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Begin New Search Topic Radiological Weapons Political Geography Global Focus

1. Horror or Hype: The Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Lasha Giorgidze and James K. Wither
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials attract the attention of terrorists motivated to inflict mass casualties and create mass panic. CBRN includes a wide array of materials, some of them very difficult to acquire, although others are of a dual-use nature. Dualuse materials can be used to construct CBRN weapons, but also have licit civilian applications. Though not all CBRN weapons are weapons of mass destruction, they can still cause massive disruption and fear in a targeted society. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the potential threat from terrorists’ use of CBRN weapons. It discusses the technical opportunities and constraints of each type of weapon and presents relevant historical and contemporary examples and case studies involving terrorist use of CBRN. The paper also assesses the contemporary threat. It examines how CBRN-related information is shared via terrorist propaganda on the internet and messaging applications, why terrorists might be motivated to use CBRN materials, and the constraints on their ambitions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Internet, Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Revisiting Compliance in the Biological Weapons Convention

Author:
James Revill
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of negotiations around a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, states parties have begun to discuss several novel issues linked to the broader implementation of the BWC as part of a series of intersessional meetings. While initially fruitful, this approach has generated diminishing returns in the last five years. Moreover, in addressing these broader issues of implementation, biological disarmament diplomacy has largely neglected the thorny issue of compliance. Compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented. Although many states insist strengthening the convention can only be achieved through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol, this is not politically feasible for the foreseeable future. Nor is this necessarily true; an incremental approach to strengthening the convention could be pursued, dealing with mutually reinforcing components of the regime in a balanced manner and laying the foundations for future work, if and when it becomes politically expedient to proceed. This Occasional Paper proposes a number of activities that could be pursued as part of an incremental approach to revisiting compliance with the BWC.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Biological Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Replacing High-Risk Radiological Materials

Author:
Miles A. Pomper and George M. Moore
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Permanent Risk Reduction of Radioactive Sources Illustration by Evelyn Helminen, MIIS There has been a marked increase in international and domestic attention to the need to replace high-risk radioactive sources with less risky and non-isotopic alternatives in order to forestall an act of radiological terrorism. In response to this need, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, with the support of the US and UK governments, hosted three, closed-door workshops with governmental and nongovernmental experts in Washington, London, and Vienna to propose appropriate policies. Through these workshops and additional research, CNS has developed the new occasional paper, “Permanent Risk Reduction: A Roadmap for Replacing High-Risk Radioactive Sources and Materials,” which offers a series of actions that governments could take to help expedite and encourage the substitution of high-risk sources with non-isotopic alternatives as an important contribution to the nuclear security framework.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Alternatives to High-Risk Radiological Sources

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, Egle Murauskaite, and Tom Coppen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
There is growing global awareness of the need to secure radiological sources in order to prevent terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon, such as a “dirty bomb.” A new CNS report calls for a move towards permanently reducing this threat by substituting non-isotopic alternatives for these sources in civil uses. As an initial step, the authors propose a move towards gradual phase-out of cesium chloride use in pre-transfusion blood irradiation on a global scale – a domain where non-isotopic alternatives are considered to be the most viable in the short-term. They urge United States to launch an international initiative involving the phase out of cesium-chloride and other high-risk radiological sources as a “gift basket” for the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Cesium chloride is one of the most commonly used radiological materials, despite being an IAEA Category 1 “extremely dangerous” source. Because cesium chloride is easily dispersible, water soluble, and relatively easy to handle, it is particularly suitable for terrorist purposes. The blood irradiators that use it as a source are located in many large hospitals and blood banks (inherently publicly accessible spaces), and the source is usually transported through regular civilian infrastructure at the beginning and the end of its lifecycle, giving more cause for concern. Cesium chloride based irradiators are used to treat blood and blood products prior to transfusion in order to prevent a rare but fatal Graft Versus Host Disease (GVHD). A growing number of non-isotopic alternatives are becoming available for that purpose, but there is a serious lack of awareness about the range of options and how they compare to current practices, both among the medical professionals and national regulators.
Topic:
Health, Biological Weapons, Radiological Weapons, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus