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2. Deferred Precession: Why was Iran so quick to enrich uranium by 60%?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- On April 16, the Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced Iran's hourly production of 9 grams of uranium enriched to 60%. This step provoked Western countries participating in the Vienna talks.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Uranium, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Vienna, and United States of America
3. Iran talks are likely going nowhere
- Author:
- Alexander Grinberg
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Iran uses uranium enrichment as leverage on the EU and US to get concessions.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Uranium, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
4. Iran Nuclear Policy Brief: An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal With Iran
- Author:
- Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
- Publication Date:
- 07-2015
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have finalized a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran that will verifiably block Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons development--the uranium-enrichment route and the plutonium-separation route--and guard against a clandestine weapons program. We assess that the final agreement will be a net-plus for nonproliferation and will enhance U.S. and regional security. This two-page Iran Nuclear Policy Brief examines the key provisions and benefits of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
- Political Geography:
- United States and Iran
5. A Win-Win Formula for Defining Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Capacity
- Author:
- Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
- Publication Date:
- 08-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- As negotiators prepare to resume talks over Iran's nuclear program, they face a formidable task: to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by November 24. Perhaps the most difficult issue Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) must resolve is how to define the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program. To achieve a win-win outcome the two sides must develop a creative, technically sound formula that increases the time it would take for Iran to enrich uranium to weapons grade, while still providing Tehran with a modest program that allows domestic production of enriched uranium to contribute to fueling future civilian reactors and allows research and development to advance centrifuge technology. In collaboration with the International Crisis Group, the Arms Control Association has developed a proposal to define Iran's uranium enrichment program in a manner that meets the fundamental concerns of both Tehran and the P5+1. The proposal is the product of feedback from a number of technical and political experts. While this may not be "the solution" to the enrichment puzzle, the proposal offers constructive options for the negotiators to consider.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
6. Performance of the IR-1 Centrifuge at Natanz
- Author:
- David Albright and Christina Walrond
- Publication Date:
- 10-2011
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- During the past year, the performance of the IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has faltered. Although the average monthly production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has increased to about 150 kg/month, the number of centrifuges needed to produce this LEU has increased disproportionately compared to the previous year. During the last year, Iran has needed 5,860 IR-1 centrifuges to produce this amount of LEU. In the previous year, it would have needed only about 4,820 IR-1 centrifuges to make this quantity of LEU.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Power, Uranium, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
7. IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Shutdown of Enrichment at Natanz Result of Stuxnet Virus?; Downgrade in Role of Fordow Enrichment Site; LEU Production May Have Decreased
- Author:
- David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond
- Publication Date:
- 11-2010
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on November 23, 2010 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran’s compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803. The following analysis highlights the IAEA’s key findings, including 1) a mysterious halt to enrichment at Natanz resulted in centrifuges not enriching for up to one week during November 2010, which ISIS speculates could have been the result of the Stuxnet virus; 2) fewer P1 centrifuges are planned for the Fordow enrichment site; and 3) the average monthly rate of low enriched uranium production increased but many additional centrifuges enriching by end of reporting period; and 4) monthly production rates of 20 percent enriched LEU remain steady.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East