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111. Germany's Bad Example for Iraq

Author:
Michael S. Greve
Publication Date:
10-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Berlin is far from Baghdad, and the Germans at least want to keep it that way. But for all the obvious differences, Germany's inconclusive election results and the impending constitutional referendum in Iraq point to some identical obstacles to effective and constitutional government. These obstacles are proportional representation and “cooperative federalism.” As it happens, well-meaning UN officials, NGOs, and U.S. advisers have been urging these constitutional arrangements upon numerous fledgling democracies, including Iraq. That may not be good advice.
Topic:
Government and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Baghdad, Germany, and Berlin

112. Entering the 'Tipping Period' in Iraq

Author:
Jeffrey White
Publication Date:
08-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Though armed insurgencies can last for a decade or more, they also can have decisive periods in which their paths are set, even if those paths do not become apparent for some time. Iraq appears to be entering just such a period of decision.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, and Government
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

113. The Three-Way Game: Iran, Iraq, and the United States

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
07-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The July 16–18 visit to Tehran by Iraqi prime minister Ibrahim Jafari and ten other members of his council of ministers has been hailed by some as the beginning of a new era in Iran-Iraq relations. In fact, the pattern of near-term relations was set during Iraqi defense minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi's preparatory visit to Iran on July 5–7. At a joint press conference on July 7 with his Iranian counterpart, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the Iraqi official fell victim to the oldest trick in the Iranian diplomatic playbook. Speaking well beyond what had been agreed by the two sides, Shamkhani announced “wide defense cooperation” and alluded to the imminent conclusion of a defense pact between the two countries (as Iran has done in the past with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). Al-Dulaimi was likewise forced to clarify the limited nature of the discussions while also taking pains to state, “Iraq will not be a source of insecurity and instability for any of its neighbors. Nobody can use [Iraqi territory] to attack its neighbors.” The message to both Tehran and Washington was clear: the three-way game between the governments of Iran, Iraq, and the United States has begun again. With Iraq caught in the middle, Baghdad intends to play an increasingly autonomous role as the game unfolds.
Topic:
International Relations, Government, and Oil
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Washington, and Middle East

114. Draft Constitution Gained, but an Important Opportunity Was Lost

Author:
Mona Iman
Publication Date:
10-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
While the outcome of Iraq's October 15 national referendum is uncertain, it is clear that many of Iraq's Sunni Arabs will vote against it. Why are Sunni Arabs opposed to a constitution that appears to give them the same opportunities for self-governance that it provides to Kurds and Shia?
Topic:
International Relations, Government, and Religion
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

115. Turbulent Transition in Iraq: Can It Succeed?

Author:
Judith S. Yaphe
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
One year after liberation, most Iraqis are impatient with the military occupation of their country. Although grateful for the removal of Saddam Hussein's cruel and repressive regime, many assumed the United States and its coalition members would soon go home and leave them to sort out their political, economic, and military fate. The war, after all, had been fought to liberate Iraqis from political tyranny, not to defeat the Iraqi people. Both U.S. and Iraqi expectations were high that the transition from oppression to democracy would be smooth and quick and that Iraqi political elites would move swiftly to ensure democratic rule.
Topic:
Government and Religion
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Arabia

116. China Brief,China's Reaction to America's Iraq Imbroglio

Author:
You Ji, Igor Rotar, Willy Lam, and Eric Teo
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership has been at pains not to appear to be gloating over the American quagmire in Iraq. Yet in terms of geopolitical calculus, there is little doubt Beijing sees America's worsening problems in Iraq as beneficial to China's global standing, diplomatically and militarily. Capitalizing on fissures in the international community over Iraq and America's war on terror, China has strengthened ties with key members of the European Union and the United Nations in an effort to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. Meanwhile, Chinese experts' scrutiny of the exploits as well as challenges of American and Allied Forces in Iraq will have a big impact on the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) ambitious modernization drive.
Topic:
International Relations, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, America, Europe, Israel, and Beijing

117. How Terrorism Affects American Diplomacy

Author:
Thomas O. Melia
Publication Date:
03-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Interviews with several dozen senior American diplomats-including ambassadors and others currently serving abroad-indicate that the daily conduct of U.S. diplomacy has recently been altered in significant ways by the elevated threat of terrorism against American interests made manifest on September 11, 2001; the worldwide War on Terror declared by President George W. Bush in consequence; and the prosecution of the war in Iraq, on which diplomats are as divided as other Americans regarding whether it is or is not part of the global War on Terror.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and America

118. The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq

Author:
Kirsti Samuels and Sebastian von Einsiedel
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Whether by accident or design, the United Nations increasingly finds itself in operations that seek to build or re-build the institutions of a state. This report discusses the challenges facing the UN in such state-building activities in the post-Iraq environment. Three sorts of challenges are reviewed: those arising from a lack of conceptual clarity on the aim of state-building, those resulting from the transformed strategic environment, and those operational and strategic challenges inherent to the complex task of state-building.
Topic:
Development, Government, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

119. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Progress toward a stable peace in Iraq and the withdrawal of US troops begins with the painful recognition that America's recent troubles are largely self-inflicted. This is due principally to the adoption of mission objectives that far exceed what is necessary or pragmatic.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Middle East

120. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The key to enabling total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels and with Iraq's neighbors - especially Syria and Iran. The proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for the insurgency, inside and outside the country. This would allow the United States to shift resources to the training mission and to adopt other de-escalatory measures - most importantly: a withdrawal time line. The strategic price of this diplomatic initiative would be a return to self-governance in Sunni areas, a guaranteed level of representation for these areas in the national assembly, an end to broad-brush measures of de-Baathification, an amnesty for most indigenous insurgents and for most former Baathists, and a de-escalation of the US confrontation with Syria and Iran regarding a range of issues. In conjunction with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States would announce a tentative time line for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq -- associated with training milestones. Also: US forces would end major offensive sweeps inside the country, adopt a defensive posture, and shift the emphasis of their activity to training Iraqi security forces. Finally: the Iraqi government would re-activate portions of the old army -- partly as a confidence-building measure, but also in order to (i) rob insurgent organizations of their recruiting base, (ii) augment the power of the new Iraqi security forces, and (iii) produce a better ethnic balance in the new forces (which are currently dominated by Kurds and Shiites). As new forces increase in capacity, US forces would be removed, further reducing a stimulus of insurgent action. Four hundred days - 57 weeks - is sufficient time to complete several Iraqi training cycles, including field exercises for many units at the battalion and brigade levels. Some division level training also can occur. Given sufficient resources (24,000 training personnel), 100,000 Iraqi security personnel can receive remedial training and another 80,000 new personnel can be trained and exercised during this period. Together with the full provision of all appropriate equipment, this development effort can yield Iraqi security forces that are several times more capable than those it controls in mid-2005. After thirteen months, the only foreign military assets remaining in Iraq would be a small monitoring and training mission with a security detail: less than 10,000 foreign civilian and military personnel in all. US troops should constitute no more than one-third of the military component -- that is, approximately 2,000 troops. This mission should be conducted under a three-year UN mandate and joint NATO-international command. In addition, the United States might maintain a 25,000-person rapid reaction task force in the region, but outside either Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East