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171. Advancing a Liberal Digital Order in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and other regional democracies risk losing ground in the competition to shape Asia’s digital future. China is making rapid inroads in developing the region’s 5G infrastructure and is playing an increasingly expansive role in the broader digital ecosystems of Indo-Pacific countries. Beijing’s position at the center of Asia’s developing digital order poses a series of challenges to the interests of America and its democratic allies and partners—ranging from the potential compromise of critical networks to the development of new technology standards that favor Chinese companies and undermine civil liberties. Policymakers are scrambling to ascertain how to compete effectively with China in the digital space, when Chinese companies and technology are already interwoven into the digital landscape. These Chinese companies are obligated to assist China on national security, intelligence, and cyber security issues, raising the prospect that they could be employed to carry out espionage or sabotage in the service of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) geopolitical goals. In the case of 5G telecommunication network development, the United States will need to expand its campaign to promote additional trusted vendors who can supply safe, reliable, and cost-effective alternatives to Chinese offerings. Shaping the 5G ecosystem now will set the stage for how the broader U.S.-China technology competition will play out over the next decade. Undersea fiber-optic cables represent another area of technology infrastructure that is being contested between China and the United States. With nearly 95 percent of intercontinental internet data flowing through these undersea cables, it is imperative that they be treated and protected like other critical technologies and infrastructure. Washington must recognize that many issues in digital development remain ambiguous, and it must craft policies that account for the field’s complexity. For example, some countries will seek to maintain a relatively liberal political environment while embracing Chinese technology for economic development purposes. Others will seek out alternatives to Chinese suppliers as a means of maintaining their own security and independence but might still employ those technologies in illiberal ways in order to suppress dissent and maintain political control at home. Moreover, the fast-moving nature of innovation in digital technologies means that technological development will often outpace the creation of liberal political, legal, and regulatory regimes—even in the United States. The development of democratic norms and best practices to combat disinformation, restrict surveillance technologies, and give individuals the right to control their own data is still in a nascent stage. In other words, much of what constitutes a liberal digital order is still being defined. The challenges to ensuring a future liberal digital order are immense; to meet them, the United States must develop a multifaceted approach that prioritizes coordination with democratic allies and partners. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, or the Quad, will play a key role in ensuring protection of emerging and critical technologies through its newly formed working group, announced following the first-ever leaders-level Quad summit in mid-March. Working closely with other technologically advanced Indo-Pacific allies and partners such as South Korea and Taiwan on digital development initiatives will also be important. The degree to which the United States can work with democratic allies and partners to pool resources and capabilities, while also setting mutually agreed standards and guidelines for use of digital technologies, will determine whether those technologies are harnessed in a way that advances free and open societies or contributes to strengthening autocratic regimes.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

172. Two Birds, One Budget: Using ODA for Influence and Development in the Indo-Pacific?

Author:
Rachael Calleja, Sam Hughes, and Beata Cichocka
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
This paper explores the UK’s proposed “Indo-Pacific tilt” from a development perspective. In light of recent cuts to the UK’s official development assistance (ODA), we ask how the UK can use scarce development resources in the Indo-Pacific more effectively to capitalise on opportunities to support strategic objectives while ensuring that ODA remains squarely focused on development priorities. Our analysis seeks to understand both how the UK is positioned within the Indo-Pacific, which is an already-crowded development landscape, as well as where the UK’s strategic and developmental priorities in the region might meaningfully overlap. We find that while there are some opportunities for the UK to support both development objectives and strategic interests concurrently in the Indo-Pacific—such as in the provision of regional and global public goods—the countries with the greatest strategic value to the UK are not those where additional ODA could contribute most clearly to poverty reduction. We conclude the paper with six policy recommendations. Among others, we propose that the UK should consider partnering with other like-minded providers to maximise its presence in the region.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Influence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Indo-Pacific

173. The Russo-U.S. National Identity Gap and the Indo-Pacific in 2021

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The start of the Biden administration demonstrated how far Russo-U.S. relations had sunk. On the heels of the massive cyber-hacking of U.S. government files, attributed to Russia, hearings for Biden’s appointees showcased harsh accusations. These were compounded by the arrest of Aleksey Navalny on his return to Moscow from convalescence in Germany after a near fatal poisoning in Russia, arousing severe rebukes in the U.S. Meanwhile, Russian officials and news sources attacked Biden personally as senile or a figurehead, a flawed U.S. system of democracy as a farce and dysfunctional, and U.S. plotting through Navalny as aimed at taking down Putin. Mutual accusations intensified in mid-March 2021 when Biden responded to a query whether he considered Putin a killer by saying, “I do,” which reverberated in sharp retorts by Putin and from many in Russia. In late April, as Russia massed troops on Ukraine’s border, Biden placed new sanctions on Russia, and Russian language grew even more threatening, relations had sunk even further. If there was no direct focus on the Indo-Pacific in such vitriolic exchanges, that can be seen elsewhere, especially in a further tilt toward China in a reputed “strategic triangle.” The Indo-Pacific is where relations between Moscow and Washington have the most potential, spared of the quandaries of NATO expansion and Soviet nostalgia over a sphere of influence or Middle East intrigues leading to shifting alliances. Many in Washington thought that a win-win scenario could be achieved if Moscow accepted integration into a dynamic region, a balance of power welcoming Beijing’s rise but preventing it from domination, the denuclearization and stabilization of Pyongyang, and breakthroughs in bilateral relations with Tokyo and Seoul. All of these objectives appeared consistent with Russian aspirations in the early 1990s, but they were thwarted by the national identity that was being reconstructed in the following quarter century, especially under Vladimir Putin from the mid-2000s. Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific proved to be a casualty of Russian thinking toward the United States, most of all, but also toward China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and India. The Russo-U.S. identity gap has widened further in 2021. As Dmitry Medvedev wrote on January 16, the relations of Moscow and Beijing with the new U.S. administration are likely to remain extremely cold after years in which the trajectory of relations between Washington and Moscow had already been heading steadfastly downhill. Russo-U.S. bilateral relations and conflicting agendas in Europe and the Middle East draw avid interest, but the Indo-Pacific appears to be an inconsequential factor in their sharp rivalry. Nor do their differences in this region appear to have much significance for the development of the area, where China casts a broad shadow and U.S. alliances and partnerships are being renewed. To argue to the contrary leads one down several possible pathways: 1) this is the one promising arena for rebuilding relations; 2) Russia has a special role to play, distinct from China’s, due to its ties to India, North Korea, or ASEAN; 3) continued strengthening of Sino-Russian ties adds an element of concern for U.S. policies in the Indo-Pacific; or 4) Russia’s animus toward the U.S. may find an unexpected outlet in this region. Whichever pathway is explored, it is important to grasp how Russians perceive this region and its various sub-regions, while keeping in mind the context of the broader clash of national identities severely affecting the Russo-U.S. relationship. In this chapter, I offer an overview of the Russo-U.S. identity gap, turn to Russian thinking about the Biden administration, review Russian national identity, focus on aspects of Sino-Russian ties and their identity gap, subsequently shift to how Russians have viewed other parts of Asia of late, and conclude with an assessment of the prospects for Russo-U.S. relations in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

174. The COVID-19 Pandemic and Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: A View from the United States

Author:
Jacques deLisle
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic poses significant geopolitical challenges and presents opportunities for the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration bungled the crisis, damaging the U.S.’s standing as a paragon of competence in public health, and functional governance more generally. The international face of the U.S. response deepened preexisting concerns—especially significant in the Indo-Pacific—that the U.S. had retreated from its post-Second World War and post-Cold War role of providing international public goods and leadership and supporting international institutions. Opportunities for the U.S. amid the crisis and in its aftermath stem primarily from shortcomings or unappealing features in China’s handling of the epidemic, and stumbles in China’s self-presentation as a provider of foreign assistance and international cooperation, and from U.S. policies—many of them embraced by the Biden administration—that could correct missteps and ameliorate trends that have diminished U.S. standing (especially during Donald Trump’s presidency). For the U.S. to reap potential gains, it also must adapt its policies to the implications of some Indo-Pacific states’ comparatively successful responses to the pandemic, and the pandemic-spotlighted nature of contemporary international problems.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States of America and Indo-Pacific

175. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Gamechanger in the Indo-Pacific: The View from China

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How has the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped or influenced China’s geopolitical outlook and its grand strategy for the years to come? This is a question that will determine China’s relationship with the United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and the rest of the world. In the Chinese strategic community, the pandemic has been regarded as a “watershed” event that has reshaped the structure of the international system and the power equilibrium. Its importance is elevated to the same status as the end of World War II, which determined the bipolar international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War which began thirty years of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Although China began as a sheer loser in the pandemic given its culpability in the origin of COVID and its early poor management of the domestic spread of the disease, Beijing believes that it has eventually emerged as a pure winner in the pandemic: the relative gain China has made vis-à-vis the U.S.’s bigger losses in disease control, national power, economic growth, global leadership, and credibility has strengthened Chinese confidence that the tide is turning in China’s favor. The “effectiveness” of the Chinese political system, as manifested in its domestic disease control, has reinforced China’s ideological conviction of its superiority. As China uses COVID diplomacy to demonstrate the superiority and desirability of its political system, the pandemic is perceived as an opportunity for it to shape the new international order and promote China’s desired “Community of Common Destiny.” Challenges remain, as the U.S. revamps its alliance system under the Biden administration and as regional powers and Western countries grow increasingly concerned and anxious about China’s growing confidence and capabilities. However, for China, the pandemic has been a great opportunity, and China has emerged from it as a pure winner. It is an interesting question as to how the pandemic has changed the nature and the dynamics of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. Most would agree that the pandemic exacerbated, accelerated, and aggravated the deterioration of relations that the U.S. and China had already been experiencing before 2020. However, the differences lie in the degree, intensity, velocity, and extensiveness of the damage. Without the pandemic, the downward slope U.S. and China had already been on would not have come to a state of “freefall” in 2020. And that “freefall” period has long-lasting and significant implications for their bilateral relations in the post-COVID world. The damaged trust, confidence, and credibility, and the deeply entrenched sense of hostility, or even antagonism, have made any effort to repair the relations extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. And this reality will affect the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region for the many years and decades to come.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

176. How the rest of the world responds to the US-China split

Author:
Hung Tran
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The election of Joe Biden as the forty-sixth US president is not expected to change the list of substantive issues dividing the United States and China, such as trade, investment, technology, geopolitical competition, national security, and human rights—except that the priority among them may change, with human rights concerns moving more to the forefront. However, the tone and modality of the unfolding of the US-China competition will change from Donald Trump’s unilateralism to Biden’s efforts to build alliances with “likeminded” countries in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere to deal with the challenges China has posed. In a way, Biden’s alliance-building approach may intensify pressure on the rest of the world to take sides. How countries respond to this challenge, unwelcome by most, depends on whether they see themselves as competitors to China, or as “price takers” in the international economic system.
Topic:
Global Markets, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Trade, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

177. U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence

Author:
Stephen Haggard
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, Innovation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific

178. Why the U.S. Should Prioritize Security in Its 5G Roll Out

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
5G technology promises to transform practically every sphere of life, from smartphones and self-driving cars, to remote surgery and virtual reality. Policies related to the rollout of 5G in the United States have tended to focus on mitigating security risks, but does protecting security come at the cost of expanding U.S. global influence—or does it simply cost too much? This policy brief by IGCC postdoctoral research associate James Lee analyzes the three main criteria for deciding what a “good” 5G policy should look like—security, global influence, and efficiency— and recommends that the United States’ 5G strategy prioritize security first, influence second, and efficiency third.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Power
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

179. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

180. The missing anchor: Why the EU should join the CPTPP

Author:
Peter Draper and Naoise McDonagh
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a twenty-first century trade accord that aims to secure a level playing field and rules-based trade environment in the Indo-Pacific. Yet in the absence of the United States, it risks underachieving on this goal. The European Union (EU) is the only global actor with the trade preferences and requisite economic heft to provide a similar anchoring function for market-orientated trade as was envisioned for the United States in the CPTPP. An EU accession bid to the CPTPP would require overcoming major hurdles and reservations, not least in Brussels. The gains in surmounting them, however, would be considerable. Any EU accession process should avoid jeopardising the possibility of a return of the United States to the multilateral trade agreement. An equivalence regime for regulations where CPTPP members are not in alignment with EU standards could in principle open the possibility of the EU and the United States eventually co-habiting within the CPTPP, however remote or delayed the prospect. Australia should use its status as a founding CPTPP member to advocate for EU accession to the trade agreement. Engaging Europe on the future of the multilateral trade architecture in Asia presents a key area of potential convergence between Brussels and Canberra, following a setback in strategic ties caused by the Australian cancellation of a French-led submarine contract.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific