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1051. Evolution and Change in Iranian Foreign Policy: From Ideology-Orientedness to Pragmatism

Author:
Cenap Çakmak
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
BILGESAM (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies)
Abstract:
There is visible Iranian interest in the so-called Arab Spring process. This growing interest could be attributed the advantages associated with the emerging Shia Crescent in the Middle East which could be favorable to the Iranian interests. However, it is essential to review the overall aspects of Iranian foreign policy to further elaborate on this matter. In other words, the Iranian foreign policy should be prone to have regional ambitions in order to speak of interest in regional developments such as Arab Spring or Shia Crescent. In order to properly analyze whether or not Shia Crescent becomes a stronger reality in the Arab Spring process, it is also relevant to discuss the fundamental tenets and current tendencies of the Iranian foreign policy. For the sake of the discussion, a brief analysis of the Iranian foreign policy after the Islamic revolution in 1979 will be sufficient to determine as to whether Iran may actually be interested in expanding its sphere of influence in the region and taking advantage of the Arab Spring, though there are some similarities with the foreign policy approach before the regime change as well.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arab Spring, Ideology, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

1052. Iran and Arab Spring

Author:
Cenap Çakmak
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
BILGESAM (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies)
Abstract:
The political actors involved in regional politics in the Middle East were apparently caught unprepared by the events culminating in an Arab Spring. The tectonic shifts and the magnitude of the people’s rise in a very short period of time were the primary reason for the unpreparedness.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Arab Spring, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

1053. Iran’s Nuclear Program and Turkey

Author:
Mustafa Kibaroglu
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
BILGESAM (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies)
Abstract:
Iran has become one of the most important issues of international agenda due to its nuclear program and continues to preserve its importance because of this. The question is how Iran has come to occupy an important place on international agenda? Is Iran pursuing its nuclear program in breach of international treaties or what causes problems are its intentions concerning the use of its nuclear capabilities?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

1054. Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs as P5+1 Talks Resume

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiations are poised to resume between Iran and the six powers seeking to rein in Iran's nuclear program, it is difficult to avoid a sense of déjà vu. For years now, the UN Security Council has demanded Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Tehran continues to expand its nuclear program and insists it will never compromise its right to enrich, the United States continues to tighten sanctions on Iranian trade and finances, and alarms are raised about Iran being able to sprint to a nuclear bomb with little warning. Yet, with a new Iranian president and negotiating team, there are grounds for cautious optimism that talks this time can be different. Although Iran continues to enrich uranium and add to its nuclear complex, time remains to negotiate an agreement that adequately guards against Iran building nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

1055. Lessons for Handling Iran From the Sad Saga of Iraq

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Alexandra Schmitt
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Ten years ago today, President George W. Bush said in a radio address to the nation: "It is clear that Saddam Hussein is still violating the demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm." Eleven days later, he announced the invasion of Iraq to remove the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) allegedly possessed by Hussein's brutal regime and to prevent their use by or transfer to terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. That no such weapons existed was less a symptom of flawed intelligence than the U.S. leaders' obsession with achieving regime change in Baghdad and their consequent willingness to distort evidence on WMD toward that end. This distortion, along with failures by the press and Congress to exercise due diligence in evaluating the assertions of the executive branch, blinded the public to contravening information on Iraqi WMD that was readily available during the six weeks preceding the attack. Ironically, the most important sources of this ignored information were the very inspectors that the international community had forced Iraq to readmit the previous fall. There are lessons here for current efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, History, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

1056. Iran's Missile Program and Its Implications for U.S. Missile Defense

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Although plans for expanding U.S. strategic missile defenses focus on the Iranian ICBM threat, that threat is not emerging as was previously predicted. Iran conducted no long-range ballistic missile tests in 2012 and has not flown even the larger space launch vehicle that it displayed two years ago, which could have helped advance ICBM technology. Moreover, Tehran has still not decided to build nuclear weapons and continues to focus on short- and medium-range rather than longer-range ballistic missiles. It is, therefore, time to adapt U.S. missile defense plans accordingly by suspending the fourth phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Doing so would remove an obstacle to negotiating further reductions in the strategic forces of Russia - the only country that poses an unambiguous existential threat to the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Missile Defense, and ICBM
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1057. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2010-2013 Report Card

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Marcus Taylor
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The study, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2010-2013 Report Card gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan—each of which possess nuclear weapons—and North Korea—which maintains a nuclear weapons capability—as well as Iran and Syria, which are under investigation for possible nuclear weapons-related activity.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, France, Syria, and United States of America

1058. Basic Attack Strategy of Stuxnet 0.5 rev. 1

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Symantec has recently established that an earlier attack strategy of the malware Stuxnet involved the secret closing of a set of valves in six of 18 cascades in a module at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). 1 This attack strategy was apparently active by late 2007, when Iran was setting up and operating its first module of about 2,952 IR-1 centrifuges. The reason for attacking only one third of a module’s cascades is unclear. But this attack could have damaged many centrifuges without destroying so many that the plant operator would have become suspicious. The code takes over the monitoring system, keeping the operator unaware of the attack. The attack involves singling out a set of centrifuges in the cascade. Figure 1 lists the Natanz cascade of 164 IR-1 centrifuges organized into 15 stages and the 110 centrifuges that are isolated during the attack. None of the affected centrifuges are in the feed stage, which is stage 10 in the table and includes 24 centrifuges. In total, 54 centrifuges are not affected. By themselves, these 54 centrifuges form a cascade of 11 stages, the stages of which are all very narrow except for a very wide feed stage. Based on an analysis of the code and the Natanz cascade, the most likely valves closed are the three fast acting valves on the three thin pipes for feed, product, and waste (or tails) that pass through the top cap of an IR-1 centrifuge (see figure 2). The three fast-acting electronically-controlled valves are part of an emergency response system of the cascade aimed at protecting the remaining centrifuges in the cascade from the effects of a crashing centrifuge. If a centrifuge crashes, or there is an imminent risk of one crashing, the computer monitoring system closes the valves of the affected centrifuge rapidly, effectively isolating it. The kinetic energy of a rotating centrifuge is huge. Because this energy is converted mainly into heat, a crashing centrifuge produces a large pulse of hot uranium hexafluoride gas and other gases that must be contained. Otherwise, this pulse travels down the cascade, taking out additional centrifuges in its path. Thus, the emergency system is designed to act within milliseconds in the event of an anticipated crash and isolate the centrifuge from the cascade. The Natanz cascade emergency response system appears to rely principally on a vibration sensor, an accelerometer, on each centrifuge. Many pressure transducers are also in each cascade to measure pressure, but the most important sensor to detect crashing appears to be the accelerometer. This sensor sends a shut-off signal to the computer monitoring system if the vibration level exceeds a certain, dangerous value. This earlier version of Stuxnet appears to exploit this emergency response system. The attack closes 330 fast-acting valves of 110 centrifuges in the cascade while leaving the valves on the other 54 open. 2 As Symantec has explained, the attack lasts for a fixed period of time or until certain conditions are met. One of these conditions is that the pressure near the feed stage registers five times its normal value. Based on a theoretical analysis, the wall pressure in an IR-1 centrifuge could be about 20-30 torr. Uranium hexafluoride condenses at about 130 torr at a temperature of 300 Kelvin. Thus, raising the pressure five-fold would raise the wall pressure of the uranium hexafluoride gas to near its condensation point. If the uranium hexafluoride gas reaches a pressure exceeding 130 torr, it will condense and form a uranium solid, likely uranium hexafluoride. This solid will attach to the wall of the rapidly spinning rotor. A non-uniform buildup of solid material could cause an imbalance in the rotor, causing it to wobble, possibly damaging the bearings or causing the rotor to strike the side of the outer casing. Both would destroy the centrifuge. Alternatively, the solid would add extra mass to the rotor wall, causing it to fail. So, the analysis suggests that an attack aims to raise the pressure of the uranium hexafluoride gas sufficiently to damage or destroy the centrifuges.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and Centrifuges
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

1059. Media Coverage of Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Jonas Siegel
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The manner in which news media frame their coverage of Iran’s nuclear program is critically important to public understanding and to policy decisions that will determine whether the dispute can be resolved without war. News coverage of the lead-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and of the justifications of that invasion was found to have had a profound, distorting effect on public understanding and the decision to go to war. Is news media coverage having a similar effect on U.S. and international discussions about Iran’s nuclear program? If so, how exactly is the framing of the dispute and the broader approach of news media to covering this issue affecting the choices available to policy makers? And how is coverage likely to affect the dispute’s outcome?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

1060. Crisis Diplomacy from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush

Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self Determination at Princeton University convened a special Colloquium, “Diplomacy from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush: A Holistic and Proactive Approach” in Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein, April 19-22, 2012. The colloquium brought together over seventy participants, including senior representatives, experts, academics, and civil society representatives from Austria, Azerbaijan, the European Union, Germany, Georgia, France, Iran, Israel, Liechtenstein, Russia, Qatar, Switzerland, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Participants engaged in both plenary and working group discussions about ways to address the four key issues: crisis diploma - cy with Iran; the ongoing crisis in Syria; Afghanistan in transition; and preventing the escalation of crises in this macro region. This was the third LISD-sponsored colloquium on developments in the Mediterranean to Hindu Kush region since the Arab Spring. The colloquium was off the record according to Liechtenstein Colloquium rules, and was financially supported by LISD, The House of Liechtenstein, the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein, and the SIBIL Stiftung in Vaduz. The Colloquium was chaired by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Director of LISD. This chair's summary includes an updated postscript.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, Middle East, France, Arabia, Germany, Syria, Qatar, and Austria