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171. Strengthening the JCPOA

Author:
Ephraim Asculai, Emily Landau, Daniel Shapiro, and Moshe Ya'alon
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the visit to Washington by President Macron and the scheduled visit by Chancellor Merkel in an effort to persuade US President Trump not to leave the JCPOA, this article zeros in on the key issues that need to be addressed by the allies. Guided by what is not only necessary but feasible at this late stage, the topics addressed include missiles, inspections, lack of transparency, sanctions, and the sunset provisions. Everything turns on political will – if it exists, agreeing to the proposed steps should not entail a lengthy process, and implementation can realistically begin in relatively short order. Significant results will mean the international community emerges with reinforced solidarity and a strengthened JCPOA. If negotiations progress seriously on this basis, it would make sense for the Trump administration to allow additional time beyond May 12 to complete them.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America

172. The Potential for a War on the Northern Front that None of the Parties Want: Insights from a War Game

Author:
Udi Dekel, Assaf Orion, Anat Ben Haim, and Zvi Magen
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
If Israel is in fact responsible for the April 29, 2018 attack in Syria, it is sending the message that it is determined and ready to fight a campaign to prevent Iran from consolidating its position in the northern arena, and that it will act to thwart the Iranian response. A war game conducted recently at INSS intended to clarify the boundaries of the ongoing campaign on the northern front and possible developments toward escalation between Israel and Iran and its proxies. Another goal was to consider a fundamental strategic question: is the northern arena truly one unit with two fronts – Syria and Lebanon, or is it two separate fronts operating according to different logics and reflecting distinct interests. Each of the involved actors – Israel, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Russia, and the United States – has a shared interest in preventing escalation that could lead to war. However, escalation has a dynamic of its own, and incidental elements – unintentional outcomes along with miscalculation – have a significant influence on events and developments. The most significant challenge for Israeli policy is how to resolve its goals vis-à-vis Iran. Thus the time has come for Israel to relinquish the comfort of its position of ambiguity on Syria; to understand that as far as it is concerned, the Assad regime is the least of all evils; and to strive to drive a wedge between Assad and Iran, and between Russia and Iran.
Topic:
Civil War, Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and War Games
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

173. Iran in the Nuclear Realm and Iran in Syria: A New State of Play

Author:
Assaf Orion and Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Despite the two blows Iran sustained last week, Israel cannot afford to be complacent or overly satisfied. It will need to follow meticulously the updated policies adopted by each of the theater’s involved actors. Thus far, Israel has held separate policies regarding Iran’s nuclear program and the Iranian proxy war and malevolent influence. Now, it must develop an integrative long term policy and strive for coordinated efforts and meaningful cooperation with the United States, European countries, and the countries of the region. Operational and strategic coordination with Russia remains essential. Contending with the Iranian nuclear challenge will require the establishment of a joint “strategic early warning enterprise,” with the United States and other allies, aimed at preventing critical surprises.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, and North America

174. The Benefit of Exposing the Iranian Nuclear Archive

Author:
Shmuel Even
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Israel’s exposure of the Iranian nuclear archive was an impressive and professional operation. It was meant to help prepare public opinion for President Trump’s statement and to make it more difficult for the other leaders who are party to the agreement and who are in no hurry to enter into a confrontation with Iran. In light of the importance of the great threat that Iran poses to Israel, the exposure operation was a vital step in a long struggle. The alternative of not exposing the material would have meant giving up the chance of using the information to create cognitive value and leaving it in the archives of the intelligence community.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and North America

175. U.S. Strategy, the JCPOA Iranian Nuclear Arms Agreement, and the Gulf: Playing the Long Game

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Few recent American foreign policy decisions have been as divisive as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear arms control agreement with Iran. Advocates of the agreement have focused far too exclusively on its potential benefits. Opponents equally exclusively on its potential faults. Both sides tend to forget that any feasible arms control agreement between what are hostile sides tends to be a set of compromises that are an extension of arms races and potential conflicts by other means. As a result, imperfect agreements with uncertain results are the rule, not the exception. President Trump has made it clear that he opposes the agreement and would like to terminate it. His dismissal of Rex Tillerson as Security of State, and his replacement by Mike Pompeo – along with his dismissal of General H.R. McMaster and replacement with John Bolton – indicate that President Trump may well seek to terminate the agreement in the near future – action which might or might not have significant bipartisan support. He faces a May 5th to decide whether to again waive economic sanction against Iran, a decision which comes up for renewal every 120 days.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

176. Developing a Containment Strategy in Syria

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The Issue Some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States should withdraw its military forces from Syria. But the United States has several interests in Syria: Balancing against Iran, including deterring Iranian forces and militias from pushing close to the Israeli border, disrupting Iranian lines of communication through Syria, preventing substantial military escalation between Israel and Iran, and weakening Shia proxy forces. Balancing against Russia, including deterring further Russian expansion in the Middle East from Syrian territory and raising the costs—including political costs—of Russian operations in Syria. Preventing a terrorist resurgence, including targeting Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al Qaeda that threaten the United States and its allies. Our Recommendations: Based on U.S. interests in Syria, Washington should establish a containment strategy that includes the following components: Retain a small military and intelligence footprint that includes working with—and providing limited training, funding, and equipment to—groups in eastern, northern, and southern Syria, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Coordinate with regional allies such as Jordan and Israel to balance against Iran and Russia and to prevent the resurgence of Salafi-jihadists. Pressure outside states to end support to Salafi-jihadists, including Turkey and several Gulf states. As the war in Syria moves into its seventh year, U.S. policymakers have struggled to agree on a clear Syria strategy. Some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States needs to withdraw its military forces from Syria. “I want to get out,” President Trump said of the United States’ military engagement in Syria. “I want to bring our troops back home.”1 Others have urged caution, warning that a precipitous withdrawal could contribute to a resurgence of terrorism or allow U.S. competitors like Iran and Russia—along with their proxies—to fill the vacuum.2 In addition, some administration officials have argued that the Islamic State has been decimated in Syria and Iraq. The National Security Strategy notes that “we crushed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.”3 But between 5,000 and 12,000 Islamic State fighters remain in Syria and continue to conduct guerrilla attacks, along with between 40,000 and 70,000 Salafi-jihadist fighters in Syria overall.4
Topic:
Civil War, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

177. Russian Forces in Syria and the Building of a Sustainable Military Presence: What About Iranian-backed Syrian Militias?

Author:
Alimar Lazkani
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
There is constant talk of the “soft conflict” between Iran and Russia in Syria. Most research and media reports focus on the areas of influence and control of each party. Without going into the relationship between Iranian and Russian forces on Syrian soil, in which the Iranian of influence weakened following the entry of Russian troops, it is important to distinguish the nature of these two forces to help identify the characteristics of this conflict, which are not limited to areas of influence. In fact, there is a clear difference between Iranian and Russian interests as well as strategy on two major issues. The first is the relationship with Israel. While Russia sees Israel as a strategic ally in the region, Iran gains its regional legitimacy by emphasizing the continuity of conflict with it. The second is the way each party sees the future of Syria, and its own role in it. Iran is not capable of establishing a centralized state in Syria because of its ideological hostility to the Sunni majority there. Therefore, a state based on sectarian militias will be the cornerstone of Iran’s continued presence on Syrian soil as it has the capacity to manage militias with no national project. Russia, on the other hand, has a vision of a centralized state that is based on the fundamental pillar of a disciplined and dutiful army. Thus, the “soft conflict” involves not only the geographical divvying-up of Syria, but also fundamental matters related to the structure of Syria’s security and military system. This paper is the second part of a broader study of Russia’s policy of establishing a military influence in Syria. It will look at the Syrian militias that Iran has fostered and supported, and Russia’s approach in dealing with them on the ground. However, it does not consider non-Syrian militias on Syrian soil brought by the Iranians, such as Hezbollah, the Fatemiyoun, the Zainabiyoun, and other Shia militias because of their close association with Iranian politics and their temporary posting in specific conflict areas, making them a foreign presence on Syrian soil.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Intervention, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

178. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?

Author:
Michael Elleman and Mark T. Fitzpatrick
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. The common claim that Iran’s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path. The international standard – but not treaty – for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran’s 13 current ballistic missile systems – the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East – exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the Fateh-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. Because capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran’s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were ‘capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles ‘designed to be’ capable of delivering nuclear weapons. What it means ‘to be designed’ is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran’s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America

179. Use of Force: The Only Way to Stop Iran

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Western hopes that Iran will moderate and “engage” with the international community following the faulty 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) have been gradually replaced with apprehension. More voices in the international community are joining Israel in expressing growing concern about Iran’s policies. While Iran seems to be abide by the JCPOA, it resists expanding the scope of inspections, continues its nuclear research and development (for example upgrading centrifuges) and continues to make progress on its long-range missile program. Recently it conducted a test of a missile designed to carry nuclear warheads. Moreover, Iran’s involvement in the region attests to its hegemonic plans, defying the notion, propagated by its propagandists, that it is a status quo power acting defensively. Rather, Iran is following its Persian imperial instincts that are reinforced by Muslim jihadist impulses. It already controls four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa; its Shi’ite militias and proxies are fighting in Iraq, Syria and Yemen and engaging in ethnic cleansing; and it is on the verge of solidifying the Shi’ite corridor from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Israel tries to capitalize on the new widespread global apprehension about Iran and a new American president who is not committed to the JCPOA to bring about the cancellation of the 2015 nuclear accord or its renegotiation, and the reinstating of the sanctions regime. Yet, these goals are difficult to attain and not useful in preventing a nuclear Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

180. Between Pyongyang and Tehran: The Need for Urgent Action against Iran

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Iranian situation is both more urgent and more malleable than the almost hopeless situation with North Korea.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America