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11. Securing the Heavens: How can space support the EU's Strategic Compass?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It may be customary to begin an analysis on space by referencing famous sci-fi productions such as Star Trek. Yet terms such as ‘final frontier’ or ‘to boldly go where no man has gone before’ are outdated. Today, space is used for countless civil and military applications and it is an increasingly contested and congested political and technological arena. While it is true that space is not yet home to photon torpedoes or deflector shields, reality is starting to catch up with the sci-fi world. Consider that the United States took the decision in December 2019 to create a ‘Space Force’ and in September 2020 France created an ‘Air and Space Force’, which followed on from the creation of a Space Command in 2019. Germany too took the decision in September 2020 to create an ‘Air and Space Operations Centre’. A month later, NATO created its first-ever Space Centre in Germany and in 2021 it was decided that France would host the new NATO Centre for Excellence in military space. Additionally, other EU countries such as Italy have established space-defence capacities and on 8 March 2021 France started its first-ever military space exercise, Aster X 2021.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Simultaneous estimation and modeling of nonlinear, non- Gaussian state-space systems

Author:
Josiah Steckenrider and Furukawa Tomonari
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
This paper presents a framework for simultaneous estimation and modeling of nonlinear, non-Gaussian state-space systems. In the proposed approach, uncertainty in motion model parameters is incorporated to avoid overconfidence in state prediction and better account for modeling inaccuracies. The additional original contribution of a model correction stage improves nonlinear model parameter estimates in order to enhance the accuracy of state estimation. The presented nonlinear/non-Gaussian Simultaneous Estimation And Modeling (SEAM) approach was compared with contemporary estimation techniques using a Monte-Carlo simulation study. This study showed that the proposed method successfully reduces estimation error relative to existing approaches even when substantial model parameter uncertainty and multi-modal sensor noise are present. The framework has potential use in a wide range of applications where state-space estimation is employed, including robotics, signal processing, and controls.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Space, Artificial Intelligence, and Models
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Sometimes, slow, steady changes produce revolutionary results. A case in point is missile and space technologies, which Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits will examine. Long-range missiles, satellites, and space launch vehicles used to be high technology exclusive to the superpowers. Now, scores of states have both. As for ballistic missiles and drones, even non-state actors have them, and these systems are far more accurate than anything the superpowers had even at the height of the Cold War. Then, long-range missiles could only be certain of destroying their targets if they were nuclear-armed and wiped out areas as large as cities. Now, drones are so accurate they can pinpoint and kill single individuals. As for space satellite launchers, they originally were derived from nuclear delivery missiles. None were privately owned. Similarly, almost all space satellites were government property and, until 1965, the owners were only American and Soviet. Now, the French, Chinese, Japanese, British, Indians, Israelis, Ukrainians, Iranians, and North Koreans have all launched satellites of their own. In addition, more than 60 nations own and operate their own satellites and increasingly, satellites are launched, owned, and operated entirely by private entities. These developments are nontrivial. They will define the military competitions with China, Russia, and other hostile states for the next two to three decades. Will the spread of accurate missiles embolden weak actors – small states and terrorist organizations – to threaten stronger states with missile attacks against key civilian targets (dams, reactors, petrochemical plants)? Will weak actors be tempted to use accurate drones to assassinate their adversaries’ key leaders? Will such attacks catalyze war, producing modern Sarajevos that draw in nuclear-armed states (e.g. Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, or the superpowers)? With so many new space actors, will anyone be able to attribute hostile actions in space? Will states attack satellites mostly in low Earth orbit or geosynchronous orbit? Will the most important attacks come from antisatellite systems based on Earth, in low Earth orbit, or on or near the moon? This volume is designed to answer these questions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Drones, Nonproliferation, Space, Missile Defense, Satellite, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Space Traffic Management (STM) – Legal Aspects

Author:
Malgorzata Polkowska
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Space Traffic Management (STM) is a new concept referring to space activities. The highest priority is the safety and security of outer space and all conducted operations. There is no definition of STM. There is an urgent need to regulate STM providing safety and security regulations at the international, regional, and national levels. Because there is no STM definition, the regulator might use the example of existing regulations of the International Civil Aviation Organization on Air Traffic Management (ATM). European EUSST is a good example of being a “precursor” of STM. However, many questions are still open regarding specific regulations needed to create an STM system, such as at which level they should be made: globally, regionally, or nationally.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Governance, and Space
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. The Role of Space as a Global Common Good for Critical Infrastructure and Industry

Author:
Christian Mölling, Florence Schimmel, and Torben Schütz
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Space-related topics transcend the “basket” logic of the Strategic Compass (SC) as they touch on aspects of all issue areas. To break down this complex topic, the workshop was based on an input paper and focused on aspects of infrastructure, congestion, and competition. While discussions cannot and should not look exclusively at security and defense, participants were encouraged to spotlight initiatives relevant for the scope of the SC process.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Space, and Industry
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Near-Earth Objects (NEO) and other current space threats

Author:
Radosław Bielawski
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The subject of the study are space threats – Near-Earth Objects (NEO) and Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHA). The research methods employed in this article included the classic theoretical methods used in security sciences and a practical method – a quantitative study of social media. At present, space threat studies aim to resolve the terminological confusion related to NEOs, to determine current and potentially hazardous space objects and estimate the potential threats from them. The research is also expected to come up with two methods for estimating NEO threats, the Palermo and Torino scales. The practical result is to evaluate the public mood regarding NEO threats. Studies have shown that certain active space objects are capable of reaching the Earth’s surface and colliding with human-made in-space objects and devices, such as communication satellites. Should this happen, it could cause substantial social damage and destabilise state security, particularly if elements of critical infrastructure of the state were to be affected. Continuous monitoring of NEOs may play a central role in the provision of security. Furthermore, the public should be kept abreast of the threats.
Topic:
Security, Space, Non-Traditional Threats, and Near Earth Object (NEO)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. Space Defense in Europe. Policy and Security Aspects

Author:
Malgorzata Polkowska
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Today countries participating in space activities, share serious concerns about militarization of space. The defense of space can become an important issue in the international arena, because counteracting emerging threats will probably be associated not only with the development of technology and operational capabilities, but also with the creation of political alliances or attempts at international agreement on certain “rules of the game” for space operations. Ultimately, the growing importance of “space for defense” creates the need for “defense of space”. Individual countries remain the main actors in the field of space defense. Military strategies are defined at national level, and the development and exploitation of military space assets are managed by national organizations. Today, most European countries recognize space as a strategic area, next to land, sea, air and, increasingly, cyberspace, but they have adopted different policies and doctrines depending on their sensitivity, priorities and concerns. European space forces also have different governance structures with significant differences in the distribution of roles and responsibilities, including space agencies and private entities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Space
Political Geography:
Global Focus

18. Spaceports of the World

Author:
Thomas G. Roberts
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Over 60 years ago, the Soviet Union used a derivative of its R-7 rocket—often called the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—to launch an artificial satellite into orbit, marking the first orbital space launch from the spaceport now known as the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Since then, launch vehicles have reached orbit from 27 spaceports around the world. With the rate of space launches projected to grow exponentially in the coming years, spaceports will become an increasingly important and potentially limiting factor in the global space industry. This report analyzes ground-based space launches from 1957 to 2018, including brief histories of all active and inactive orbital spaceports, 10 year launch records for the 22 spaceports still in use today, and the current status of several proposals to create new facilities capable of supporting orbital space launches. Ground-based spaceports are typically built in geopolitically favorable locations. Many spaceports are located in the most physically optimal regions available to operators, with geographic characteristics that include close proximity to the equator, opportunities for eastward or near-eastward launch, and favorable environmental factors. Historically, orbital space launch operations have been closely tied with ballistic missile research, leading several ICBM development and testing centers to later become spaceports. Due to the political risk associated with both missile development and orbital space launch testing, several spaceports were originally created such that their precise positions could remain ambiguous. In at least one case, a spaceport was created with the intention of being entirely secret—with its operator denying its existence for more than 15 years.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Space, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. Will Outer Space Be Weaponized?

Author:
Miroslav Tuma
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
This essay discusses the main elements of the American security document called the Missile Defense Review 2019, which was presented by the US Ministry of Defense in January 2019. It covers the possible reasons for the postponed publication of the document and informs about the main legal documents dealing with the peaceful use of space. It compares the current document with the similar one from 2010, which was published by the Obama administration. It also focuses on the possibility of the deployment of US spacebased interceptors in the Earth’s orbit. In this context it analyses the possible negative consequences of such a development, especially that it could lead to the beginning of a phase of a high risk weaponization of outer space and the start of an arms race in that domain.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Weapons, and Space
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

20. Future Space Controls and the Invisible Hand

Author:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) and the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security (SCOLNS) held a law and policy workshop on Thursday, June 20, 2019. The workshop was the second collaboration between NPEC and SCOLNS, and it concerned the legal and policy issues that are emergin as space becomes increasingly commercialized and accesible. As the emerging space domain presents new challenges and opportunities, it is the hope of SCOLNS and NPEC that this report will guide future legal and policy decisions. The workshop sought to address a series of questions regarding national security challenges in space: Commercial Space: What will be profitable and when? Future Undesirable Space Conjunctions: Who is and should be liable? Insuring Against Unwanted Space Conjunctions: What new norms, regulations, laws, and understanding might be desirable? The workshop was comprised of experts from NPEC, SCOLNS, the U.S. Air Force, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commece, the Department of States, nonprofits, think tanks, academia, and private companies and individuals. The discussion was governed under Chatham House rules, and therefore ideas and group affiliations from the workshop were not attributed to specific individuals.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Law, Space, Public Sector, Norms, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Global Focus