Search

Begin New Search Topic Financial Crisis Political Geography Greece

21. Europe on the Brink

Author:
Simon Johnson and Peter Boone
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Attempts to resolve the problems in Europe are failing, and the crisis is spreading from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal to larger nations. Europe's financial system relies on moral hazard, i.e., a “no defaults” policy, to attract the funding needed to roll over large amounts of short–term bank and sovereign debt. Now that politicians in creditor nations are calling for private sector burden sharing, investors are demanding higher interest rates to hold these debts. But higher rates may tip banks and nations toward bankruptcy. Europe's banks and financial system are highly integrated across countries. Rising expectations of default in some countries could lead to large-scale capital flight into “safe” countries. This shift will raise concerns regarding solvency and liquidity of many financial institutions. The payments system of the euro area is serving as an opaque bailout mechanism that is currently preventing the euro area from falling apart at this time. If the number of nations in trouble spreads beyond Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, this bailout system will be stressed because of the potential size of accumulated funding. The European Central Bank (ECB) could soon see a vocal debate between inflationist and hawkish (anti–inflation) members. Inflationists will call for large–scale interventions, including bond buybacks and emergency loans, while the hawks will attempt to close loopholes in the payments system that effectively permit each troubled nation to create money needed to finance capital flight and budget deficits. At this stage in the debate, we see little chance that Europe can avoid ending the “moral hazard” regime, in which case it needs to plan for widespread sovereign and bank debt restructurings.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, and Ireland

22. Turkey's 2000/1 Banking Crisis: A Case Study for the Transformation of the Greek Finance?

Author:
Onur Bayramoğlu
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
On April 2010, recently after the eruption of the Greek crisis, an unexpected hand from Turkey reached to Greece. Proud with his country's last decade growth figures, Turkey's then Vice Prime Minister, Ali Babacan, paid a visit to Greece in order to share his country's reform period after its 2000/1 crisis, arguing that it could also be a case study for Greece. In this brief, I analyzed Greek and Turkish financial crises. Although it is a mere fact that the structural problems in Greek economy complicate the reform period in Greece, there are certain lessons that Greeks can learn from the Turkish experience. As Turks did after 2001, they should see the crisis as an opportunity to overcome the long time problems . In this regard, Greeks first and foremost should establish consensus among themselves, signaling to the markets that they are ready to face the burdens of the reform period.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Turkey, and Greece

23. Europe's debt crisis: Where and when will it end?

Author:
Ben Jones
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Greece is not unique. Investors are finding it hard to judge which countries are "safe" or price for that risk. The EFSF is too small to buy the debt of larger states on the scale needed to stabilise markets. The EFSF cannot be scaled up in its current form without threatening the AAA ratings of the creditor countries.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Debt, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

24. Sustainability of Greek Public Debt

Author:
William R. Cline
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
On July 21, 2011, the heads of government of the euro area announced a new plan to address the Greek debt crisis. This policy brief presents a simulation exercise that examines whether the new arrangements are likely to provide a sustainable solution. The analysis focuses on four key measures: gross debt relative to GDP; net debt relative to GDP; net interest payments relative to GDP; and amortization of medium-and long-term debt coming due during the year in question, relative to GDP. The new Greek package shows prospective future progress on all four measures, and Greek debt looks much more sustainable after the package than before. Debt also appears considerably more manageable if the criterion is net debt or interest burden rather than gross debt ratio, although even for gross debt the ratio is down substantially by 2020. It also becomes clear that the major contribution of the private-sector involvement (PSI) part of the package is in the form of sharply cutting amortization due, although by avoiding large new borrowing at crisis-level interest rates it also alleviates the interest burden that would otherwise occur.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

25. Privatization Helps: The Hungarian Example

Author:
Donald Blinken
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
As Greece works out of financial crisis, it should look to Hungary fifteen years ago for part of the answer. Far too large a segment of the Greek economy remains locked up in public hands. Their sale to the private sector, as Hungarians discovered, while not a panacea, will help reduce catastrophic public debts, and salaries and pensions will become the responsibility of private owners rather than the government. The Greek Parliament's austerity plan would raise 70 billion euros from privatization by 2015. The government will sell stakes in banking, airports, water utilities, motorway concessions, port operations, state land, and mining rights. Selling assets to the private sector will also improve managerial know-how, increase transparency, and encourage confidence in a Greek recovery.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Greece

26. Eurozone finally agrees a deal but uncertainties remain unresolved

Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
After protracted negotiations, Eurozone leaders finally agreed on a new package of measures last week. The outline deal has a three-pronged approach aimed at tackling the main aspects of the crisis: reducing Greece's debt burden, avoiding a credit crunch by recapitalising European banks, and preventing contagion to other countries via a boost to the EFSF.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Markets, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

27. Greek FDI in the Balkans: How is it affected by the crisis in Greece?

Author:
Persephone Economou and Margo Thomas
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The current Greek crisis raises the question of its impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) by Greece on its neighbors in the Balkans. Greek multinational enterprises (MNEs) first began to establish a presence there in the 1990s, following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. This trend accelerated during the past decade. As of 2009, Greece's outward FDI stock in the Balkans stood at US$ 10.5 billion or 26.5% of Greece's outward FDI stock worldwide.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Global Recession, Foreign Direct Investment, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Balkans

28. Outward FDI from Greece and its policy context

Author:
Aristidis P. Bitzenis and Vasileios A. Vlachos
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
With the fall of centrally planned economies in the Balkans, their liberalization and the opening of their borders to free trade and capital movements, Greece became more active in the generation of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Greece's OFDI stock increased from US$ 3 billion in 1990 to US$ 6 billion in 2000 and to US$ 38 billion in 2010. The Europeanization process of Turkey and the transition of the economies in the Balkans was accompanied by a gradual rise of FDI from Greece into those economies. More than half of Greece's OFDI stock – over US$ 20 billion in 2009 (67% of total) – is located in South-East Europe: in the Balkans, Cyprus and Turkey. While Greece's early OFDI flows were directed to the secondary sector to reduce costs, the bulk of later flows was directed to the services sector, as new markets were opened. This shift signifies the rise of major corporate players. The Greek Balkan policy, which commenced through the European Union, and the upgrading of the Athens Stock Exchange have positively affected Greece's position as a key regional investor. The expectations for sustaining this leading role, however, have been weakened recently since, due to the Greek sovereign debt crisis, Greek multinational enterprises (MNEs) disinvested US$ 1.6 billion from their FDI abroad in 2010.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Greece, Balkans, and Cyprus

29. Is Greece heading for default?

Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Greece has slid into a serious fiscal crisis over the last few months. A ballooning budget deficit and high levels of government debt have raised questions in the minds of investors about the sustainability of the country's public finances. The level of concern among investors can be seen from developments in Greek borrowing costs relative to those in Germany. At the beginning of 2008, the yield on Greek 10-year bonds was only around 0.3% higher than on equivalent German securities, but this gap has now risen to over 3%. This yield spread is at its widest for more than a decade and is by far the largest within the Eurozone. The root cause of Greece's problems is a long period of fiscal indiscipline. In 2009, after years of heavy spending, the budget deficit rose to almost 13% of GDP and the public debt to GDP ratio is set to reach 125% this year. The deteriorating fiscal position has led to a slew of ratings downgrades, and outside the Eurozone Greece's credit rating would probably be in 'junk' territory. On top of the fiscal problems, Greece also suffers from weak external competitiveness. The real exchange rate has appreciated substantially since Greece joined the Eurozone, contributing to a sharp widening in the current account deficit to around 12% of GDP last year. On some estimates, the real effective exchange rate is now around 20% overvalued. As a result Greece now faces a series of policy choices all of which look unpalatable. Within the Eurozone, the only realistic orthodox option is a combination of massive fiscal retrenchment and 'internal devaluation' – forcing down costs relative to those of Greece's competitors. But fiscal cutbacks and cost deflation on the scale required could plunge the country into a deep and prolonged recession and might prove politically and socially unsustainable. The Greek economy is already showing signs of serious stress, with GDP down 2.6% on the year in 2009Q4. The extreme alternatives are default and/or leaving the Eurozone and enacting devaluation. But the political barriers to such moves are immense, and while default and devaluation could ease budgetary and external imbalance problems, they would also cause massive economic and financial disruption and probably a deeper recession in the near-term. Default and devaluation would also risk huge negative contagion effects on the Eurozone and the wider global economy. With Greece's debt approaching €300 billion a default would be the largest sovereign collapse since WWII, dwarfing those in Russia and Argentina. Eurozone banks could face losses of up to €100 billion on top of the heavy writedowns already suffered, risking a renewed Europe-wide credit squeeze. There could also be collapses in demand for the debt of other weaker Eurozone members such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland. World markets for equities, corporate bonds and emerging market debt would also likely be badly affected. There could also be pressure for the major economies to accelerate their fiscal adjustment efforts, given the impact on investor confidence and the scale of their budget deficits. Our estimation results suggest that a Greek default could be a real threat to the progress of the global recovery, cutting growth in the major economies by around 1% per annum compared to our baseline forecast and world growth by 0.6%. Given the potential massive consequences of a Greek default, the pressure for a bailout has been growing. Although there are questions about the legality of such a move, we believe it is possible if the political will exists. Estimation results using the Oxford Model suggest a bailout would be likely to be less economically damaging than a default, even assuming some negative impact from higher bond yields in the core Eurozone countries. The costs of a bailout could rise rapidly, however, if it extended beyond Greece to other troubled countries. A bailout would create a big risk of moral hazard, perhaps inducing fiscal misbehaviour among other Eurozone members or being used by Greece to sidestep the necessary adjustment. To avoid this, any bailout would have to incorporate strict conditionality, perhaps raising serious questions about fiscal sovereignty within the Eurozone. Over the last two weeks, the other EU countries have taken a relatively hard line with Greece, stopping short of announcing explicit financial support and pushing for strong fiscal adjustment measures. Although a bailout remains the most likely outcome if Greece struggles to refinance its debts, there are some signs that political resistance to such a move is growing. The key risk period could be April-May, when a large volume of Greek debt matures.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, and Argentina

30. Adjustment Difficulties in the GIPSY Club

Author:
Daniel Gros
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
This paper describes the key economic variables and mechanisms that will determine the adjustment process in those euro area countries now under financial market pressure. (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy = GIPSY) The key finding is that the adjustment will be particularly difficult for Greece (and Portugal) because these are two relatively closed economies with low savings rates. Both of these countries are facing a solvency problem because they combine high debt levels with low growth and high interest rates. Fiscal and external adjustment is thus required for sustainability, not just to satisfy the Stability Pact. By contrast, Ireland and Spain face more of a liquidity than a solvency problem. Italy seems to have a much better starting position on all accounts. Fiscal adjustment alone will not be sufficient to ensure sustainability. Without significant reductions in labour costs, these economies will face years of stagnation at best. Especially in the case of Greece, it is imperative that the cuts in public sector wages are transmitted to the entire economy in order to restore competitiveness, and thus ensure that export growth can become a vital safety valve. Without an adjustment of wages in the private sector, the adjustment will become so difficult that failure cannot be excluded.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland