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21. Turkey's 2000/1 Banking Crisis: A Case Study for the Transformation of the Greek Finance?

Author:
Onur Bayramoğlu
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
On April 2010, recently after the eruption of the Greek crisis, an unexpected hand from Turkey reached to Greece. Proud with his country's last decade growth figures, Turkey's then Vice Prime Minister, Ali Babacan, paid a visit to Greece in order to share his country's reform period after its 2000/1 crisis, arguing that it could also be a case study for Greece. In this brief, I analyzed Greek and Turkish financial crises. Although it is a mere fact that the structural problems in Greek economy complicate the reform period in Greece, there are certain lessons that Greeks can learn from the Turkish experience. As Turks did after 2001, they should see the crisis as an opportunity to overcome the long time problems . In this regard, Greeks first and foremost should establish consensus among themselves, signaling to the markets that they are ready to face the burdens of the reform period.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Turkey, and Greece

22. Sustainability of Greek Public Debt

Author:
William R. Cline
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
On July 21, 2011, the heads of government of the euro area announced a new plan to address the Greek debt crisis. This policy brief presents a simulation exercise that examines whether the new arrangements are likely to provide a sustainable solution. The analysis focuses on four key measures: gross debt relative to GDP; net debt relative to GDP; net interest payments relative to GDP; and amortization of medium-and long-term debt coming due during the year in question, relative to GDP. The new Greek package shows prospective future progress on all four measures, and Greek debt looks much more sustainable after the package than before. Debt also appears considerably more manageable if the criterion is net debt or interest burden rather than gross debt ratio, although even for gross debt the ratio is down substantially by 2020. It also becomes clear that the major contribution of the private-sector involvement (PSI) part of the package is in the form of sharply cutting amortization due, although by avoiding large new borrowing at crisis-level interest rates it also alleviates the interest burden that would otherwise occur.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

23. Privatization Helps: The Hungarian Example

Author:
Donald Blinken
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
As Greece works out of financial crisis, it should look to Hungary fifteen years ago for part of the answer. Far too large a segment of the Greek economy remains locked up in public hands. Their sale to the private sector, as Hungarians discovered, while not a panacea, will help reduce catastrophic public debts, and salaries and pensions will become the responsibility of private owners rather than the government. The Greek Parliament's austerity plan would raise 70 billion euros from privatization by 2015. The government will sell stakes in banking, airports, water utilities, motorway concessions, port operations, state land, and mining rights. Selling assets to the private sector will also improve managerial know-how, increase transparency, and encourage confidence in a Greek recovery.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Greece

24. Eurozone finally agrees a deal but uncertainties remain unresolved

Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
After protracted negotiations, Eurozone leaders finally agreed on a new package of measures last week. The outline deal has a three-pronged approach aimed at tackling the main aspects of the crisis: reducing Greece's debt burden, avoiding a credit crunch by recapitalising European banks, and preventing contagion to other countries via a boost to the EFSF.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Markets, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

25. Can Europe's Divided House Stand?

Author:
Hugo Nixon
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom has it that the eurozone cannot have a monetary union without also having a fiscal union. Euro-enthusiasts see the single currency as the first steppingstone toward a broader economic union, which is their dream. Euroskeptics do, too, but they see that endgame as hell -- and would prefer the single currency to be dismantled. The euro crisis has, for many observers, validated these notions. Both camps argue that the eurozone countries' lopsided efforts to construct a monetary union without a fiscal counterpart explain why the union has become such a mess. Many of the enthusiasts say that the way forward is for the 17 eurozone countries to issue euro bonds, which they would all guarantee (one of several variations on the fiscal-union theme). Even the German government, which is reluctant to bail out economies weaker than its own, thinks that some sort of pooling of budgets may be needed once the current debt problems have been solved. A fiscal union would not come anytime soon, and certainly not soon enough to solve the current crisis. It would require a new treaty, and that would require unanimous approval. It is difficult to imagine how such an agreement could be reached quickly given the fierce opposition from politicians and the public in the eurozone's relatively healthy economies (led by Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands) to repeated bailouts of their weaker brethren (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Moreover, once the crisis is solved, the enthusiasm for a fiscal union may wane. Even if Germany is still prepared to pool some budgetary functions, it will insist on imposing strict discipline on what other countries can spend and borrow. The weaker countries, meanwhile, may not wish to submit to a Teutonic straitjacket once the immediate fear of going bust has passed.
Topic:
Economics and Government
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Greece, Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Ireland

26. Fiscal Asymmetries and the Survival of the Euro Zone

Author:
Paul R. Masson
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), seemingly guaranteed by its statutes, is presently under attack. The ECB has been led to acquire large amounts of government debt of the weaker euro zone members, both to help contain their interest costs and to help protect the solvency of banks throughout the zone that hold their debt. This paper presents a model of a dependent central bank that internalizes the government's budget constraint. Using a Barro-Gordon framework, the model embodies both the desire to stimulate output and to provide monetary financing to governments. As a result of the inability to pre-commit to first-best policies, the central bank produces excess inflation — a tendency partially reduced in a monetary union. The model implies that not only shock asymmetries, but also fiscal asymmetries, are important in the membership calculus of desirable monetary unions. On the basis of this framework, calibrated to euro zone data, the current membership is shown not to be optimal: other members would benefit from the expulsion of several countries, notably Greece, Italy and France. A narrow monetary union centred around Germany is sometimes mooted as a preferable alternative, especially if it could guarantee central bank independence. However, simulation results suggest that such a narrow monetary union would not be in Germany's interest: though better than the euro zone with a dependent central bank, it would not internalize enough trade to make it more attractive than the resumption of monetary autonomy by Germany.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, France, Germany, and Italy

27. Outward FDI from Greece and its policy context

Author:
Aristidis P. Bitzenis and Vasileios A. Vlachos
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
With the fall of centrally planned economies in the Balkans, their liberalization and the opening of their borders to free trade and capital movements, Greece became more active in the generation of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Greece's OFDI stock increased from US$ 3 billion in 1990 to US$ 6 billion in 2000 and to US$ 38 billion in 2010. The Europeanization process of Turkey and the transition of the economies in the Balkans was accompanied by a gradual rise of FDI from Greece into those economies. More than half of Greece's OFDI stock – over US$ 20 billion in 2009 (67% of total) – is located in South-East Europe: in the Balkans, Cyprus and Turkey. While Greece's early OFDI flows were directed to the secondary sector to reduce costs, the bulk of later flows was directed to the services sector, as new markets were opened. This shift signifies the rise of major corporate players. The Greek Balkan policy, which commenced through the European Union, and the upgrading of the Athens Stock Exchange have positively affected Greece's position as a key regional investor. The expectations for sustaining this leading role, however, have been weakened recently since, due to the Greek sovereign debt crisis, Greek multinational enterprises (MNEs) disinvested US$ 1.6 billion from their FDI abroad in 2010.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Greece, Balkans, and Cyprus

28. Is Greece heading for default?

Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Greece has slid into a serious fiscal crisis over the last few months. A ballooning budget deficit and high levels of government debt have raised questions in the minds of investors about the sustainability of the country's public finances. The level of concern among investors can be seen from developments in Greek borrowing costs relative to those in Germany. At the beginning of 2008, the yield on Greek 10-year bonds was only around 0.3% higher than on equivalent German securities, but this gap has now risen to over 3%. This yield spread is at its widest for more than a decade and is by far the largest within the Eurozone. The root cause of Greece's problems is a long period of fiscal indiscipline. In 2009, after years of heavy spending, the budget deficit rose to almost 13% of GDP and the public debt to GDP ratio is set to reach 125% this year. The deteriorating fiscal position has led to a slew of ratings downgrades, and outside the Eurozone Greece's credit rating would probably be in 'junk' territory. On top of the fiscal problems, Greece also suffers from weak external competitiveness. The real exchange rate has appreciated substantially since Greece joined the Eurozone, contributing to a sharp widening in the current account deficit to around 12% of GDP last year. On some estimates, the real effective exchange rate is now around 20% overvalued. As a result Greece now faces a series of policy choices all of which look unpalatable. Within the Eurozone, the only realistic orthodox option is a combination of massive fiscal retrenchment and 'internal devaluation' – forcing down costs relative to those of Greece's competitors. But fiscal cutbacks and cost deflation on the scale required could plunge the country into a deep and prolonged recession and might prove politically and socially unsustainable. The Greek economy is already showing signs of serious stress, with GDP down 2.6% on the year in 2009Q4. The extreme alternatives are default and/or leaving the Eurozone and enacting devaluation. But the political barriers to such moves are immense, and while default and devaluation could ease budgetary and external imbalance problems, they would also cause massive economic and financial disruption and probably a deeper recession in the near-term. Default and devaluation would also risk huge negative contagion effects on the Eurozone and the wider global economy. With Greece's debt approaching €300 billion a default would be the largest sovereign collapse since WWII, dwarfing those in Russia and Argentina. Eurozone banks could face losses of up to €100 billion on top of the heavy writedowns already suffered, risking a renewed Europe-wide credit squeeze. There could also be collapses in demand for the debt of other weaker Eurozone members such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland. World markets for equities, corporate bonds and emerging market debt would also likely be badly affected. There could also be pressure for the major economies to accelerate their fiscal adjustment efforts, given the impact on investor confidence and the scale of their budget deficits. Our estimation results suggest that a Greek default could be a real threat to the progress of the global recovery, cutting growth in the major economies by around 1% per annum compared to our baseline forecast and world growth by 0.6%. Given the potential massive consequences of a Greek default, the pressure for a bailout has been growing. Although there are questions about the legality of such a move, we believe it is possible if the political will exists. Estimation results using the Oxford Model suggest a bailout would be likely to be less economically damaging than a default, even assuming some negative impact from higher bond yields in the core Eurozone countries. The costs of a bailout could rise rapidly, however, if it extended beyond Greece to other troubled countries. A bailout would create a big risk of moral hazard, perhaps inducing fiscal misbehaviour among other Eurozone members or being used by Greece to sidestep the necessary adjustment. To avoid this, any bailout would have to incorporate strict conditionality, perhaps raising serious questions about fiscal sovereignty within the Eurozone. Over the last two weeks, the other EU countries have taken a relatively hard line with Greece, stopping short of announcing explicit financial support and pushing for strong fiscal adjustment measures. Although a bailout remains the most likely outcome if Greece struggles to refinance its debts, there are some signs that political resistance to such a move is growing. The key risk period could be April-May, when a large volume of Greek debt matures.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, and Argentina

29. Adjustment Difficulties in the GIPSY Club

Author:
Daniel Gros
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper describes the key economic variables and mechanisms that will determine the adjustment process in those euro area countries now under financial market pressure. (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy = GIPSY) The key finding is that the adjustment will be particularly difficult for Greece (and Portugal) because these are two relatively closed economies with low savings rates. Both of these countries are facing a solvency problem because they combine high debt levels with low growth and high interest rates. Fiscal and external adjustment is thus required for sustainability, not just to satisfy the Stability Pact. By contrast, Ireland and Spain face more of a liquidity than a solvency problem. Italy seems to have a much better starting position on all accounts. Fiscal adjustment alone will not be sufficient to ensure sustainability. Without significant reductions in labour costs, these economies will face years of stagnation at best. Especially in the case of Greece, it is imperative that the cuts in public sector wages are transmitted to the entire economy in order to restore competitiveness, and thus ensure that export growth can become a vital safety valve. Without an adjustment of wages in the private sector, the adjustment will become so difficult that failure cannot be excluded.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland

30. Crisis in the eurozone and how to deal with it

Author:
Paul De Grauwe
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The crisis that started in Greece culminated into a crisis of the Eurozone as a whole. How did we get into this mess? To answer this question it is useful to distinguish the three actors that have played a role in the development of the crisis: Greece, the financial markets (including the rating agencies) and the eurozone authorities. Let us analyse the role of these three actors in the drama.
Topic:
Economics and Markets
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece