reconstruction of the country's economy. After three years of struggle, the expenditure of more than $ 20 billion US aid funds, $ 37 billion Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) - UN accumulated from the oil for food program's revenues and the seizure of bank accounts- and death of thousands of US and other coalition soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqis, Iraq is producing less oil, has less electricity and less water than it did during the Saddam period. After studying the modern Iraqi economic history as a background, this work analyzes why.
The rising insurgency in Iraq has become a “war after the war” that threatens to divide Iraq and thrust it into full-scale civil war. It dominates the struggle to reshape Iraq as a modern state, has become a growing threat to the Gulf Region, and has become linked to the broader struggle between Sunni and Shi'ite Islamist extremism and moderation and reform throughout the Islamic world.
I was originally asked to address the five areas where our country has the most need to invest more for its security. This, however, is not the approach I would currently take to either issues involving national security or federal spending. In fact, my approach is almost the opposite. I am not a “spend without taxing” Republican, and I don't find much to celebrate in a President and Congress that have done the worst job of fiscal management in our nation's post-World War II history, if not our nation's entire history.
The Iraq crisis has been a stress test for the transatlantic partners.1 It is the latest in a series that at once has been revealing and redefining their relationship since the Cold War's end. The first Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo: each measured the ability of Americans and Europeans to continue working effectively together. Each highlighted distinctive habits of national mind and action obscured by the exigencies of the Cold War. Each raised pointed questions about the pattern of interaction between the United States and its major allies. Each provided insights into the capabilities, limitations, and internal strains of multilateral organizations: NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. Each altered attitudes and images in ways that affected how the next crisis was handled.
Topic:
International Relations and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Bosnia, Middle East, Kosovo, and United Nations
In this paper, Ramesh Thakur examines the implications of the Iraq War for the UN, shows how the goals being pursued in Iraq have been undermined by the means, and argues that the liberation of the people from Saddam Hussein's brutal regime was a collateral benefit amidst much damage to principles, institutions and relations. His thesis is that the Iraq War has complicated the international community's efforts to fashion a robust collective response to the nuclear challenge posed by Iran. The war's legacies include diminished Western credibility in highlighting an Iran threat, narrower policy options in responding to the nuclear challenge, and an Iran that is simultaneously politically stronger in Iraq, richer due to rising oil prices, and more emboldened and motivated on national security.
Humanitarian intervention entered into the agenda of the international community once again after the Kosovo intervention of 1999. It is not one of the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force brought by the United Nations Charter. Despite all efforts to describe it as one of the justifiable causes of using force against another state in 1970s and 1990s, both states' attitudes and writers' elaborations show clearly that it is not accepted as a legal exception even by intervening states in Kosovo. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, debates of humanitarian intervention first dropped from the agenda, but later it became a hot topic once again as one of the reasons of the invasion. Nevertheless, there is a small minority considers the invasion as an example of humanitarian intervention and their argument is not persuasive because of the still insecure conditions in Iraq.
The aftermath of the invasion of Iraq has been characterised by continued instability and insecurity. In the midst of all this certain questions have been recurrently asked.Why has Tony Blair, given such unwavering support to the US invasion of Iraq, againts the wishes of the UN, Britain's key European partners, and a majority of public opinion? What, in short, is the overwhelming British interest that an invasion was supposed to protect? This essay argues that the key to understanding Britain's persistent support of the US lies mainly in the notion of the "special relationship".