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32. Oil Pipelines in the Silk Road Region Coordination and Collaboration Amidst Competition and Confrontation
- Author:
- Rodrigo Labardini
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- For centuries, numerous projects have wanted to connect the Caspian Sea to its main markets in the East (China) and the West (Europe). All vie to link energy sources (oil and gas) and goods (commodities and manufactured products) with consumers. Contemporary pipelines and transport corridors are presented as cost‑efficient, faster, and profitable, and thus sound economical alternatives to traditional hauling via tankers. Reviewing the political map, continental pathways between East and West must traverse two regional “choke‑points,” each with three alternative routes. First, the “Eastern Gap” at the Caspian Sea: Russia, Iran, and the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea region also includes Azerbaijan, of course, since it is the only state (together with Russia and Iran) located on its western bank, with routing options via the Caucasus to reach the Black Sea and Anatolia on to Europe. Second, the “Western Gap” at the Black Sea: Russia (again), the Black Sea, and Anatolia. The South Caucasus’ unique geographical location between East and West as well as between Russia and Iran place it at a strategic crossroads of key geopolitical interest. Furthermore, the Caucasus‑Caspian Sea‑Central Asia region (CCCA) today—this corresponds more or less to what the editors of Baku Dialogues have called the “Silk Road region”—is merging ever closer with Eurasian and Middle East politics. The politicization of energy and transport—with pipeline politics often dealing with opposing economic and partisan interests—as well as sanctions against Russia and Iran, also raises the importance of sanctions‑free routes. Compounding these issues is the fact that several countries in the region are landlocked, dependent on transit states, and vulnerable to the latter’s maneuvers.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Oil, Natural Resources, and Silk Road
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
33. The Role of Blockchain in Green Hydrogen Value Chains
- Author:
- Nicola De Blasio and Charles Hua
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- A rainbow of colors currently dominates almost every conversation on the transition to a low-carbon economy: green, grey, blue, turquoise, pink, yellow[1] - an ever-increasing palette to describe the same colorless, odorless, and highly combustible molecule, hydrogen. The only difference is the chemical process used to produce it. The colors of hydrogen are crucial for the energy transition because each production pathway generates different amounts of greenhouse gas emissions. For example, while grey hydrogen, produced from fossil fuels, yields up to 20 tons of carbon dioxide per ton of hydrogen, green hydrogen, produced from renewable energy sources like solar and wind, yields no emissions. Furthermore, although these colors all refer to the same molecule, production costs differ: green hydrogen remains substantially more costly today. With aggressive development and deployment of electrolyzers and other hydrogen technologies at scale, green hydrogen could become cost-competitive with blue hydrogen, produced from natural gas with carbon capture, by 2030 in many countries.[2] Overall, the rate at which green hydrogen costs decrease will also depend on government policies and incentives, such as carbon pricing and tax credits. Therein lies a critical challenge for the successful transition to a low-carbon economy. As energy systems increasingly evolve from centralized to decentralized, from “grey” to “green,” stakeholders will need to efficiently account for and track emissions and green molecules in a transparent, secure, and standardized way, and must be able to do so along value chains from production to consumption.
- Topic:
- Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Innovation, Renewable Energy, Hydrogen, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
34. How to rein in fossil fuel subsidies ? Towards a New WTO Regime
- Author:
- Simon Happersberger, Eleanor Mateo, and Selcukhan Ünekbas
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
- Abstract:
- Fossil fuel subsidies have negative consequences on the climate change, public budgets and and the transition to an environmentally friendly economy. Nevertheless, governments do not keep up with their commitments to phase out fossil fuel subsidies but misallocate again COVID-19 recovery funds in fossil fuel subsidies. This article provides an analysis of the current obstacles for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and the potential of the WTO to advance a reform on fossil fuel subsidies. It argues that the WTO can contribute to a fossil fuel subsidies reform by its technical expertise in regulating subsidies, by its broad membership and by its institutional setting. Under the current framework of the ASCM, WTO member can use existing mechanisms, such as the TPRM, to increase transparency in the short term and facilitate discussions on the scope of subsidies while mitigating impacts on vulnerable groups or sectors. This would provide the ground for governments to work towards a new and ambitious agreement to stop producer fossil fuels subsidies and phase out consumer fossil fuels subsidies in the mid-to-long-term. However, the phase out of consumer subsidies needs to be carefully designed and embedded, to avoid unintended consequences on energy access and vulnerable households.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Environment, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, Trade, Fossil Fuels, COVID-19, WTO, and Ecology
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
35. The Carbon-Neutral LNG Market: Creating a Framework for Real Emissions Reductions
- Author:
- Erin Blanton and Samer Mosis
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- As governments and companies consider options to decarbonize their energy systems, addressing greenhouse gas emissions from natural gas and liquified natural gas (LNG) will inevitably become a greater concern. Natural gas is viewed by some as potentially providing a bridge in a broad energy transition from dependence on fossil fuels to lower-emission sources. Even with advancements in renewable energy, many forecasts show natural gas will remain core to meeting global energy demand for some time, including as a backup fuel source for renewables.[1] But as the emissions profile of the natural gas value chain has become clearer, estimates of its footprint have increased, raising questions about natural gas’s transitory function. While gas will continue to have a prominent role in the energy mix,[2] without action to better account for, reduce, and offset natural gas and LNG emissions, the breadth and length of its use will increasingly come into question—including by countries with growing energy demand who see diminishing incentive to favor natural gas over high-emitting but fiscally cheap fuel sources, such as coal. Amid these considerations, discussions of value chain carbon intensity and greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting are becoming an important component of LNG trade, giving rise to the concept of “carbon-neutral LNG.” In the trade of carbon-neutral LNG, GHG emissions from supply and/or consumption are accounted for and offset by procuring and retiring carbon credits generated through GHG abatement projects, such as afforestation, farm/soil management, and methane collection.[3] Currently, carbon-neutral LNG makes up a slim portion of global LNG trade, with just 14 cargoes traded transparently since the first was sold in 2019, compared to over 5,000 cargoes of LNG being delivered globally in 2020 alone.[4] By examining the efficacy of the market at this early stage, as this commentary does, areas for improvement in the carbon-neutral LNG trade are highlighted. Procurement of carbon credits does not negate the emissions from natural gas and LNG, and accordingly, adoption of offsets should be paired with a broader and deeper reduction in the emissions intensity of these fossil fuels to ensure they remain conducive to meeting growing energy demand without needlessly jeopardizing global, national, and corporate efforts to reduce emissions. When considering this alongside the important role LNG and natural gas are likely to continue to play in meeting energy demand in key parts of the world during the transition period, it becomes clear that efforts must be made to scale GHG emissions mitigation throughout the value chain, such as through leakage reduction and employment of less carbon-intensive liquefaction technology, as well as to offset remaining emissions through the procurement and retirement of high-quality carbon credits. Serious questions remain about scaling the carbon-neutral LNG trade, including which emissions are accounted for, what methodology is employed in the emissions measurement and verification, and how the emissions are priced—either through a carbon credit or a carbon tax. If these questions are sufficiently addressed, natural gas and LNG may align better with global policy direction and emissions requirements. That is to say, GHG verification and mitigation will be critical to the sustainability of LNG in the decarbonizing global energy stack in the coming decade, with knock-on impacts on long-term LNG contract structure, trade flows, and market pricing. While this commentary does not prescribe policy to meet carbon neutrality or Paris Agreement goals specifically, it does examine an existing and growing market trade behavior that has the potential to assist countries dependent on natural gas in meeting their climate targets during this transitory period for the global energy system. Section 1 outlines the current state of the carbon-neutral LNG trade, while section 2 suggests a structure for LNG GHG accounting based on existing accounting methodologies. Section 3 discusses the different forms through which emissions mitigation can be integrated into the LNG trade, including a discussion on the risks of greenwashing. Section 4 highlights the implications of the growing carbon-neutral LNG market and provides recommendations to market participants and policy makers.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
36. Oil Intensity: The Curiously Steady Decline of Oil in GDP
- Author:
- Christof Ruhl and Titus Erker
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Oil is the largest primary fuel, and the trajectory of oil consumption is of great concern and consequence for economic, political, and, not least, for climate change reasons. Anticipating oil prices and production from year to year is not easy; identifying even basic ingredients of aggregate demand and supply schedules, such as price or income elasticities, is notoriously difficult. It’s an additional challenge to model the structure of a market that sometimes appears to be highly cartelized, and at other times populated by a large flock of peaceful price takers. But a remarkably steady metric—and possible tool for projecting consumption into the future—has been identified in this paper: oil intensity. Oil intensity is the volume of oil consumed per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). Measured simply in barrels per dollar, it is often viewed as a broad measure of oil efficiency; it certainly demonstrates the importance of oil in a society. The efficiency of oil use has improved, in other words oil intensity has declined, over the years and decades. In 1973, for example, when oil intensity was at its zenith, the world used a little less than one barrel of oil to produce $1,000 worth of GDP (2015 prices). By 2019 (the last data set before Covid) global oil intensity was 0.43 barrel per $1,000 of global GDP—a 56% decline. Oil has become a lot less important and humanity has become more efficient in making use of it. What is worth a closer look, and is the focus of this paper reporting on oil and gas related research at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, is the pattern by which this progress has been achieved. Since 1984, oil intensity has fallen every year in an almost perfectly linear fashion: the amount of oil used per dollar of global GDP has dropped by roughly the same amount each year. Wars and revolutions, booms and busts, OPEC successes and failures, and every other monumental event in the last 35 years left their imprint on oil markets but didn’t alter oil intensity’s steady, downward crawl. This kind of regularity is very rare in any long-time trend, in economics or in energy. Although oil intensity isn’t a new topic, an attempt to explain its curiously consistent downward progress—or even any discussion about it—is hard to find in the literature. For this paper, the authors explain the trend and cross-validate its predictive potential before delving into possible reasons behind the linear decline in oil intensity. It finally extrapolates what such a continuing trend might mean for oil consumption and policies around it going forward.
- Topic:
- Economics, Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, and GDP
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
37. The Global Energy Crisis: Implications of Record High Natural Gas Prices
- Author:
- Anne-Sophie Corbeau
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- The recent spike in energy prices across the globe has led to talks of an energy crisis with far reaching repercussions as the Northern Hemisphere braces for winter. While a significant focus has been on natural gas as gas spot prices in Asia and Europe hit levels unthinkable before ($56/million British thermal unit [mmBtu], or over $320/barrel [bbl] in oil-equivalent terms), the crisis has extended well beyond gas: oil prices are rising, China and Europe are facing record coal prices, and carbon prices in Europe have reached historic levels. As gas-fired plants (or coal in some regions) are at the margin, this is also leading to record power prices in different parts of the world. These circumstances lead to immediate concerns, but also flag important potential lessons for the future. In the short term, immediate concerns include a potential gas supply and power crunch over the coming winter, the impact of record-high gas and electricity prices on end-users’ energy bills, and power shortages. For natural gas, however, the crisis may extend beyond the weather. The role of natural gas in a world looking to slash carbon emissions has been an ongoing topic of discussion, and the potential for a sustained crisis that batters consumers may have critical repercussions for the fuel longer term. Already, at least two schools of thought are emerging from the current situation that reflect the ongoing debate about natural gas: one that views this episode as further proof that the world needs to rapidly get rid of fossil fuels, including natural gas, and one that views it as proof that more gas is needed in the immediate future to satisfy growing global energy demand. Questions of security of supply and affordability are also part of the discussion, especially in a future world with a higher share of renewables but where fossil fuels are still necessary to provide flexibility and are likely to continue to set power prices at the margin until new flexibility tools such as batteries or demand-side management are developed at scale. In addition, there are concerns about another widespread gilets jaunes[1] protest movement triggered by price spikes as governments push their agenda for decarbonization. For the gas industry, it could prove to be a moment of truth. The IEA stated earlier this year that “no new oil and natural gas fields are needed in the net-zero pathway.”[2] Indeed, producers are facing increased scrutiny about future investments, including in upstream activities and liquefied natural gas (LNG), but at the same time are asked to make gas readily available when needed.[3] Meanwhile, developing countries that had been looking favorably at natural gas as a way to complement renewables and decommission coal could be deterred by these high and volatile gas prices from supporting LNG imports. The recent increase in gas prices could impact these decisions in different ways, especially if they remain high for the next few years. This commentary provides a brief overview of the current gas market and examines the potential near- and longer-term impacts for natural gas.
- Topic:
- Economics, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Energy Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
38. The Impact of ESG on National Oil Companies
- Author:
- Luisa Palacios
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- The rise of ESG investing—investment focused on environmental stewardship, social responsibility, and corporate governance—in the 21st century has created significant pressures on oil companies. Some shareholders of international oil companies (IOCs) have pressed them to pay closer attention to ESG goals and diversify their business models away from hydrocarbons and into other sources of energy amid efforts to address greenhouse gas emissions.[1] National oil companies (NOCs)—which currently control about 50 percent of the world’s oil production—have different corporate mandates than their IOC peers that might imply a more complicated relationship with ESG goals. NOCs are mainly owned by governments in the developing world, and thus face vastly different demands than IOCs answering to private sector shareholders.[2] But different does not mean NOCs do not or will not feel pressure to address ESG issues. Given NOCs’ significant share of global oil production—and the fact that this share may increase as IOCs diversify—the pressures they face and changes they make could have a significant impact on the future of the oil and gas industry as well as countries’ abilities to meet climate goals. During the November 2021 COP 26 meetings in Glasgow, Saudi Arabia and India became the latest countries with strong NOCs to pledge to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in the next decades.[3] This commentary examines how the ESG agenda is impacting NOCs through the ecosystem of organizations and principles that have emerged from the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement as well as from investors and regulators in global financial markets. The piece then describes the three components of the ESG framework in relation to NOCs and the challenges of accurately measuring adherence to them due to insufficient standardization of metrics and the variety of reporting frameworks. Also, because environmental, social, and governance competence are not strictly related to one another, companies may be strong in some areas and weak in others, making it difficult to evaluate their ESG performance as a whole.[4] Finally, while ESG pressures are coming alongside discussions about the energy transition and climate change, ESG assessments do not evaluate companies’ energy transition plans, even if some aspects of ESG scores might provide insights about them. The commentary pays special attention to the importance of corporate governance for national oil companies in achieving overall ESG goals, given the key differences between their ownership structure and that of private sector companies working in the oil industry.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, and Green Technology
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
39. Market, Policy, and Political Implications of the Global Natural Gas Crisis: Forum Report
- Author:
- Hon Xing Wong, Erin Blanton, and Samantha Lang
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- On October 18, 2021, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) hosted a special session of the Natural Gas Forum on the global nature of the current unexpected gas crisis, which has sparked chaos in many parts of the world. A number of factors have been put forward to explain the crisis, including a faster-than-expected pandemic recovery in economic demand that has precipitated global supply chain issues, extreme weather conditions around the world, and liquified natural gas (LNG) facility outages. The forum was an opportunity for participants to discuss the underlying causes of the global gas crisis and its long-term market, policy, and political implications. The discussion started with outlooks for the winter across the European Union, Russia, the United States, and East Asia before turning to a debate over any longer-term implications of the natural gas crisis on the energy transition. The forum’s participants included policy makers and senior leaders from major international agencies, energy companies, financial institutions, civil society organizations, academia, and nongovernmental organizations. This summary of the proceeding begins with the broad takeaways of the discussion, which occurred on a non-attribution basis under the Chatham House Rule, and then delves into regional issues and the future of natural gas.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Global Markets, Gas, Renewable Energy, and Energy Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
40. Energy Futures: Oil And The Oil Industry
- Author:
- Richard A. Sears
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- Abundant affordable energy has built the world in which we live today. Machines and the chemical energy that drives them have made it possible for a small percentage of the population to produce enough food for many of us to be scientists, engineers, artists, and authors. We are only able to pursue our diverse interests because available energy multiplies human effort many times over. With all the good that has come with access to energy resources extracted from the Earth, there is also an environmental price, which impacts our land, water, and air. My intent here is not to debate the merits of our current energy system; it is the reality in which we exist. Humans and human society have become dependent on energy in so many ways that we cannot simply undo what we have and flip overnight to alternatives that we believe preserve the benefits without the costs. The scale of our global energy use is enormous, and the infrastructure we have built to deliver that energy and convert it to useful work has been developed over more than a century. It will realistically take several decades for energy alternatives to grow to replace the major sources of primary energy that we utilize today; similarly, it will take many decades to rebuild our energy infrastructure to efficiently utilize new sources of primary energy.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, and Fossil Fuels
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus