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1. Moving Targets. Trends in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In December 2022, Japan announced it would drastically increase its defence budget by 2027. The decision came as a wake-up call for the whole region: Japan was gearing up for a world of heightened tensions and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region. This Report analyses the present and future of Japan’s security and defence policies. Within the context of a rising China, Tokyo has broadened its defence ties with the US, India, Australia, and Taiwan. However, China remains its biggest trading partner, meaning Tokyo's policymakers are charged with the task and challenge of striking a balance between defence policies and business and trade relations with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, ASEAN, Influence, Defense Spending, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

2. Securing Regional Solar Supply Chains: Determinants and Preparedness of the Northeastern Region of India and ASEAN

Author:
Prabir De, Komal Biswal, and Venkatachalam Anbumozhi
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Renewable energy contributes to the acceleration of the energy transition, supports global environmental mitigation, and helps meet sustainable development goals. Energy connectivity of India’s Northeastern Region (NER) with neighbouring countries particularly ASEAN assumes critical importance for accelerating economic integration. NER can play a three-dimensional role as power producer, exporter, and transit provider provided a quadrangular approach to build energy linkages and promote integration is consciously put in place. To understand whether the NER states are capable enough to take forward the solar supply chain development and bolster the ASEAN-India engagements in solar energy sector, this study has designed a state-level index of solar supply chain development by factoring in seven parameters, namely, (i) economic situations, (ii) environmental factors, (iii) spread of connectivity, (iv) financial enabling conditions, (v) mobility, (vi) human development, and (vi) social cohesion, which directly or indirectly influence the solar supply chain development in India. The results show that a clean and decent environment is must for development of solar supply chain. In addition, the study suggests that there is a need to improve the solar supply chain capability in the NER to enhance the economic growth. Leveraging policy support and reinvigorating existing institutions and creating new ones are imperatives for predicting the solar supply chain in the NER. This indexing may help track the trends, allowing for more informed decision-making in securing regional solar supply chain.
Topic:
Renewable Energy, ASEAN, Solar Power, Supply Chains, and Energy
Political Geography:
India and Asia

3. Volatility in the Rice Sector: Time for ASEAN to Act?

Author:
Jose M. L. Montesclaros
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
How Thailand and Vietnam – two major rice exporters after India – will react to the latter’s recent rice export ban will depend very much on expectations of how long the ban will last. Should rice exporters in these countries engage in price speculation, global food security can be put at risk. It is time for ASEAN to explore how price speculation in the rice trade can be prevented.
Topic:
Agriculture, Food Security, ASEAN, Volatility, and Rice
Political Geography:
India, Vietnam, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

4. Neglected Maritime Terrain in the Bay of Bengal: An Examination of the Future of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands

Author:
Evan Phillips
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) are some of the most neglected maritime terrain in the world despite their proximity to one of the busiest maritime chokepoints on Earth. Strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal and around the Strait of Malacca necessitates that U.S. strategy carefully considers the implications of having a U.S. presence on the ANI. The United States has the capacity to assist in international law enforcement of illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing and piracy as well as ensure the security of international shipping through the Strait of Malacca. The possibility of bilateral exercises that introduce concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and the use of the U.S. Coast Guard in multiple capacities are real possibilities as well. Perhaps most importantly, the United States can partner with India to leverage China’s Malacca Dilemma and constantly threaten a blockade of Chinese shipping through the Strait of Malacca in a potential conflict. China also aspires to alleviate its Malacca Dilemma.
Topic:
Security, Nationalism, Maritime, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
India and Indo-Pacific

5. South Korea’s New Southern Policy as an Open Regime: A View from Southeast Asia

Author:
Aaron Jed Rabena
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
There are four ways on how the NSP Plus could be further improved. First, to avoid policy limitations and maximize the room for supply chain resiliency and functional cooperation, the coverage of the NSP countries can be expanded apart from ASEAN and India. Second, South Korea can employ the concept of Third-Party Market Cooperation (TPMC) or the pursuit of joint ventures or partnerships with other countries in maximizing capacity-building in third countries (NSP countries). Third, South Korea can help strengthen ASEAN institution-building, regionalism and internal balancing by applying a similar policy framework to the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) just as it does to the Mekong Region. Fourth, there needs to be more reciprocity or two-way interaction in the NSP so as to not make it seem that ASEAN is only on the receiving end of South Korean generosity. Finally, it is important to note that a change in the South Korean administration does not necessarily spell the end of the NSP just as the US’ Pivot or Rebalance to Asia of the Obama Administration was remodeled to the Indo-Pacific under the Trump administration.
Topic:
Markets, Regional Cooperation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
India, Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

6. South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties With India and ASEAN

Author:
Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Under South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his administration, Seoul has undertaken its first unified diplomatic initiative aimed at advancing ties with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This initiative is known as the New Southern Policy (NSP). Though Moon’s efforts toward securing inter-Korean peace have received the most publicity, the NSP has arguably sustained more momentum than any of the administration’s other flagship foreign policy initiatives. Looking beyond South Korea’s relationships in Northeast Asia, it is also important to assess the NSP’s progress toward its goal to “elevate [South] Korea’s relations with ASEAN member states and India in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, among others, to the same level [South] Korea maintains with the four major powers (the United States, China, Japan and Russia).”1 The NSP is an extension of South Korea’s need to diversify its economic and strategic relationships amid the uncertainty posed by competition between its closest ally, the United States, and largest trading partner, China. By elevating ties with India and Southeast Asia, particularly in the economic realm, Seoul hopes to insulate itself from the risks posed by trade and strategic friction between the two great powers. Moreover, it hopes to advance its middle power diplomacy and improve ties with India and Southeast Asia commensurate with their growing economic and strategic importance. Though India and ASEAN countries have strong ties to South Korea and share many of the same values and interests, they have not featured as prominently in Seoul’s diplomacy as major powers around the peninsula in the past. While it has clear logic behind it, the NSP’s implementation and outcomes so far are mixed. Of the policy’s three pillars—prosperity (economic cooperation), people (sociocultural cooperation), and peace (political and strategic cooperation)—the prosperity pillar has received the most emphasis. Under this pillar, South Korea has initiated new negotiations for free trade agreements and launched an official development assistance (ODA) strategy aimed at six NSP partner countries. However, cooperation with India has often lagged while cooperation with Vietnam has outpaced attention to most other ASEAN member states. The peace pillar, by contrast, has been relatively underdeveloped and focused mainly on nontraditional security issues while avoiding sensitive strategic issues confronting the region. This pillar showcases how South Korea’s concerns about Chinese influence both motivate and constrain the policy—though Seoul wants to diversify its economic portfolio and strategic partnerships to mitigate its reliance on China, it also must tread carefully to avoid retaliation from Beijing. Even so, while ASEAN, India, and South Korea share common interests on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, stability in the Taiwan Strait, and denuclearization by North Korea, South Korea’s main security concerns revolve around Northeast Asia, while those of India and ASEAN do not. Seoul’s hierarchy of priorities in the security realm will continue to differ from that of its NSP partners, posing another obstacle to security cooperation. That said, the policy has made progress in strengthening South Korea’s diplomatic infrastructure and institutional apparatus to devote more attention to NSP partner countries, even in just four short years and after being disrupted by a global pandemic. Considering this short period, many of NSP’s projects will take time to show results. Even so, the broad and far-reaching policy has sometimes struggled to define its goals or unify its wide range of elements under a clear strategy. It would benefit from a more well-branded approach to India and Southeast Asia that highlights core projects under each pillar.2 To that end, the Moon administration should strive to evaluate the outcomes of the NSP in its final year in office. Although it is typically difficult to maintain continuity in foreign policy due to South Korean presidents’ limit to one five-year term, the geopolitical and economic imperatives driving the NSP will remain under a new administration in 2022. Given the staying power of these drivers and the continuously growing importance of India and Southeast Asia, South Korea’s next president will have every reason to keep emphasizing these regional partnerships as well.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Integration, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and South Korea

7. Digital Platform Markets of ASEAN and India: Implications for Cooperation with Korea

Author:
Jeong Gon Kim, Seung Kwon Na, Jaeho Lee, ChiHyun Yun, and Eunmi Kim
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The growth of digital platform markets in ASEAN and India is prominent. With COVID-19, demands for economic and social activities centered on digital platforms are expected to rise further; especially five sectors (e-commerce, sharing economy, education, healthcare and fintech) are fast growing seectors. Korean is a potential partner of ASEAN countries and India. Korea's Digital New Deal policy now stresses tasks such as sharing and utilizing data, convergence of 5G and artificial intelligence across whole industries, spreading digital education, digital healthcare, etc., which are closely related to the economic and social needs of ASEAN countries and India. In order to promote regulatory harmonization and cooperation with ASEAN and India, it is necessary for Korea to promote digital economy and trade agreements.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, ASEAN, COVID-19, 5G, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and South Korea

8. 2019 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus: Enhancing Bilateral and Regional Cooperative Security for India and Japan in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, cooperative security became a catchphrase term used generally to describe a more peaceful approach to security through increased international cooperation. The cooperative security model essentially embraced four concentric and mutually reinforcing “rings of security”: Individual Security, Collective Security, Collective Defense, and Promoting Stability. In 1992, American strategists — Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner discussed cooperative security in terms of providing new avenues toward world peace, and argued, “Organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of the cold war… Cooperative Security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post– cold war era.” Two years later, in 1994, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described cooperative security as tending “… to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

9. Domestic Politics Force India's Withdrawal from RCEP and Broader Trade Disengagement

Author:
Amitendu Palit
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations concluded at the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok on November 4, 2019. Fifteen RCEP members, including the ten-ASEAN countries, and Australia, China, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, agreed to commence preparation of the legal text of the agreement for signing in 2020. India was the only member to opt out, citing significant unresolved outstanding issues. India’s decision was surprising as it actively participated in the negotiations that lasted for 29 rounds and went on for more than six years since beginning in 2013. Domestic pressures forced Prime Minister Modi to withdraw India from RCEP at the last minute. It also points to disengagement becoming the prominent character of India’s trade policy as domestic protectionist interests successfully undermine outward-oriented economic visions.
Topic:
Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

10. The New Southbound Policy Deepening Taiwan’s Regional Integration

Author:
Bonnie Glaser, Scott Kennedy, and Matthew Funaiole
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In a concerted effort to expand Taiwan’s presence across the Indo-Pacific, President Tsai Ing-wen has introduced the New Southbound Policy (NSP) to strengthen Taipei’s relationships with the 10 countries of ASEAN, six states in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan), Australia, and New Zealand. The policy is designed to leverage Taiwan’s cultural, educational, technological, agricultural, and economic assets to deepen its regional integration. This report tracks the ongoing implementation of the NSP and assesses what has been achieved since Tsai was elected in January 2016. The Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy issued by the Tsai administration detail that the policy is designed to (1) forge a “sense of economy community” by fostering links between Taiwan and the 18 NSP target countries; and (2) establish mechanisms for wide-ranging negotiations and dialogues, and to “form a consensus for cooperation” with NSP target countries. In the short and medium term, the Guidelines identify four goals: (1) use national will, policy incentives, and business opportunities to spur and expand “two-way” exchanges with NSP target countries; (2) encourage industry to adopt “a New Southbound strategy” in their planning; (3) cultivate more people with the skills needed to support the NSP; and (4) expand multilateral and bilateral negotiations and dialogues to enhance economic cooperation and resolve disputes and disagreements.1 The NSP follows from similarly named policies initiated under Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, which were aimed at diversifying Taiwan’s outbound investment away from Mainland China and into Southeast Asia. Since these prior efforts had only a limited impact, skeptics often mischaracterize the NSP as the latest iteration of a failed policy. Such naysayers fail to appreciate, however, that Tsai’s approach is both more strategic and more comprehensive than those of her predecessors. While diversifying and reinvigorating Taiwan’s economy remain fundamental to the NSP, the policy also outlines mechanisms for more effectively integrating Taiwan into the region through cultivating interpersonal connections. Moreover, the NSP is being implemented at a time of slowing growth and rising wages in Mainland China, while investment opportunities are booming in Southeast Asia and South Asia. The core economic goals of the NSP include institutional initiatives, such as updating and expanding economic agreements with targeted countries. At the same time, Taiwan is seeking to encourage small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to explore opportunities overseas. Taipei has also identified avenues for improving bilateral ties by engaging with the general publics of NSP target countries, as well as with government officials and business executives. As such, Taiwan has invested heavily in expanding cultural and educational exchanges to help promote a deeper under- standing of South and Southeast Asian cultures, languages, and business practices among the people of Taiwan. These “people-centered” exchanges serve to realize Taipei’s twin goals of strengthening Taiwan’s integration with the region and facilitating its economic diversification. It is too early to determine whether the NSP will ultimately achieve its ambitious goals, and it may take years before the Tsai government’s investment will start paying dividends. Furthermore, the NSP should be carefully examined by both the countries targeted by Tsai and partners further afield—including the United States. Many of these countries have a vested interest in bolstering the mechanisms available for Taiwan to contribute to the peaceful development of Asia. These countries may find that the goals of the NSP overlap with their own objectives in the region, and therefore may be eager to lend additional support to the endeavor. Selected Policy Recommendations for the United States The United States has a profound interest in the success of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. Taiwan has been a long-standing partner of the United States. Its democracy and free society are a beacon of liberal values in the region, while its economic development model has been admired and studied for decades by nations in Asia and beyond. To date, the United States does not appear to have given much thought or expended much effort to support the NSP within Asia. We suggest the United States consider actively supporting the NSP. We recommend the following specific actions: The assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs should coordinate with his/ her counterpart in the South and Central Asia division to create an internal working group to consider how the U.S. government can support the NSP. The U.S. government should engage Japan, Australia, and India, the other members of the “quad,” in support of the NSP. The U.S. government should continue to support Taiwan’s inclusion and active participation in international and regional initiatives where statehood is not required. U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly those with programs in NSP target countries, should consider partnerships with NGOs in Taiwan to integrate their work where appropriate in support of the NSP. The Commerce Department’s U.S. Commercial Service should engage with American industry associations and companies, and explore potential avenues of collaboration be- tween American and Taiwan industry in NSP target countries. The United States should consider bilateral (U.S.-Taiwan) cultural initiatives that may be brought to third countries in Asia. The United States should include Taiwan youth in relevant regional programs and networks.
Topic:
Agriculture, Education, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Culture, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan