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71. A Tale of Two Normalizations: Israeli Normalization with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain – Part II

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Bahrain and Israel signed their “Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations” on September 15, 2020; the “Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel” was signed on the same day. Since then, bilateral relations between the two states and Israel have rapidly progressed, with many more issue-specific agreements signed. The Negev Summit on March 28, 2022, which was attended by Bahrain, U.A.E., Egypt, and Morocco, as well as the United States, symbolized a maturing and coalescence of the regional normalization processes between Israel and conservative Arab states. A follow-up to the Negev Summit took place in Manama on June 27, 2022 and the steering committee, which was chaired by Bahraini Undersecretary for Political Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, formed working groups on security, health, education, tourism, food and water security, and energy.[1] A previous paper addressed recent developments in the foreign policy of U.A.E. which impact on the current status of relations with Israel, as well as recent developments in the two states’ bilateral relations. This paper will look at the context and content of relations between Israel and Bahrain, and analyze the overall state of normalization in the region at this stage.[2]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

72. Saudi Arabia’s New Nationalism: Embracing Jahiliyyah

Author:
Ilan Zalayat
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
For more than two-thousand years, the walled city of al-ʿUla has been laying peacefully in a northwestern oasis of the Arabian Peninsula. While in ancient times it was an important oasis on the Spice Route, in the modern era, only the approximately five-thousand inhabitants of this far-flung town on the Saudi periphery know it to be the home of well-preserved stone monuments made by Nabataean sculptors. Its relative anonymity stands in stark contrast to its world-renowned twin city in Petra of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. However, ever since the de-facto Saudi ruler, Prince Mohammed bin Salman (“MbS”), became Crown Prince in June 2017, Saudi Arabia has gone to great lengths to publicize forgotten al-ʿUla: The government has invested $15 billion on advertising and developing the site, attracting hundreds of thousands of visitors.[1] The government also used the site to host the Saudi reconciliation with Qatar in 2021. Al-ʿUla was also the setting for the first-ever movie that was shot and produced in Saudi Arabia.[2] The counterintuitive choice to feature pagan monuments as the new symbol of Saudi Arabia,[3] a country that has long touted itself as the custodian of Islam, epitomizes the kingdom's effort to reimagine its pre-Islamic history in a nationalist frame.
Topic:
Islam, Nationalism, History, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia and Gulf Nations

73. Gulf States and Peacebuilding: Key Characteristics, Dynamics, and Opportunities

Author:
Sultan Barakat
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
While the Gulf States have long been generous providers of foreign aid, it is only in recent years that they have publicly committed to playing a major role as peacebuilders. This paper analyzes the current role and prospects of the Gulf States as actors in the field of peacebuilding.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Aid, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations

74. The Graveyard of Hubris – Yemen Annual Review 2021

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Through most of 2021, the armed Houthi movement appeared unstoppable. As their forces pushed relentlessly toward Marib city, the fall of the last government stronghold in the north began to seem inevitable. Rich in oil and gas, its loss would be a mortal blow to the spiraling economy and political legitimacy of the internationally recognized government. Along frontlines across the country, Houthi forces either held their ground or advanced, showing a cohesiveness, discipline and effectiveness unmatched by the motley array of armed groups opposing them. Houthi drones and ballistic missiles flew across the border into Saudi Arabia, and continued even in the face of retaliatory airstrikes, heightening the cost of conflict for the coalition. Houthi military efforts were buttressed by developments behind the frontlines and beyond Yemen’s borders. A significant threat to the movement emerged and vanished without the Houthis even having to respond. The group was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2021 as a swan song of the Trump administration in Washington, but the decision was rescinded less than a month later by newly inaugurated US President Joe Biden after the United Nations and aid organizations testified it would paralyze humanitarian operations. For Houthi leaders, it was an affirmation of their strategy of holding the wellbeing of the civilian population hostage, giving the international community the poisoned choice of abandoning people in need or propping up the Houthi state. The group has been able to marshal humanitarian assistance to underwrite economic activity in the areas it controls, helping to legitimate its rule and freeing up resources for its war effort. Houthi security forces have successfully suppressed dissent, and an ever-growing number of children and adults are indoctrinated into the group through the rewriting of school curricula and religious teachings at mosques. The economy remained relatively stable in Houthi-held areas, even as searing inflation took hold elsewhere in the country. Its apparent success has furthered the group’s zealotry and sense of impunity, both on display in September with the public executions of eight men and a minor in Sana’a. In sum, the Houthis’ theocratic state-building project continued to gain steam through 2021. The Graveyard of Hubris – Yemen Annual Review 2021 - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/16768
Topic:
Politics, Military Affairs, Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

75. When Giants Strike – The Yemen Review, January & February 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The Houthi threat to Marib that dominated 2021 set in motion a shift in strategy by Saudi Arabia that restored the vanguard role to the United Arab Emirates and its allied Yemeni forces. The turning point came in January when the UAE-backed Giants Brigades pushed Houthi forces out of Shabwa and entered southern Marib, forcing the Houthis to divert resources away from their campaign against Marib city. The Emiratis’ renewed influence prompted Houthi drone and missile strikes on Abu Dhabi, resulting in an intense and sustained round of Saudi-led coalition airstrikes on Sana’a and other parts of Houthi-controlled northern Yemen. While the risk of Marib and Shabwa falling to the Houthis has eased, the shifts within the anti-Houthi alliance and on the battlefield have set in motion a new phase of the war. The uncertainty this has created has been further compounded by fuel shortages, rising food prices and the prospect that Russia’s war on Ukraine will cut into humanitarian assistance to Yemen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

76. Ramadan Truce Faces Uphill Struggle – The Yemen Review, March 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
March saw an escalation in cross-border attacks between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, with Houthi missiles and drones targeting Saudi oil and gas infrastructure, and the kingdom responding with airstrikes on Houthi-held areas in northern Yemen. However, the month ended on a hopeful note, with the warring parties declaring that they were entering, for the first time in more than seven years of war, a nationwide cease-fire. The truce, which commenced on April 2, the first day Ramadan, is set to last two months and includes a halt to military operations and cross-border attacks, in addition to the easing of coalition restrictions that would reopen Sana’a airport to commercial flights and allow fuel tankers to resume deliveries to the Houthi-held port of Hudaydah. Despite multiple early accusations of violations, there is hope that the cease-fire will provide Yemenis a reprieve from both the fighting and the three-month long fuel crisis that has gripped the country. The cease-fire also provides breathing space for peace consultations among anti-Houthi parties, brought together in Riyadh in late March and early April under the auspices of the six-state Gulf Cooperation Council.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

77. Changing of the Guard– The Yemen Review, April 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The surprise resignation of long-serving President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the appointment of a new Presidential Leadership Council heralded a busy month of political and economic developments in Yemen, as a UN-brokered Ramadan truce largely held across the country. Hadi ceded his powers to a council of prominent military figures led by former Interior Minister Rashad al-Alimi at talks in Riyadh, in a move nominally brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council. The handover was orchestrated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE with little to no consultation of Yemeni political figures. In the interim capital Aden, the council was sworn in before a rare meeting of Parliament while support was rapidly voiced by the UN Security Council and the United States. The Houthis have characterized the new council as illegitimate and contrived by foreigners; they had made similar criticisms of Hadi’s administration. The Saudis and UAE committed US$3 billion in new funding for the government, earmarked for development and assistance to the Central Bank in Aden; the news has already increased the value of the Yemeni riyal in government-held areas. Though sporadic violence has continued, the military truce brokered by UN Special Envoy Hans Grunberg remained intact through the month of April. The resumption of flights from Sana’a International Airport, another component of the agreement, remained stalled, but the resumption of oil and gas imports via Hudaydah port has helped mitigate nationwide fuel shortages. There are fears that the Houthis may use the lull in violence to reinforce and re-maneuver their forces ahead of another assault on the oil-rich stronghold of Marib. And while the ascendance of the Presidential Leadership Council has been greeted with skeptical approval as an improvement over the Hadi presidency, there are concerns about the council’s ability to work together to meet the enormity of Yemen’s crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

78. Despite Headwinds, Truce Flies On – The Yemen Review, May 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Despite reports of violations from both the Yemeni government and Houthi forces, May saw the truce hold for a second month, leading to an agreement brokered by the UN special envoy’s office to extend it for another two months from June 2. In addition to the continued absence of air strikes around the country, commercial flights finally resumed between Amman and Sana’a on May 16 and between Cairo and Sana’a on June 1, after delays caused by a dispute over Houthi-issued passports. The main areas of ongoing tension are Marib and Taiz. UN-backed talks between the warring parties in Amman failed to reach agreement on reopening roads to the besieged city of Taiz, whose government-held areas continued to come under occasional Houthi attack. Marib governorate, whose capital is the last northern city still under full government control, saw occasional clashes. Political tension in the south threatened to undermine the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)’s message of unity. Forces loyal to PLC members Aiderous al-Zubaidi of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Tareq Saleh, head of the National Resistance Forces, faced off over an attempt by Saleh’s supporters to raise the national flag over Maashiq Palace on the anniversary of the 1990 unification of Yemen. On the economic front, renewed warnings that Yemen’s food insecurity crisis could see pockets of famine emerging in the coming months, in part because of plummeting wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia.
Topic:
Food Security, Crisis Management, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

79. Taiz Siege Continues as Talks Face Roadblocks – The Yemen Review, June 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
A truce between the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the armed Houthi movement was extended on June 2 and has largely held, despite intermittent violence and unresolved issues from the original agreement. While the truce has succeeded in limiting violence and facilitated the reopening of Sana’a airport, negotiations over the besieged city of Taiz have devolved into recriminations, fueling concerns that the armed Houthi movement will renege on its commitment to reopen access to the city. UN-facilitated negotiations on lifting the blockade of major roads into the city continued into July. Yemen’s economic performance over the month of June was characterized by familiar patterns of fuel shortages and renewed depreciation of the rial in government-held territory. The slide was halted by news of a further US$400 million in pledged Saudi financial support, announced as Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alami visited Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced billions of dollars in economic support since the PLC took over executive responsibilities in early April, though it is unclear how much has been delivered as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are demanding institutional and governance reforms before allowing the Yemeni government to access most of these funds. Renewed fuel shortages in the south precipitated familiar scenes of long lines at petrol stations. Anger over price hikes and power outages during the height of summer, combined with a perceived failure of the government to implement timely economic reforms, sparked demonstrations in Aden and other areas of southern Yemen. The demonstrations overshadowed Al-Alami’s otherwise fruitful tour of regional capitals, where he secured promises of various forms of support from Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar.
Topic:
Economy, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

80. Government Instability Overshadows Truce – The Yemen Review, July 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and the Southern Transitional Council boiled over in Shabwa in July, as political disputes over security posts devolved into clashes between their affiliated forces. Government efforts to assuage the parties were unsuccessful, setting the stage for a battle over the capital, Ataq city, in early August. The Shabwa tensions overshadowed agreement on a two-month extension of the UN-brokered truce between the government and the armed Houthi movement, though sporadic violations continued. A proposed six-month extension fell apart over disagreements on road reopenings, air travel and payment of public sector salaries. The Presidential Leadership Council announced a cabinet reshuffle at the end of the month, replacing the heads of four ministries. The new appointees were all southerners, approved by the STC, in a nod to the substantial power wielded by the movement. The government also appointed new governors of Hadramawt and Socotra; the latter is the STC’s top man on the island. Meanwhile, Houthi authorities continued to profit handsomely from the exorbitant cost of fuel in areas they control while also attempting to convince consumers that the Saudi-led coalition is to blame for sky-high prices at the pump.
Topic:
Leadership, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations