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21. Trade and Climate Change: How to Design Better Climate-Related Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements

Author:
Clara Brandi, Kateryna Holzer, Jean-Frédéric Morin, Harro van Asselt, and Katherina Weber
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
To bring our economies on a path to climate neutrality, investments in carbon-intensive production processes have to stop. At the same time, we need to mobilise large amounts of capital for investments conducive to a just transition. Reforming the financial sector in a way that allows this redirection of capital flows to take place is crucial. As one element of a comprehensive sustainable finance strategy, taxonomies can potentially play a pivotal role in this regard. By providing common definitions for sustainable economic activities, these taxonomies aim to increase transparency on financial markets and help market participants to align their investment decisions with sustainability considerations. This policy brief presents policy recommendations concerning the implementation of sustainable finance taxonomies based on experiences with the South African Green Finance Taxonomy (GFT). It mainly builds on data collected in semi-structured expert interviews with different stakeholders of the GFT conducted in South Africa between February and April 2023 (Hilbrich et al., 2023). The implementation phase of the GFT has revealed multiple challenges, including a need for improved regulatory embedding and enhanced capacities on the part of potential users. This has led to a low uptake by market participants.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Investment, Trade, Fossil Fuels, and Preferential Trade Agreements
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Scaling Investment in Renewable Energy Generation to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and 13 (Climate Action) and the Paris Agreement: Roadblocks and Drivers

Author:
Mithatcan Aydos, Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Ladan Mehranvar, and Theodoros Iliopolous
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The zero-carbon energy transition is the solution to the 2022 energy crisis and a fundamental part of the solution to the global climate crisis. Yet, there are relatively low levels of investment in renewable energy in developing countries, hindering their achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and contribution to the Paris Agreement goals. In 2021, the Asia–Pacific region (excluding China) accounted for less than 8% of investments in energy transition technologies, Latin America and the Caribbean for less than 4%, and Africa and the Middle East for less than 2%. Annual investment in zero-carbon energy in developing economies other than China has stagnated since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015. To put the world on track to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, annual capital spending on zero-carbon energy in developing countries must increase by more than seven times, to more than USD 1 trillion, by the end of the 2020s. There is therefore an urgent need to address the drivers of public and private finance for investment in renewable electricity generation, network infrastructure, and enduse sectors to meet the Paris Agreement and two complementary SDGs: ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all (SDG 7); and taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (SDG 13). This report sheds light on roadblocks to scaling up investments in renewables while distilling solutions from international experience and brings clarity to where international and national efforts should urgently be focused to address the deterrents of investment in renewables and enable zero-carbon energy security and prosperity.
Topic:
Climate Change, Investment, Renewable Energy, Carbon Emissions, Paris Agreement, Energy Transition, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Finance For Zero: Redefining Financial-Sector Action to Achieve Global Climate Goals

Author:
Lisa Sachs, Nora Mardirossian, and Perrine Toledano
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
As of 2023, the financial system is woefully misaligned with the world’s climate goals. Six times the current annual level of investment in non-fossil fuel investments is needed between 2023 and 2030 to stay on a 1.5ºC warming pathway.1 The ratio of clean-energy lending and equity underwriting by banks relative to fossil fuels needs to reach 4 to 1 by 2030, whereas for 1,142 assessed banks, the ratio was between 0.8 and 1 at the end of 2021.2 As providers, underwriters, and fiduciaries of trillions of dollars of capital flows annually, financial institutions (FIs) play a critical role in decarbonizing the economy and scaling access to clean, affordable energy. Optimally, the roles and opportunities for the financial sector should be guided by an official pathway and associated policy tools, such as carbon pricing, public finance and guarantees, strategic subsidies, sectoral regulations, and so on. Unfortunately, that policy framework to shape and guide the financial sector does not yet exist. In the absence of strong government leadership, there has been a proliferation of bottomup models, tools, metrics, methodologies, and initiatives designed to measure and evaluate the climate performance of financial institutions. While the rapid growth of these initiatives demonstrates the financial sector’s engagement, meaningful progress in realigning global finance to support climate goals has been limited. These frameworks and tools often overstate or misrepresent the extent to which they support meaningful action toward achieving climate goals, and at times rely on misaligned targets or metrics that undermine their effectiveness as tools for setting or assessing corporate commitments. Overall, existing commitments and strategies are not sufficiently aligned with the actions needed from financial sector actors to achieve climate goals. There are deep and inherent limitations to bottom-up approaches to achieving decarbonization, some that are within the capability of financial institutions to address but many that are beyond their remit. This report focuses on the things the financial sector can and should do even in the absence of a robust long-term policy framework. Part 1 of this report urges FIs and their alliances to be clear in their commitments, pledges, and communications about their climate-related objectives and corresponding strategies, their limitations, if any, and how they measure success. Current climate-related pledges, alliances, frameworks, and tools at times confuse or conflate risk mitigation with climate action, relying on targets and metrics that may not be fit for purpose. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, FIs and their alliances can misrepresent or overstate the effectiveness of their approaches in contributing to climate action. This misrepresentation can be exacerbated by the use of misleading metrics or strategies, such as selling or legally spinning off high-emitting assets or using offsets in net-zero pathways. FIs should communicate clearly and accurately about their climate-related pledges and commitments, including whether their goal is to contribute to climate action or to mitigate their own financial risk and how their business strategies will be aligned to achieve those goals. FIs should ensure that targets, metrics, and methodologies are aligned with their goals and business strategies and do not misrepresent the effectiveness of their strategies. FIs’ commitments and strategies are shaped by their financial interests and their interpretation of their fiduciary and other legal duties and obligations; because of perceived tensions between legal obligations and certain climate-oriented strategies, FIs and their alliances should provide clear, public explanations of how their interpreted fiduciary and other legal duties shape their climate-related strategies. Part 2 of this report proposes how financial institutions can and should contribute to, and not undermine, climate goals, under current policy conditions. While many of these actions are relevant for a risk-mitigating approach for FIs and their alliances, these recommendations go beyond risk mitigation in order to guide those FIs and their beneficiaries that seek to have real climate impact.
Topic:
Climate Change, Investment, Sustainability, Financial Institutions, and Financial Systems
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. Provisions on Liability for Decommissioning Upstream Offshore Oil and Gas Infrastructure in Investor-State Contracts

Author:
Martin Dietrich Brauch, Juan Carlos Fernández-Rodríguez, and María José Roa
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
•Decommissioning upstream offshore oil and gas operations involves dismantling infrastructure and equipment and mitigating their environmental impacts when the oil or gas resource becomes depleted or economically unviable. Stricter climate policy and the energy transition away from fossil fuels are likely to accelerate decommissioning processes.  • Domestic statutes, decrees, and regulations that apply to the oil and gas industry are ideally suited for governing decommissioning liability. In principle, these instruments are not subject to negotiation with private entities, reducing their leverage in setting decommissioning obligations, in particular those related to environmental and financial matters. • Oil and gas contracts between the host state and private oil and gas companies may include decommissioning provisions, whether to govern the issue comprehensively where statutory or regulatory frameworks are silent on the issue or to complement them.  • Where statutory and regulatory frameworks are insufficient, contracts should include provisions governing decommissioning as an integral stage occurring at the end of the project (and not as a post-project activity), factoring in the health, environmental, safety, and financial risks it entails throughout the project’s life cycle. • As part of an analysis commissioned by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), this paper examines contractual provisions related to decommissioning or abandonment of offshore oil and gas extraction infrastructure from various jurisdictions for which contracts are available on ResourceContracts.org. • Not every contract includes decommissioning provisions or requires the oil and gas company to develop a decommissioning plan; across contracts that do, the scope of provisions varies significantly. Certain contracts refer to a standard to be applied in decommissioning activities, with varying stringency levels. While some contracts refer to industry best practices, not all of them define what they entail. Not all contracts contain environmental protection and rehabilitation obligations specific to decommissioning.  • Certain contracts require approval and oversight by a state agency to ensure that the oil and gas company prepares and submits an appropriate decommissioning plan and that the decommissioning process takes place as set out in the applicable statutes and regulations, the contract, and the plan itself. The effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the rigor and regularity with which the government assesses and inspects decommissioning plans and processes.  Where feasible, climate concerns should be added to standard environmental warranties. Contracts could restate environmental and climate-related requirements as forward-looking warranties made by the company to remove any ambiguity about its obligations and the consequences of failing to meet them. • To avoid a scenario where the government must cover decommissioning costs in case of noncompliance by the oil and gas company with its decommissioning obligations, contracts should create a dedicated decommissioning fund, with sufficient money to cover all decommissioning (including expected post-decommissioning) costs, and:  o Require the oil and gas company to fully prefund the decommissioning fund as part of capital and operating expenditures, with contributions assured by the ultimate parent company and beginning before project construction. Determine that funds be set aside in an escrow account dedicated to decommissioning in an independent private banking institution and in the form of a specific financial instrument that guarantees decommissioning without freezing the oil and gas company’s funds to develop the project.  o Require the company to meet the full costs of decommissioning if the offshore extraction infrastructure is transferred to third parties or if the fund is insufficient, extending the liability to the ultimate parent company whenever possible. o Require the parties to renegotiate as needed to adjust decommissioning activities or increase or decrease their costs. o Provide for tax deductibility and cost recoverability of fund contributions, to promote companies’ compliance with their obligation to contribute to the fund.  • Contracts should outline objective conditions for the release of decommissioning liability, along with any subsisting obligations that the oil company and its ultimate parent company retain in perpetuity after decommissioning or after the sale or transfer of the upstream asset. • Contracts should not include non-fiscal stabilization provisions, to ensure that states can enforce any new or amended statutes or regulations governing decommissioning liability, without having to compensate oil and gas companies that are party to pre-existing contracts.
Topic:
Climate Change, Infrastructure, Investment, Sustainability, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. Construction productivity and global inequality

Author:
Saumik Paul and Kunal Sen
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Two well established stylized facts of economic development are a strong correlation between investment and income, and large differences in investment rates across countries. Construction is the largest component of investment. This paper examines the implications of heterogeneity in construction productivity on cross-country income disparity. We estimate the 10:1 spread in construction productivity among 145 countries in 2005 as a factor of 61.7-fold. Based on a general equilibrium model with input–output linkages, we find that the 10:1 spread in income per capita declines by 45 per cent when the construction productivity gap is eliminated. Sectoral characterization of the aggregate effect of a change in construction productivity shows heterogeneous sectoral contributions to income convergence. Electrical equipment, metals, and transport equipment play stronger roles in transforming the effect of a change in construction productivity to the aggregate level in China compared with other countries.
Topic:
Inequality, Investment, Productivity, Construction, and Income
Political Geography:
China and Global Focus

26. Trade and Investment Are Not a Balancing Act

Author:
Norbert Michel
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The trade deficit is the amount by which the value of a country’s imports exceeds the value of its exports during a given period, such as one calendar year or quarter. It is a commonly misunderstood concept that inspires harmful economic policies, such as proposals that a country “balance” its imports and exports by taxing international capital flows. Supporters of this policy hope to shrink the trade deficit (i.e., to balance imports and exports) by taxing the capital surplus that goes along with a trade deficit in the balance-of-payments framework. In the United States, senators Tammy Baldwin (D‑WI) and Josh Hawley (R‑MO) authored a 2019 bill to do this and, though it died in the Senate Banking Committee, similar legislation may appear in the future. This kind of policy is highly flawed on theoretical, empirical, and practical grounds. For starters, trade deficits and capital surpluses are merely part of a national accounting system that includes multiple arbitrarily assigned categories. In fact, even the concept of balancing in the national accounting system is not as straightforward as supporters of balancing trade flows suggest. The evidence demonstrates that there is no clear negative relationship between a trade imbalance and a country’s optimal economic performance, especially regarding employment in manufacturing, which is a common concern among politicians. At best, taxing international capital flows would fail to change the incentives that drive US consumers’ high demand for imports. At worst, it would cause a global economic recession that impoverishes millions of people and makes Americans poorer.
Topic:
Economics, Investment, Trade, and Deficit
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

27. The Anti-Circumvention Instrument: Another Roadblock on the Investment Development Path?

Author:
Weihuan Zhou and Victor Crochet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:
Companies from emerging economies, and China in particular, have started internationalizing their production operations. In doing so, they are following the same path as that taken by American, European and East Asian corporations before them, by setting up factories in third countries to serve their export markets from closer locations and produce more efficiently. Thus, it is no longer only developed countries’ multinationals which are moving their operations to developing countries, but emerging market companies that are increasingly engaging in production abroad. This phenomenon is having beneficial effects in countries where these companies invest and might help them start their own industrialization process. Yet, it has attracted the ire of developed countries, in particular the European Union. They are now targeting these downstream production plants abroad by using the so-called anti-circumvention instrument, resulting in trade defence duties imposed on the parent companies being extended to their foreign subsidiaries. This application of the anti-circumvention instrument departs from its historic rationale and might hinder the development of countries in need of foreign investment. Therefore, affected governments should consider taking international legal action to bring developed countries to the negotiating table to put a halt to this abuse of the anti-circumvention instrument.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, Investment, Trade, Internationalization, Production, Emerging Economies, and Anti-Circumvention Instrument
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Global Focus, and United States of America

28. Tropical rainforests and global warming

Author:
Mike Speirs
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Disappearing tropical forests are high on the global climate change and biodiversity agendas. A survey of progress towards setting up a ‘results-based payments’ (rewards) scheme known as REDD+ explores international funding for forests, with evidence from Bolivia, Ghana and Indonesia. The need to tackle the drivers of deforestation is emphasised, including land use changes for crop cultivation and livestock. The roles of indigenous people and local communities in ensuring equitable and effective natural resource management and forest conservation are underlined in the survey.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Food, Investment, Land Rights, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Ghana, Bolivia, and Global Focus

29. The Justice Gap and the Budget Black Hole: Promoting Justice through Budget-Based Work

Author:
Gustavo Maurino
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The field of justice lags behind other sectors in linking fiscal and budget policies to the achievement of people-centered objectives because people assume the challenge to be primarily legal, and assessments are not often informed by fiscal costs, resources, and impact. This policy brief looks at how access to justice for all will remain elusive unless justice experts begin to evaluate and address the fiscal dimensions of the justice gap. In most countries, data on public and private investment in justice services is limited. Many countries do not have information on the levels of investment nor on the effectiveness of investment. Others assess only investment in traditional, formal justice institutions, which tackle just a small proportion of people’s justice problems. In the human rights and other fields, recognition has also grown in recent years that budgets are not just technical matters, but determinants of whose needs are prioritized and attended to. Budgets reflect political choices and priorities and lie at the center of democratic governance and accountability. This has led to a democratization of budgetary processes, with people increasingly participating in the process— demanding greater transparency and accountability from those responsible for budget design and execution. Further, this brief looks at how results-based budgeting models and performance-oriented budgets have been the most important developments in connecting budgets to substantive social justice agendas. Justice experts can learn from successful budgeting models implemented in other areas, including human rights budgeting, gender budgeting, equality and well-being budgeting, and green budgeting. Opening up justice budgeting and ensuring that it responds more effectively to people’s needs will require a comprehensive assessment of the social costs of unmet justice needs; the cost of services currently deployed; the potential costs of alternative interventions; and the impact of investment on the justice outcomes people need and want. Finally, this brief examines the importance of considering not only the institutional but the functional role of justice budgets in affecting social outcomes. This will require expanding the traditional conception of what constitutes justice services beyond formal courts and lawyers; basing investment decisions on evidence of what works to meet people’s justice needs; rebalancing investment to assist hitherto neglected communities and population groups; and considering the role of other sectors and of non-state actors in promoting or denying justice.
Topic:
Budget, Accountability, Investment, and Justice
Political Geography:
Global Focus

30. Facing the Future: What National Oil Companies Say About the Energy Transition

Author:
Andrea Furnaro and David Manley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
National oil companies (NOCs) should publicly acknowledge the risk of the energy transition, assess this risk, and act by implementing mitigation plans. Only 9 out of 21 NOCs analyzed acknowledge the risk of the energy transition, 4 have mentioned the use of transition risk assessments, and 5 have explicitly mentioned strategies to mitigate the risk. None of the NOCs have published “just transition plans” detailing how they will help workers and communities. NOCs do not plan to decrease investments in risky oil and gas assets. Petrobras (Brazil), Petronas (Malaysia) and Sonangol (Angola) are divesting from less valuable assets, but not necessarily to mitigate transition risk or downsize operations. Some NOCs, such as NNPC (Nigeria) and GNPC (Ghana), want to expedite drilling before oil and gas demand falls and acquire assets divested by other companies. At least six NOCs intend to increase oil and gas investment to secure energy supplies. Most NOCs intend to diversify, especially into gas, oil refineries, petrochemicals and renewable energy. However, it is unclear how much NOCs are spending on diversification or whether these are effective mitigation strategies. NOCs can learn from each other. Two NOCs—Ecopetrol (Colombia) and Petrobras—are clear leaders in terms of recognition of energy transition risk. However, NOCs disclosing more transition risk information are not necessarily also those reducing higher-risk investments.
Topic:
Oil, Business, Investment, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Global Focus