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31. India–East Africa: A Not So Healthy Relationship?

Author:
Isabelle Saint-Mezard and Françoise Nicolas
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Due to historical as well as geographical reasons, India and East Africa have long been close partners. In the recent period however, and even more so since the early 2000s, these ties have tightened as a result of combined efforts by the government of India and its business community. The presence of communities of Indian origin in several East African countries has also acted as a catalyst. East Africa is perceived as a valuable partner both by Indian authorities and by Indian private companies. Although the two types of Indian players may not explicitly coordinate their actions, their interests dovetail nicely in this particular region. The health sector sticks out as one major sector on which Indian actors focus in East Africa. It provides a striking example of the multilayered complementarity between India and East Africa, on the one hand, and between public and private Indian players’ interests on the other. However, India’s activism in the health sector is not necessarily perceived positively by the East African host countries. Despite some technology transfers and efforts by the Indian actors, be they public or private, to promote capacity-building, East African countries find themselves in a situation of dependence as a result of Indian companies exporting and producing drugs, building hospitals, improving hospital management and Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, or digitalizing healthcare. However, the major point of tension pertains to the promotion of medical tourism. Although offshore healthcare comes with many benefits, it is unlikely to be sustainable for the East African economies in the long run. Moreover, the money spent on medical tourism could arguably be used more usefully to develop local medical facilities and competence. The recent developments in the context of the pandemic have made the associated risk very clear. The challenge in the coming years will be for the two parties to find a way to better balance their relationship and set it on firmer ground – in other words, to make it healthier.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Health, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, and India

32. Digital Southeast Asia:Opportunities for Australia–India cooperation to support the region in the post-Covid-19 context

Author:
Huon Curtis, Bart Hogeveen, Jocelinn Kang, Huong Le Thu, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, and Trisha Ray
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Covid-19 and the subsequent public-health responses have disrupted social and economic lives across the globe. Fiscal support measures may have alleviated the initial fallout in some places, but one of the bigger shocks has been the accelerated adoption and integration of and reliance on digital technologies. While this is a positive contribution towards digital development, it has also accentuated the already large gap between those able to adopt digital technologies and those without sufficient means to do so. For the many fragile democracies in the Indo-Pacific, this is creating conditions that could undermine democratic resilience. A central question for these democratic governments is how to drive accelerating digital transformation and ICT-enabled growth towards poverty reduction, sustainable economic growth and building social cohesion while maintaining resilience to cybersecurity threats. Southeast Asians are exceptional consumers of online goods and services. The region is also home to a growing number of technology start-ups, and governments are pushing this ‘drive for digital’ through ambitious national strategies. Despite those positives, digital growth within the region and within individual economies is uneven.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
India, Australia, and Southeast Asia

33. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

34. What is at Stake in China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations?

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Satellite imagery reveals that China has recently accelerated construction along its border with Bhutan. Underway since 2020, the project includes over 200 structures, with several two-story buildings in six locations (Times of India, January 13). Bhutan has not commented on the situation in keeping with its policy to refrain from public discussion of border issues, whereas Beijing has framed the development as “normal construction activities on its own territory” (The Hindu, January 13). India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has acknowledged that it is monitoring China’s bridge-building activities over the Pangong Tso lake (India MEA, January 6). In late December, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the “standardization” of the names of 15 places (eight residential areas, four mountains, two rivers, and one mountain pass) in the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims and calls “Southern Tibet” (藏南, Zangnan). This is the second instance of China renaming localities in Arunachal Pradesh; the first occurred in 2017 (Global Times, December 30, 2021). India called it a “ridiculous exercise to support untenable territorial claims” (Indian MEA, January 6). Though 2022 has only begun, China’s various intimidation tactics against India are already in full swing: from renaming places and circulating videos of People’s Liberation Army soldiers raising the five-starred red flags of China, supposedly, in the Galwan Valley as part of their New Year celebrations, to expanding its dual use infrastructure along the Himalayan border (Global Times, January 1; The Print, January 13). According to state media, China has been strengthening infrastructure-related projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Beijing claims its infrastructure push in Tibet is intended to support economic development, but the Indian side interprets the projects as serving dual use, or, military purposes (China Brief, November 19, 2021). While Chinese sources claim that India was making a “fuss,” they did not, however, entirely deny these reports (Global Times, January 19).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Bhutan

35. Scope and Limitations of Soft Power Diplomacy: A Quantitative Analysis of Afghans' Perceptions about India

Author:
Mohammad Reyaz and Sabir Ahamed
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Before the Taliban came back to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, India and Afghanistan had cordial bilateral relations and were often described as great friends. Since 2002, India had helped build several infrastructure projects as part of its promised development assistance program of over $2 billion (later increased to $3 billion). Considering India’s investments in Afghanistan, the goodwill it enjoyed among common Afghans was understandable. However, it would be wrong to imply that these unique, multifaceted bilateral relations between the two countries were simply due to India's helping hand. This research paper is one of its kind attempt to explain the perceptions Afghans had about India based on the field survey done in Afghanistan in 2019. Using responses of over 321 Afghan participants, the paper attempts to quantitatively analyze the goodwill and positive vibes that India enticed among Afghans. However, many Afghans felt that India did not do enough during the crisis in August 2021. Based on the survey and the general perceptions of Afghans in the aftermath of the return of the Taliban, this paper argues that the soft power investments in Afghanistan helped India in its nation-branding, making it attractive and creating goodwill. However, New Delhi lacked the will to act smartly and hence did not get the desired strategic influences due to ‘soft power behavior’.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, India, and Asia

36. A Saudi-Pakistani Reset: Business as Usual?

Author:
Joshua Albin Cheyaden
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
“Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are back on track,” declared ʿAli ʿAwadh ʿAsseri, a former Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, following Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s state visit to Riyadh in May 2021.[1] Khan’s visit ended a two-year diplomatic rift that had marred a close relationship spanning seven decades.[2] The Pakistani Prime Minister’s visit reopened vital channels of communication that had been shut for almost a year and signaled a “reset” in Saudi-Pakistani relations.[3] The rift between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began in 2019 and peaked in 2020, while the year 2021 was marked by calls for a reset in their relations.[4] Saudi Arabia’s deepening ties with India remain at the heart of the Saudi-Pakistani split, and they are unlikely to change despite any presumptive diplomatic reset between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s increasing engagement with India as a key energy client is just one aspect of a broader transformation the Kingdom is experiencing under Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.[5] At the same time, Pakistan is in a deep economic crisis and is looking for foreign investment in major infrastructure projects to generate employment in the country.[6] In 2021, Pakistan declared its intention to pursue a foreign policy guided by its focus on economic security over its geopolitical interests.[7] Therefore, the long-term prospects for the Saudi-Pakistani reset depends on Pakistan’s ability to accept Saudi Arabia’s more even-handed India-Pakistan policy and the Saudis’ willingness to invest in an economic partnership with Pakistan.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, Middle East, India, and Saudi Arabia

37. Nature and Nurture: How the Biden Administration Can Advance Ties With India

Author:
Anubhav Gupta
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The state of the U.S.-India relationship is strong, but two critical developments in 2020 have created a new inflection point for the relationship. Growing apprehension in both New Delhi and Washington about Chinese aggression has created the strategic convergence long sought by a U.S. defense establishment eager to enlist India to balance China. On the other hand, devastated by the Covid-19 global pandemic, the United States and India face challenging economic recoveries amid growing protectionist sentiments at home that could diminish the relationship’s promise. Having won the U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden has an opportunity to consolidate and accelerate the relationship by creating a substantive and broad partnership with India, which can undergird U.S. policy in Asia and support U.S. global interests for decades to come. this paper provides a blueprint for how the Biden administration can actualize what previous presidents have deemed a “natural partnership.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, COVID-19, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, India, and United States of America

38. A US-India Trade Agenda for the Biden Administration

Author:
Aparna Pande and Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US ought to counteract the influence of Chinese authoritarianism early and often. One relatively low-cost way is to encourage India to engage more deeply as a competitor with China in the global economy. A democracy since its independence in 1947, with a population about the same as that of China, India is that country’s natural rival in Asia. Beginning with India’s decision in 1990-91 to liberalize its economy, the nation has gradually opened its vast market to global trade. Fueled by fresh access to foreign capital and technology, India’s economy grew over six percent during the first decade of the 21st century. In May 2014, this progress was further advanced by the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the first time in India’s history, a conservative administration had a clear parliamentary majority, making it possible to legislate foundational, market-positive reform. India has adopted a new insolvency and bankruptcy code and replaced multiple taxation regimes across its states with a federal goods and services tax, which is welcome. But India has done little to end its excessive protectionism. Its distrust of foreign corporations, a legacy of colonial rule, endures. Indian policy makers may believe that the US is so eager for Indian competition with China that Washington will grant them a pass on restrictive trade and investment policies. But there is a better choice. India is nowhere near its full economic potential, and the fix isn’t complicated. The Biden agenda for India should encourage India to lower tariffs, to remove barriers to foreign retail, to roll back unnecessarily restrictive data privacy rules, and to provide economic incentives for foreign investment.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

39. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

40. The Coronavirus: Fueling Concerns and Contrasts between India and China

Author:
Tanvi Madan
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
On February 26, 2020, an Indian plane landed in Wuhan carrying medical supplies for China, which was then the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak. On its return, it evacuated a number of Indian and Bangladeshi nationals, as well as citizens of other countries. On the face of it, this is the kind of cooperative effort that is expected during a global public health crisis, with countries—even competitors—coming together at a time of need. However, the saga of that flight reflected another (prescient) dynamic—that COVID-19 would reinforce and increase rather than alleviate competition between China and India and complicate cooperation, with pandemic response and recovery efforts being seen through a competitive prism. That flight to Wuhan was not smooth; indeed, it was much delayed. Delhi had announced it a week earlier. It was a way to help China, demonstrate India’s capacity, and assist India’s neighbors by evacuating their citizens. But then Indian officials publicly, albeit anonymously, revealed that Beijing was not clearing the flight. The reason was unclear—China, after all, had been requesting international support. There also did not seem to be a bureaucratic snafu. So, was it the visual of Beijing accepting support from India, which Chinese officials and analysts sometimes dismiss as a less capable, even chaotic, neighbor? Was it the desire not to give India a soft power win, including with its neighbors? Was it because the flight involved a military transport aircraft procured from the U.S.? Was it retaliation for the temporary Indian detention of a Chinese ship bound for Pakistan due to a tip-off of dual-use items on board? Or was the reason Chinese unhappiness about Indian travel restrictions to and from China, or Indian export limits on certain medical products? Whatever the reason, China eventually gave the flight clearance, but only a week later and after much Indian negotiation. It was an early sign that the public health arena would not be immune from the competitive atmosphere prevailing between the two countries, and in the region as a whole. Subsequent events only bore that out. There has been considerable discussion about how countries’ perceptions of China would change due to the pandemic—at the beginning because of its mishandling, and then because of its recovery. This chapter argues that, rather than change perceptions, Beijing’s handling of COVID-19 increased the largely skeptical views of China that prevail in India, which had at least 29 million cases and over 385,000 deaths in India by mid-June 2021 (the 2nd and 3rd highest in the world respectively). This trend was further bolstered by the worst boundary crisis between the two countries since they fought a war in 1962. Together, the pandemic and the boundary crisis have ensured that the competitive and conflictual elements of the India-China relationship have been front and center over the last year. They have reinforced and accelerated concerns in India about China’s lack of transparency, its uncertain commitment to the rules-based order, as well as its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and in international institutions. And they have demonstrated that despite Delhi and Beijing’s efforts to cooperate and to stabilize their relationship over the last two decades, it remains a fundamentally competitive one that can spill over into conflict. This chapter examines the impact of first the pandemic and then the boundary crisis on perceptions of China among the Indian government, establishment, and public. It proceeds to outline the consequences of these perceptions on Indian domestic policy, its partnerships with like-minded major and middle powers, and its counter-COVID activism. Finally, it considers China’s response, particularly to Indian policy changes.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia