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21. Why the U.S. Should Prioritize Security in Its 5G Roll Out

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
5G technology promises to transform practically every sphere of life, from smartphones and self-driving cars, to remote surgery and virtual reality. Policies related to the rollout of 5G in the United States have tended to focus on mitigating security risks, but does protecting security come at the cost of expanding U.S. global influence—or does it simply cost too much? This policy brief by IGCC postdoctoral research associate James Lee analyzes the three main criteria for deciding what a “good” 5G policy should look like—security, global influence, and efficiency— and recommends that the United States’ 5G strategy prioritize security first, influence second, and efficiency third.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Power
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

22. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

23. Benchmarking critical technologies: Building an evidence base for an informed critical technologies strategy

Author:
Kitsch Liao, Samantha Hoffman, Karly Winkler, Baani Grewal, and Cheryl Yu
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Technology policy formulation has recently gained a renewed importance for governments in the era of strategic competition, but contextual understanding and expertise in deciding where to focus efforts are lacking. As a result, decision-makers might not understand their own national strengths and weaknesses. It’s difficult to judge whether a country’s R&D outputs, no matter how advanced, and its development of production capacity, no matter how significant, align with the country’s intended strategic objectives or can be used effectively to achieve them. The ability to measure the relative strengths and weaknesses of a country by weighing specific strategic objectives against technical achievements is of paramount importance for countries. This is especially true as nations seek to resolve supply-chain resilience problems underscored by the Covid-19 pandemic. China’s rejection of the Quad’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, willingness to use economic coercion and the resulting strategic competition, call further attention to multiple technology sectors’ heavy reliance on a single source. A solution must be found that can exploit synergy across multiple technology sectors among collaborating countries while ensuring supply-chain resilience.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

24. European Contributions to Indo-Pacific Maritime Order

Author:
David Scott
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper looks at European contributions to the Indo-Pacific maritime order. The policy significance is two- fold. Firstly, the Indo-Pacific has become an increasingly crucial geographic region, with a constellation of leading powers. The United States and Japan face a rising China, with India a vital swing state. European powers are now faced with choices of policy in response to power competition in the Indo-Pacific. This also reflects the rising geo-economic importance of the region, home to the world’s most populous countries, India and China, and critical commercial sea lanes. Secondly, European actors–France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU) –have all announced various specific Indo-Pacific strategies to support their interests. Nevertheless, despite European interests and contributions to Indo-Pacific security, the European response to China-related maritime challenges, such as those in the South China Sea, has been too limited. European states are finding it difficult to balance national security interests tied to maritime stability and rules-based order in the region, with economic interests tied to China, the world’s second-largest economy. Europe needs a principled approach and a long-term view of its overall interests in the South China Sea and the wider maritime Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
National Security, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

25. Three Dilemmas Facing the Indo-Pacific’s Regional Order

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
For decades, an international order delivered security and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific. The order was based on U.S. military hegemony and alliances that preserved the strategic status quo and multilateral cooperation that enabled economic development and growth. That order is now under strain. The COVID-19 pandemic is challenging the order’s founding principles, prompting some regional states to limit their interdependency in certain sensitive sectors under the guise of supply chain resilience. The pandemic was not the first challenge to test the order; serious threats began to emerge over a decade ago, with the global financial crisis of 2008, and were sharply exacerbated by China’s economic rise and strategic revisionism, which threatens U.S. military and economic primacy and the territorial status quo. The United States, India, and like-minded middle-power partners from the Indo-Pacific and Europe have struggled to respond effectively. The other contributions in this series on navigating U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific show how these states have sought to recover from the pandemic while also answering structural threats of revisionism and economic headwinds from decoupling, protectionism and changing integration patterns. Cutting across those specific policy issues are three overarching dilemmas that each state will be forced to resolve when making policy. How policymakers navigate these dilemmas will define the policy settings of their regional strategy.
Topic:
Security, Economic Growth, Multilateralism, Regional Integration, Economic Development, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

26. European Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific amid GreatPower Strategic Competition

Author:
Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
European middle powers are not typically part of U.S. discussions of the Indo-Pacific. However, in an era of growing strategic competition, they are collectively and individually expressing stronger equities in the stability of the region. In May 2021, for example, the United Kingdom’s aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth set sail for the first time on a tour that will take it to various locations, including to the Indo-Pacific region. The Dutch frigate HNLMS Evertsen, as well as a U.S. destroyer and aircraft, are also part of the carrier strike group. Thus, now is a good moment to step back and reflect on the role of European middle powers in the Indo-Pacific amid the backdrop of great-power, strategic competition. The Netherlands, Germany, and France have recently published strategy documents focused on the Indo-Pacific. The Netherlands’ document released in November 2020 discussed concerns about upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea and the need for the European Union to take a more vocal stance on stability in this region. Germany published a similar document in September 2020 in which it emphasized its deep economic interests in the Indo-Pacific “rules-based international order.” Earlier, France led thinking about evolving regional dynamics in 2018. Through the publication of France’s Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific and France and Security in the Indo-Pacific documents in 2019, France expressed its concerns about the impact of China’s activities in the East and South China Sea on regional stability. These issues have also been raised through NATO, which has been grappling with the belief that “China does not share our values” and the implications for alliance security and the international rules-based order.
Topic:
Power Politics, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Germany, Netherlands, and Indo-Pacific

27. Shaping the Indo-Pacific? Japan and Europeanisation

Author:
Yee-Kuang Heng
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this Strategic Update, Professor Yee-Kuang Heng investigates European power projection and presence in the Indo-Pacific, and its converging nature with Japan’s attempt to shape the regional environment in its favour. While UK threat perceptions have converged significantly with Japan’s since former Prime Minister David Cameron’s promulgation of a “golden era” in relations with China, managing expectations of Japan’s attempt to ‘shape’ and encourage Europeanisation remains crucial. But is it fair to conclude that Japan has been successful in encouraging a stronger European presence to help it shape the Indo-Pacific order?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Europeanization, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Indo-Pacific

28. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, ​Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

29. An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM Hypercompetition and US Army Theater Design

Author:
Mr. Nathan P. Freier, John Schaus, and Prof. William G. Braun III
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The United States faces a hypercompetitive geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, arguably the most consequential theater for US national interests over the coming decades. Although the United States has created exquisite military capabilities to counter insurgencies and fight terrorists, rivals like China have developed a whole-of-government toolkit focused on expanding their span of control and freedom of action, separating the United States from its allies, and deterring US leaders from greater engagement in East Asia. China is actively transforming its military forces, with an eye toward defeating the United States in the event of armed hostilities. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is also creatively employing its military and paramilitary assets strategically to outmaneuver the United States and partners in meaningful gray zone approaches. The PRC enjoys strategic depth and increasingly operates on internal or heavily protected lines of communication while demonstrating the ability to threaten American interests with a variety of multi-domain capabilities and forces. Meeting this challenge will require joint transformation to a more hypercompetitive theater design. Army adoption of the four transformational roles of grid, enabler, multi-domain warfighter, and capability and capacity generator will be essential to realizing this more hypercompetitive Joint theater approach.
Topic:
Army, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, and Joint Operations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

30. Geopolitical Competition in the Indo-Pacific: The Mekong Region

Author:
Fabio Figiaconi
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In the last decade, the Mekong Region (MR) — that is, the area crossed by the Mekong River and encompassing Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam — has become central to the strategies of major global powers due to a series of economic and geopolitical factors. The most prominent are the region’s growing importance in global trade routes, its geographical proximity to major hotspots (such as the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait) and China’s growing regional activism. The growing importance of the MR in global dynamics spurred several actors to develop specific strategies. While liberal democracies such as the United States (US) and Japan both created regional fora for policy discussions as well as development funds, China increased its presence by offering loans, constructing infrastructures and creating a specific regional institution. Due to the mounting competition, the MR is set to become a major geopolitical hotspot in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and Indo-Pacific