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361. Iran’s Revolutionary Influence in South Asia

Author:
Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Soon after Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979, its leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared that Iran would challenge “the world’s arrogant powers” across the globe. 1 “We shall export our revolution to the whole world,” he announced, adding that “Until the cry ‘There is no God but God’ resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.’” 2 The idea of exporting Iran’s ideology was also incorporated in the Islamic Republic’s constitution. Article 154 of the current Iranian constitution affirms that Iran “supports the just struggles of the mustad’afun [oppressed] against the mustakbirun [tyrants] in every corner of the globe.” As is often the case with revolutionary regimes, the early fervor of the Iranian revolution seems to have subsided and the broader goal of replicating the Islamic revolution has been modified to expanding Tehran’s influence and ensuring external support for the survival of its clerical regime. But Iran still pursues a robust policy of cultivating and deploying proxies in other, mainly Muslim countries. The role of Iran’s proxies and allies in the Middle East is well known, partly because it is more overt. Hezbollah’s targeting of Israel and its efforts to dominate Lebanon, Iran’s role in propping up the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, or its political and militant meddling in Iraq and Yemen often make headlines. But the Ayatollahs have also expanded their influence across South, Central, and East Asia without attracting the same level of attention as their activities in the Middle East.
Topic:
History, Ideology, Islamism, and Revolution
Political Geography:
Iran, South Asia, Indonesia, and Middle East

362. Trump, the Middle East, and North Africa: Just Leave Things to the Proxies?

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
When Trump says that he wants NATO to take more responsibility in the Middle East, what he means is that he wants the European allies to do more. He is campaigning for re- election and has promised to bring the boys (and girls) home for Christmas. And of course, in Iraq American troops are less than welcome these days, after the targeted assassination of Iranian General Soleimani near Baghdad airport (3 January 2020). In late 2019, Trump had already withdrawn most troops from Syria, and now the peace agreement with the Taliban (29 February 2020) will allow him to draw down the US military presence in Afghanistan too. And the US is considering pulling its troops out of the Sahel as well. What does this mean for Europe?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and North America

363. The Battle for the Soul of Islam

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
It is not the caliphate that the world’s Muslim powerhouses are fighting about. Instead, they are engaged in a deepening religious soft power struggle for geopolitical influence and dominance. This battle for the soul of Islam pits rival Middle Eastern and Asian powers against one another: Turkey, seat of the Islamic world’s last true caliphate; Saudi Arabia, home to the faith’s holy cities; the United Arab Emirates, propagator of a militantly statist interpretation of Islam; Qatar with its less strict version of Wahhabism and penchant for political Islam; Indonesia, promoting a humanitarian, pluralistic notion of Islam that reaches out to other faiths as well as non-Muslim centre-right forces across the globe; Morocco which uses religion as a way to position itself as the face of moderate Islam; and Shia Iran with its derailed revolution. In the ultimate analysis, no clear winner may emerge. Yet, the course of the battle could determine the degree to which Islam will be defined by either one or more competing stripes of ultra-conservativism—statist forms of the faith that preach absolute obedience to political rulers and/or reduce religious establishments to pawns of the state.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Islam, Politics, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates

364. Iran in Lebanon: A Fatal Occupation

Author:
Hassan Mneimneh
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2020, Lebanon should be celebrating its centenary. It is not. Instead, it is close to terminal collapse as a polity, an economy, and even as a society. Lebanon is under Iranian occupation, although ascertaining this condition may demand some attentive consideration from the uninitiated. Iran’s proponents assess it as a confirmation of the “Axis of Resistance” against imperialism and Zionism; its detractors ascribe it to a deliberate plan of Iranian expansion across the region. However, the Iranian occupation of Lebanon may be rooted in Lebanon’s own tumultuous history rather than in Tehran’s designs. Iran in Lebanon may be more an artifact of history than a product of strategy. In fact, the outcome of Lebanon’s present course may not yield Iran any tangible advantage. And it certainly seems to be on the verge of destroying Lebanon.
Topic:
International Relations, Corruption, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Radicalization, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Lebanon

365. Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran: Implications for US Nonproliferation Efforts

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Assessments of foreign policy tend to fall into one of two major camps: either they ascribe to a state’s actions all of the characteristics of a unitary actor, in which there is a decision made and executed as designed; or they fixate on the minutiae of the internal politics and deal making that went into the decision, underscoring the complexity of decision-making but often losing the thread of what results. This is particularly pernicious when involving the actions of a state with opaque decision-making and where attribution of responsibility is often itself the subject of intense internal political debate and controversy, as is the case with Iran. In this paper, Ariane Tabatabai seeks to pierce the veil of Iranian nuclear decision-making to both explain how decisions are reached and identify the effects of those decisions as a matter of Iranian state policy. This is, in many ways, an essential matter for those interested in understanding how Iran will decide—and what Iran may decide—to do in response to the continued stresses being imposed upon it by US-led international sanctions, especially when previous analysis has proven to be both overly optimistic (that Iran would meekly absorb the costs of US sanctions) and, at times, overly pessimistic (that Iran would withdraw from the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action without delay). It is necessary to understand better how Iran reaches its decisions, particularly in the nuclear sphere, to be able to more accurately predict what it may choose to do next. This has utility in a variety of lines of work and study, but perhaps no more so than in the energy industry, which is both affected by—and has the power to affect in turn—Iranian decision-making. For this reason, we commissioned this paper and commend it to you as an important source of knowledge on how Iran’s decision-making process works, especially as relates to its nuclear weapons–relevant capabilities. Though the weapons program remains dormant, the way in which Iranian officials—and Iran as that unitary actor—think about these capabilities is an essential element of the story to come.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

366. The Implications of an Iran Sanctions Snapback

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
For several months, it has seemed likely that the Trump administration would elect to pursue the reimposition, or snapback, of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran. For those less steeped in the terminology, the concept of sanctions “snapback” is one developed as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It refers to the ability of the United States and other partners to quickly reimpose the sanctions that were suspended as part of the quid pro quo that saw Iran accept significant restrictions and transparency requirements for its nuclear program. Conceptually, this was necessary because Iran had the ability to restart its nuclear program if the United States or others were seen as cheating on the deal. The United States and its partners needed some assurance that, if Iran were found to be cheating, they could react just as swiftly. On August 20, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo finally submitted the notification that, according to the US government, would trigger a 30-day timeline for the reimposition of these sanctions. In the US view there is now no stopping the return of the UNSC’s original Iran sanctions regime, though there may be some procedural wrangling over how and when the measures will be reimposed. It is not clear, however, whether this will be the case. A fair amount of analysis has gone into the fundamental question of whether the United States has the standing to trigger snapback, which is an issue I explored in 2019.[1] European, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other observers argue that the United States has no such standing, because, under the terms of the UN Security Council resolution that created the snapback mechanism (UNSCR 2231), it is no longer a “participant” of the JCPOA following its withdrawal in 2018. Even former National Security Advisor John Bolton—who was in large part responsible for the US withdrawal from the JCPOA—tends to agree with this reading.[2] The Trump administration obviously disagrees. It is an important question, and one that speaks to the underlying credibility and integrity of the US snapback decision as well as its results. But, ultimately, there is no way of finding a conclusive answer. International law being what it is, there are no authoritative arbiters available to determine whether the United States or its many critics are right. Snapback is happening and will have consequences, we now need to shift to considering what comes next. I see four main outcomes that are directly relevant to this decision and the future of US sanctions policy and negotiations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

367. Eurasia, the Hegemon, and the Three Sovereigns

Author:
Pepe Escobar
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I t is my contention that there are essentially four truly sovereign states in the world today, at least amongst the major powers: the United States, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. These four sovereigns—I call them the Hegemon and the Three Sovereigns—stand at the vanguard of the ultra-postmodern world, characterized by the supremacy of data algorithms and techno-financialization ruling over politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Emerging Powers, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, Global Focus, and Russian Federation

368. Iran’s Longstanding Cooperation with Armenia: Domestic Azerbaijani Opposition May be Rising

Author:
Brenda Shaffer
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Iran’s stable northern boundary suddenly became a shared border with five states: land borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and maritime borders with Kazakhstan and Russia. Tehran viewed this momentous change as a source of several new security challenges. Among these were maritime delimitation in the Caspian Sea and the establishment of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, two states that shared ethnic ties with large numbers of Iranian citizens.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

369. Reviving the Dying Giant: Addressing the Political Causes of Water Shortage in the Zayandeh Rud River, Iran

Author:
Ali Yousefi, Christian Knieper, and Claudia Pahl-Wostl
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The Zayandeh Rud, one of the main rivers in Iran, suffers from severe water scarcity caused by competition among different water users. Overcoming the dominance of supply-oriented water management, strengthening transparency and more collaborative governance would help address the water crisis.
Topic:
Politics, Natural Resources, and Water
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

370. A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security Partners—Second Edition

Author:
Gary J. Schmitt
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
With the United States facing two major revisionist powers, Russia and China, as well as additional security threats from North Korea, Iran, and jihadist terrorism, a critical advantage for the United States is its global network of alliances and strategic partners. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy states, “Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.” The advantage of having military allies and partners is enhanced by the core capacity of the American military having remained largely the same over the past decade, though the global security environment grew more complex and difficult during that time. In short, the United States needs allies and security partners. But the United States needs allies and partners that can pull their weight militarily if the country is going to be able to maintain a favorable balance of power in critical regions of the world. The second edition of A Hard Look at Hard Power provides an in-depth examination of the overall strategic perspective, defense plans, budgets, and capabilities of seven key European and Asian allies, three frontline strategic partners, and NATO.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Terrorism, Budget, Global Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, France, Poland, Germany, Australia, Sweden, and United States of America