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1471. Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s

Author:
Jonathan B. Tucker
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
States seeking to produce chemical weapons (CW) typically rely on the importation of intermediate chemicals called “precursors,” which have legitimate industrial applications but can also be converted into military-grade CW agents, such as mustard gas or sarin. The dual-use nature of precursor chemicals poses challenges for policy makers seeking to prevent CW proliferation. Under U.S. Department of Commerce regulations, manufacturers planning to export CW precursors to certain countries must obtain prior government authorization in the form of an export license. Yet despite significant improvements over the past decade in the export-control systems of the United States and other industrialized countries, trafficking in precursors and other dual-use items relevant to CW production has continued.
Topic:
Crime, International Law, International Trade and Finance, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Iran

1472. The Growing Threat of Special Groups in Baghdad

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
While al-Qaeda in Iraq remains the primary threat in northern Iraq, violence by Special Groups—Shi'a extremist elements funded, trained, and armed by Iran—remains a key challenge to stability and security in central and southern Iraq. Despite reports in late 2007 that Iranian sponsorship of Special Groups had declined, the trend in Special Groups activity in January and February 2008 suggests otherwise. In a recent briefing, Admiral Gregory Smith, the Deputy Spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, explicitly stated, “The Special Groups' activity has not decreased in recent months. They continue to be probably the most violent of the extremist groups that we're seeing from Shi'a sects. [The] intent of Iran in supporting the training and financing we believe continues.” Other officials from both the Departments of State and Defense have also cited an increase in Special Groups activity since the beginning of 2008.The use of highly-lethal explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), a hallmark of Iranian-backed groups, has risen since the start of 2008.Indeed, the month of January saw twelve EFP attacks, which was the highest monthly total of such attacks in over a year. This meant that, on average, from early January to early February, there was an EFP attack every three days.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

1473. Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: What's the Connection?

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
It is widely speculated in the media that the relationship between the Shi'a government of Iran and the Sunni insurgent group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, is a hostile one, primarily because of the sectarian differences between the two. However, there is clear evidence of Iranian support for another Sunni group, the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is worth investigating the potential links between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iranian regime, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGCQF). The dossier below contains articles, press releases, and Defense Department briefings from the last year that consider the nature of this relationship. While it may not present a definitive explanation of the connection between these groups, it does suggest possible links exist between the groups and the sectarian grounds for dismissing the relationship are likely too simplistic. The most relevant passages have been highlighted in yellow.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Taliban

1474. Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences that Matter

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
There are significant and little appreciated differences in the trajectory of Sunni extremist terrorism and that of Shi’a extremism. The differences exist across six key areas that impact American policy considerations, especially in light of steadily escalating tensions with Iran. First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi’a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid‐to‐high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open‐ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi’a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives. Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi’a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi’a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state‐run businesses. Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi‐Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities. Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi’a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill. Fifth, Shi’a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high‐casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi‐Jihadist variant. Finally, each sect’s extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently. The Sunni approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and widely amplify a terrorist event. Shi’a terrorists, while not averse to normal media publicity and amplification, by and large take a much lower‐key approach.
Topic:
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

1475. A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff

Author:
William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The recent National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion that Tehran stopped its efforts to develop nuclear weap- ons in 2003, together with the significant drop in Iranian activity in Iraq, has created favorable conditions for the US to hold direct talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The Bush administration should act on this opportunity, if for no other reason than that its current position is growing weaker, and without such an initiative, Iran will continue its efforts to produce nuclear fuel that might, in the future, be used to build nuclear weapons. Currently, Iran has approximately three thousand centrifuges, which it has used to produce small test batches of uranium that has been enriched to a low level (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons). Until now, Iranian engineers have not successfully operated a centrifuge cas- cade (a collection of centrifuges working together) at full capacity—which, as a practical matter, would be needed to enrich nuclear fuel to the level necessary either to establish an effective nuclear energy program or to manufacture nuclear weapons. But the Iranian government has declared its ambition to build more than 50,000 centrifuges, and recent reports also suggest that Tehran is testing a modified “P-2” centrifuge, a more advanced version of its existing centrifuge technology, which can produce a larger volume of enriched uranium. We propose that Iran’s efforts to produce enriched uranium and other related nuclear activities be conducted on a multilateral basis, that is to say jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments. This proposal provides a realistic, work- able solution to the US–Iranian nuclear standoff. Turning Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities into a multinational program will reduce the risk of proliferation and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of our disagreements but of our common interests as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1476. Iran-U.S.: The Case for Transformation

Author:
Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini and John Tirman
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Thirty years of enmity, disruption, and brinksmanship have yielded very little worthwhile in the relationship between Iran and the United States. The policies in both capitals toward the other are essentially bankrupt and dysfunctional. Each clings to their quiver of grievances against the other, letting the past dictate the future to the detriment of both countries. It may be time to turn this animus on its head—seeking a broad accommodation— and an opportunity for transformational diplomacy. While ample sources of suspicion and distrust have fed this simmering hostility, these sources do not warrant the war footing, attempts at isolation, political violence, and rhetoric of a looming Armageddon that mark the U.S.-Iran tangle. Both countries suf- fer high costs stemming from the confrontation. These two major states, one far more powerful than the other, are bound to compete and test each other, but in a region rife with instability, they also need each other. Iranians are weary of the cacophony of hatred. In America, the Iraq war is still a nightmare and the public is in no mood for more. A comprehensive concordat instead would serve the U.S. and Iran and help steady a very rickety part of the world. What the change is and how it is engineered are crucial, however. There is an appli- cable lesson from diplomatic history: bold and sweeping transformation may be prefera- ble—more successful and, paradoxically, easier to engineer—to small, incremental steps. Whether there is the political acumen in the leadership of either country to initiate such transformative diplomacy is arguable. But the logic of a new concordat is powerful, especially if seen through an unemotional lens of national interests and the security of the United States and Iran.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1477. The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry

Author:
Barnett R. Rubin and Sara Batmanglich
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Afghanistan is one of several contexts in which the long-term common interests of the U.S. and Iran have been over- shadowed by the animus originating in the 1953 CIA-led coup in Iran and the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the detriment of the interests of the U.S., Iran, and Afghanistan. This confronta- tion has served the interests of the Pakistan military, Taliban, and al-Qaida. Re-establishing the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan would provide significant additional leverage over Pakistan, on whose territory the leadership of both the Taliban and al-Qaida are now found. During the first half of the Cold War (until the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 revolution in Iran), Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with a Soviet-trained army wedged between the USSR and U.S. allies. In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. supported efforts by the Shah of Iran to use his post-1973 oil wealth to sup- port efforts by Afghan President Muhammad Daoud to lessen Kabul’s dependence on the USSR. This ended with the successive overthrow of both Daoud and the Shah in 1978 and 1979. A U.S. close partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged as the primary means of maintaining U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and its eastern flank. Support for Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and an Islamist-oriented military regime in Pakistan formed parts of this strategy to repulse the USSR from its occupation of Afghanistan, begun in late 1979, and to isolate Iran.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1478. Iranian Strategy in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means” assesses Iran’s strategy to project influence in Iraq and the means it uses to do so. This report addresses Iran’s dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran’s political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. This report provides an overview of Iran’s multi-faceted efforts to pursue its national interests by influencing the political and security dynamics in Iraq from the Iranian Revolution to the present day. Although the report describes Iran’s direct and indirect lethal aid to surrogates in Iraq since the U.S. led invasion, it ultimately concludes that U.S. policy focuses on Iranian lethal aid to Iraqi militias at the expense of countering Iran’s primary mode of power projection in Iraq: support of Iranian-affiliated Iraqi political parties. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends.
Topic:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Quds Force, and Jaysh al-Mahdi
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

1479. Osirak Redux?

Author:
Whitney Raas and Austin Long
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The use of military force to halt or reverse nuclear proliferation is an option that has been much discussed and occasionally exercised. In the 1960s, for example, the United States considered destroying China's nuclear program at an early stage but ultimately decided against it. More recently, the key rationale for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the threat posed by Iraq's suspected inventory of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although significant evidence of WMD was not found in the Iraq case, the potential utility of military force for counterproliferation remains, particularly in the case of Iran. The possibility of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities has gained prominence in the public discourse, drawing comments from journalists, former military officers, and defense analysts. This makes the Iranian nuclear program a potential test case for military counterproliferation.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, and Asia

1480. PolicyWatch #1315: Unwanted Guest: The Gulf Summit and Iran

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On December 3-4, Arab leaders representing Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman met in the Qatari capital, Doha, for their annual Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) summit, which for the first time was attended by an Iranian president. In November, the UAE set a precedent by impounding an Iranian-bound shipment of undisclosed material banned by UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 because of its potential use for nuclear weapons or missile programs. All of this came against the background of the new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.
Topic:
Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Kuwait, Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar