1061. The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran
- Author:
- Judith S. Yaphe and Kori N. Schake
- Publication Date:
- 05-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- Scholars and other spcialists on Iran have argued about that country's political intentions and strategic amibitions since the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. In the 1980s Iran's efforts to export its revolution and support international terrorism raised the question of whether a moderate Islamic republic that was able to deal with the West could ever exist. The death of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the succession of Ali Hashimi-Rafsanjani as president raised new issues for the 1990s. As the European and American oil and investment communities considered the race to open Iran commercially, scholars and diplomats debated Iranian efforts to recover from nearly a decade of war and revolution. They compared the merits of the European approach of initiating critical dialogue with the U.S. policy of containing and isolating Iran. Neither approach seemed to have much impact, both conceded, and Iranians continued to sort out their domestic political agenda and to decide how best to protect their strategic and national interests. The U.S. Government, for example, tried to estimate how much time and money Iran would need to modernize its military and to acquire new weapons systems despite projected low oil prices and the country's need to rebuild its damaged and neglected civilian and industrial infrastructure.1 The assumption underlying the U.S. projections was that Iran would be pursuing weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear technology and longrange missile systems.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Law, Nuclear Weapons, and Religion
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Iran, and Middle East