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61. France's “Indo-Pacific” Strategy: Regional Projection

Author:
David Scott
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
President Macron talks of France’s ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ (une stratégie indo-pacifique). This article analyzes French strategic discourse and strategy adopted for the Indo-Pacific by France. It finds that French strategy has three main elements. Firstly it has seeks legitimacy, politically seeking to move from a colonial possessions position to democratic integration with France, and has sought to achieve regional integration and legitimacy of this. Secondly, geographically France has moved up northwards from its possessions in the Southern Indian Ocean and Southern Pacific to active maritime involvement in the northern Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Western Pacific. Thirdly, French strategy is to actively secure security partnerships with other countries in the region. Naval projection is a prominent feature of French strategy, which is a strategy which is significantly driven by China’s maritime expansion across the Indo-Pacific. The article thus seeks to analyze, explain and evaluate the effectiveness of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe, Indonesia, India, France, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

62. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for U.S.-ASEAN Economic Governance Architecture

Author:
Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During his visit to Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump announced his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the U.S. approach to the region. The Department of State unveiled in detail the economic elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2018. These economic policies were reiterated by Vice President Mike Pence at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in Papua New Guinea in November 2018. For instance, Pence maintained that Washington plans to “make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade,” promote private sector investment, and assist regional states on sustainable infrastructure development. On December 31, Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) passed by the U.S. Congress earlier that month. ARIA further advances the strategy by mandating the executive branch to “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region.” Moreover, the text authorizes $1.5 billion to “the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense . . . for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used” to achieve several objectives including ensuring “the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption.” Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the effects of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy on the future of U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture. “Strategy” refers to “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” Such a study is warranted for a few reasons. First, the jury is still out on the degree to which this strategy would align or clash with different approaches and policies supported by Southeast Asian governments. Clashes of ideas and policies can result in not only failed implementation of the U.S. strategy but also competing economic initiatives which could undermine the future of U.S.-ASEAN trade and investment ties. Therefore, this research is aimed at: 1) assessing how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy would interact with Southeast Asian nations’ policies to shape the future development of regional economic architectures, and 2) forging policy recommendations for the U.S. and ASEAN governments on how they could jointly pursue regional economic institution-building. The questions I explore include: 1) What are the economic components of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy? 2) How will this strategy and Southeast Asian countries’ economic agendas/policies interact to shape the future advancement of regional economic architecture? and 3) What should American and ASEAN governments do to foster cooperation and lessen conflict among their different policies regarding economic regionalism? The chapter is organized as follows. The next part discusses the economic components of the Indo-Pacific strategy under the Trump administration. The second section examines the interactions between this strategy and the economic agendas of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to highlight the areas of complementarities and clashes. The last section provides policy recommendations for American and Southeast Asian governments to augment synergies and ameliorate clashes among their policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Governance, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

63. Sharp Power Versus Values Diplomacy in Indo-Pacific

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the Trump era, there has been a surge of interest in the upsurge of sharp power as a disruptive force in international relations and the precipitous decline in the role of diplomacy based on values as an ennobling factor in bilateral and multilateral relations. Geostrategic fears and trade protectionism have taken center stage as strains are exacerbated by interference in internal affairs on an unparalleled scale and are rarely ameliorated by reassuring affirmation of shared values. The two principal actors in the Indo-Pacific battle between sharp power and values diplomacy are China and the United States. The first chapter in Part II deals directly with the standoff between the two, principal antagonists. In the following chapters, U.S. allies on the frontlines are covered: South Korea, which was battered by Chinese vilification over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment; Japan, a target of China only recently treated less harshly as Xi Jinping agreed to an official state visit by Abe Shinzo; and Australia, the most conspicuous example of China’s use of sharp power. A final case covered in the chapters to follow is: North Korea, which in 2018 found new ways of using sharp power against South Korea. While authors vary in how they interpret the new concept of “sharp power” and in which country’s value diplomacy they emphasize, this collection of five cases offers a foundation for generalizing about this struggle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Trade, and Sharp Power
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

64. The India-Australia security engagement: Opportunities and challenges

Author:
David Brewster
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
India wants to take a leading strategic role throughout the Indian Ocean region and expand its strategic reach further into the Pacific. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has commented, India now sees itself as a “net security provider” to the region. But what will this mean in terms of India’s regional relationships? Over the last decade or more, India has spent a lot of money on modernising its defence forces. This includes buying aircraft carriers, submarines, and aircraft that will give India the ability to project power at longer distances. But India has given relatively less attention to developing closer security partnerships in the region, particularly with the middle states of the Indian Ocean. In many ways, the recognition of India as a regional leader will depend on the quality of these relationships. One of these relationships – between India and Australia – will become increasingly important to both countries. Indeed, there is an opportunity for them to develop a strategic partnership that effectively spans the Indo-Pacific. The two countries are the leading maritime powers among Indian Ocean states, they share many values and traditions, and their strategic interests are becoming increasingly aligned. Although the two countries have for long operated in largely separate strategic spheres, these are now converging. India has strategic interests throughout the Indo-Pacific and Australia is taking a much greater interest in the Indian Ocean region and in India, in particular. The shared strategic concerns include maritime security, the stability of the region, and the role of China. But while there are many opportunities to develop a close strategic partnership, there will also be challenges for both sides.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Australia, and Indo-Pacific