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11. Thoughts on the evolution of national security in cyberspace

Author:
Imre Dobák
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Nowadays, the vast majority of the threats to our security come from cyberspace, resulting in a significant transformation of national security systems. Behind these changes, we can find some organisational and capability responses to technological developments, seeing that the function of national security is inseparable from the social environment and its processes. The study examines certain impacts of cyberspace on national security as a system, addressing some features of the changing external environment. The topic is related to the research on the relationship between the information society and security in the 21st century. Therefore, the study explores some processes visible at the international level and reviews some external environment trends in connection with national security. The role of the technological environment and cyberspace has already come to the fore in connection with national security threats. The changes affect the future of national security thinking and the development of principles and methods. It is the task of national security services operating under strict legislation to respond effectively to various threats in a changing environment. All this is only possible through the continuous monitoring of changes in the environment and long-term strategic thinking.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Non-State Actors’ Cyberattacks and States’ “Cyber-due diligence”/Los ciberataques de los actores no estatales y la “ciberdiligencia debida” de los Estados

Author:
Andrea Cocchini
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Peacetime cyberattacks by groups of hacktivists, transnational criminal organizations or terrorist groups, increase every year, being the most frequent cyber threat against States’ IT infrastructures. Given this reality, the international community does not have developed yet an effective legal tool in order to attribute international responsibility to those States from whose territory non-State actors launch their cyberattacks against other countries. Therefore, this article suggests that the adoption of the “cyber-due diligence” concept – based on the classic notion of “due diligence” – would make easier to identify responsible States and attribute them their responsibility for failing to adopt preventive measures, such as monitoring activities./Los ciberataques en tiempos de paz – por parte de grupos de hacktivistas, organizaciones criminales transnacionales o bandas terroristas – aumentan cada año más, suponiendo para los Estados la ciberamenaza más frecuente contra sus infraestructuras informáticas. Ante esta realidad, la comunidad internacional no cuenta todavía con una herramienta jurídica eficaz para atribuir la responsabilidad internacional a aquellos Estados desde cuyo territorio dichos actores no estatales lanzan sus ciberataques contra otros países. Por tanto, en el presente artículo se propone la adopción del concepto de “ciberdiligencia debida”. Partiendo de la noción clásica de “diligencia debida” desarrollada en el Derecho internacional del medioambiente, se sugiere que la “ciberdiligencia debida” permitiría identificar con más facilidad al Estado responsable y atribuirle la responsabilidad por no adoptar las medidas preventivas, como las de monitoreo, necesarias para oponerse a las actividades cibernéticas ilícitas de estos grupos privados.
Topic:
Crime, Non State Actors, Cybersecurity, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. AI in the Age of Cyber-Disorder

Author:
Fabio Rugge, John R Allen, Giampiero Massolo, Thomas A. Campbell, Samuele Dominioni, Caitlin Chin, Mishaela Robison, John Villasenor, Darrell M. West, and Paola Benanti
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The rise of Artificial Intelligence applications is accelerating the pace and magnitude of the political, securitarian, and ethical challenges we are now struggling to manage in cyberspace and beyond. So far, the relationship between Artificial Intelligence and cyberspace has been investigated mostly in terms of the effects that AI could have on the digital domain, and thus on our societies. What has been explored less is the opposite relationship, namely, how the cyberspace geopolitics can affect AI. Yet, AI applications have so far suffered from growing unrest, disorder, and lack of normative solutions in cyberspace. As such, from algorithm biases, to surveillance and offensive applications, AI could accelerate multiple growing threats and challenges in and through cyberspace. This report by ISPI and The Brookings Institution is an effort to shed light on this less studied, but extremely relevant, relationship.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, Inequality, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Disinformation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums

Author:
Sarah O'Connor, Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, state actors have taken advantage of the digitisation of election systems, election administration and election campaigns to interfere in foreign elections and referendums. Their activity can be divided into two attack vectors. First, they’ve used various cyber operations, such as denial of service (DoS) attacks and phishing attacks, to disrupt voting infrastructure and target electronic and online voting, including vote tabulation. Second, they’ve used online information operations to exploit the digital presence of election campaigns, politicians, journalists and voters. Together, these two attack vectors (referred to collectively as ‘cyber-enabled foreign interference’ in this report because both are mediated through cyberspace) have been used to seek to influence voters and their turnout at elections, manipulate the information environment and diminish public trust in democratic processes. This research identified 41 elections and seven referendums between January 2010 and October 2020 where cyber-enabled foreign interference was reported, and it finds that there’s been a significant uptick in such activity since 2017. This data collection shows that Russia is the most prolific state actor engaging in online interference, followed by China, whose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity has increased significantly over the past two years. As well as these two dominant actors, Iran and North Korea have also tried to influence foreign elections in 2019 and 2020. All four states have sought to interfere in the 2020 US presidential elections using differing cyber-enabled foreign interference tactics. In many cases, these four actors use a combination of cyber operations and online information operations to reinforce their activities. There’s also often a clear geopolitical link between the interfering state and its target: these actors are targeting states they see as adversaries or useful to their geopolitical interests. Democratic societies are yet to develop clear thresholds for responding to cyber-enabled interference, particularly when it’s combined with other levers of state power or layered with a veil of plausible deniability. Even when they’re able to detect it, often with the help of social media platforms, research institutes and the media, most states are failing to effectively deter such activity. The principles inherent in democratic societies—openness, freedom of speech and the free flow of ideas—have made them particularly vulnerable to online interference.
Topic:
Elections, Referendum, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Global Focus

15. Mis/ Disinformation and Cyber Incident Communications Response: Top Takeaways

Author:
Belfer Center
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The top priority in a cyber crisis or in the face of mis and disinformation, will be to maintain public trust. The most effective way to achieve that goal is to respond confidently and quickly. Although response to both types of incidents will differ, there are a number of common best practices you can apply in your preparation ahead of election day. This summary guide helps detail common and specific responses to each type of incident.
Topic:
Communications, Elections, Misinformation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Intergovernmental checkmate on cyber? Processes on cyberspace in the United Nations

Author:
Erik Kursetgjerde
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Cyberspace is an increasingly controversial field on the international agenda. Despite the fact that processes on the thematic have been going on in the UN since 1998, a more significant international agreement is needed on what basic principles should apply in cyberspace. Small states have the opportunity of pushing cybersecurity as a thematic priority in the United Nations Security Council – a path Norway could pursue in its forthcoming 2021–2022 Security Council term. The attribution of the assumed Russian cyber operations toward the Norwegian parliament earlier this year actualizes the addressing of the issue in the Council. The policy brief discusses the GGE negotiations on cyberspace in 2015 and 2017 - and gives policy recommendations on the way forward.
Topic:
United Nations, International Affairs, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. Enduring Cyber Threats and Emerging Challenges to the Financial Sector

Author:
Adrian Nish, Saher Naumaan, and James Muir
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Cybersecurity is a unique challenge for the financial sector. To prevent massive financial losses, banks and other financial institutions should understand how cyber threat groups could launch complex new cyber attacks. At the time of writing, several financial services firms are working to restore their networks following disruptive cyber attacks. Banks in Chile and Seychelles, as well as financial technology companies like Silverlake Axis, a supplier of core banking systems throughout the Asia-Pacific, are all reportedly victims of separate ransom and extortion attempts. Elsewhere, the threat from cyber criminals triggered a suspension of automatic teller machine (ATM) transactions overnight, and hackers recently knocked websites associated with a stock exchange offline using distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Such disruptions not only impact customers of these services, but also undermine the confidence of peers in the financial services community. Regulators have been taking increasing notice of these cyber threats, and operational resilience has shot to the top of agendas around the world. A few years ago, targeted attacks on financial services sector firms were still relatively rare. However, cases have increased in recent years as capabilities and specialisms such as network intrusion have advanced. BAE Systems in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has documented public examples via the Timeline of Cyber Incidents Involving Financial Institutions. This timeline serves as a useful resource in tracking trends, even though public cases are just the tip of the iceberg and the true volume of incidents and near misses is much greater.
Topic:
Security, Finance, Non-Traditional Threats, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

18. The Fundamental Conceptual Trinity of Cyberspace

Author:
Bruno Pauli Medeiros and Luiz Rogerio Franco Goldoni
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
This article is based on the premise that the increasing human interaction in cyberspace elevates it to the level of a strategic domain and, as such, raises theoretical and practical challeng- es for International Relations. It is founded on an epistemological reflection on the fundamental assumptions of the paradigms that permeate International Relations. The main objective is to con- ceptualise cyberspace as the strategic domain in the 21st century, as well as to develop an analytical framework that will both provide evidence and investigate the resilience of the foundations of cur- rent International Relations, these being specifically, the following precepts: i) sovereignty based on territoriality, ii) state monopoly of power, and iii) accountability between international actors. With this in mind, the approach refers to defence documentation and scientific sources in order to reach a definition that will characterise cyberspace, considering its technical, scientific and strategic aspects. At the same time, the bibliographic work underpins the development of the analytical tool known as the Fundamental Conceptual Trinity of Cyberspace, based on the characteristics of the cyberspace domain: i) deterritoriality, ii) multiplicity of actors, and iii) uncertainty.
Topic:
International Relations, Accountability, Monopoly, Cyberspace, and Territory
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. Iran’s Authoritarian Playbook: The Tactics, Doctrine, and Objectives behind Iran’s Influence Operations

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
According to a 2013 indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice, hackers backed by a foreign power gained access to the controls of the Bowman Avenue Dam, a small dam in the New York City suburb of Rye, New York. Cyberattacks on infrastructure have long been a concern in the United States: Russia has targeted the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure in the past—at times successfully.1 Hackers backed by the People’s Republic of China have targeted U.S. utilities companies.2 However, neither of these strategic adversaries was behind this bold foray into U.S. suburbia: the culprit, according to the indictment, was the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 Over the past decade, Iran has emerged as an important national security challenge for the United States. A novel part of the regime’s effort—facilitated by the advent of the information age and new technology—is its development of a playbook and toolkit designed to undermine the United States at home just as, in the eyes of Tehran, Washington does in Iran. This makes the current Iranian challenge more subtle and nuanced than has been the case for most of the Islamic Republic’s existence. Iran has gradually expanded its capabilities to compete against the United States for influence within the region, and it is now also taking this competition into the United States and even Europe. One hundred days before the 2020 U.S. elections, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence put a fine point on this threat when National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director William Evanina released a statement noting that, “at this time, we’re primarily concerned with China, Russia and Iran,” who are all looking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”4 The statement characterized the Iranian threat as follows: “Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and divide the country in advance of the elections. Iran’s efforts center around online influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-U.S. content.”5 The Islamic Republic’s authoritarian toolkit is unlikely to become as sophisticated as that of China or Russia in the near-term. After all, Iran’s economy is in shambles, its capacity restrained, and the model of society and governance it tries to offer profoundly limited in its appeal. And even the flagship tool used by Iran to interfere in democracies, namely its online influence operations, continues to suffer from such basic shortcomings as misspelled names, the repeated use of the same tactics and techniques, and a lack of proper research into the target and familiarity with its behavior.6 However, a perceived existential threat posed by the United States, an inability to match the conventional capabilities of the United States and its allies, and a strong desire to compete with the same, have encouraged Iran to double down on efforts to develop a set of asymmetric tools allowing it to overcome its shortcomings. In this sense, Iran is not dissimilar to Russia. “Authoritarian learning” (including partnerships with both Beijing and Moscow) has likely helped Tehran to overcome challenges and to develop its toolkit quickly and effectively. The result is that Iran is becoming a significant authoritarian actor challenging democracy in the United States and Europe. Tehran’s influence operations span traditional and digital media. The regime has built a sprawling web of traditional media outlets, as well as networks of accounts on all major social media platforms (even as it bans and limits access to these websites at home), allowing it to reach millions of users abroad. The content Iran creates, distributes, and amplifies is multilingual and seeks to adapt to democracies’ social, cultural, and political contexts—with fairly mixed results. Among the objectives of Iran’s information manipulation efforts are sowing tensions in democracies, dividing democratic nations internally and from each other, and alleging hypocrisy in democratic states’ foreign policies, undermining democratization in Iran and elsewhere. Iranian hackers routinely target U.S. persons, academic institutions, companies, non-profit organizations, and government agencies and departments. And Iran’s illicit finance schemes are considerable; although, they are currently focused on sanctions evasion and support of information operations, rather than used as a standalone vector to undermine democracies. Some of these tools and the tactics used by Iran are similar to those employed by both Russia and China—and both Beijing and Moscow have lent Tehran a hand in developing some of its capabilities,7 particularly in the realm of information manipulation. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese state media and associated social media accounts echo and amplify each other’s messaging. But there are also some differences in how Tehran deploys these tactics. This is in part due to differences in the political culture and structure of the country, the Islamic Republic’s own ideology and worldview, and the country’s status in the international system. Another significant set of differences arises from Iran’s shortcomings vis-à-vis both its adversaries (including the United States) and its authoritarian partners in Russia and China. For example, Russia and China can leverage their vast nuclear arsenal and enormous economic weight, respectively, to compete directly with the United States. Iran is ill-equipped to compete with the United States in either of those domains and, as such, sees this set of tools and efforts to undermine democracy as a means to elevate its level of competition rather than an end in itself. Hence, Tehran’s toolkit is more limited than those of Beijing or Moscow, leading the Islamic Republic to be more deliberate and selective in the programs it develops and, perhaps, more forceful in how it deploys them. As a result, though Iran’s growing efforts to undermine democracy should not be ignored and should be addressed adequately, for now, the Islamic Republic remains a lesser threat than China and Russia. This report tries to make sense of these activities and provide a framework for understanding Iran’s intentions and capabilities. It provides one of the first comprehensive discussions of Iran’s authoritarian toolkit, doctrine, and objectives. It must be noted that unlike other key Iranian initiatives—such as its nuclear program, missile activities, support for non-state actors, and regional interventions—Iran’s authoritarian toolkit remains scarcely studied in the academic literature. Understanding Tehran’s objectives in undermining democracy and the means it leverages to do so is important for a few reasons. First, Iranian activities over the past few years have shown that the regime is increasingly active in this space. And as Iran’s objectives and the tools it employs are different from those of other key malign actors, understanding their strengths and weaknesses and developing specific responses to them is a worthy exercise. Second, authoritarians learn from each other, and observing the Iranian case allows us to better identify the trends and comprehend the ways in which less powerful malign actors (as opposed to Russia and China, for example) may engage in similar activities designed to undermine democracy.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, Cyberspace, and Influence
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Global Focus

20. From Battlefront to Cyberspace: Demystifying the Islamic State’s Propaganda Machine

Author:
Asaad Almohammad and Charlie Winter
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report offers a unique contribution to the literature by examining the Islamic State’s production, dissemination, and evaluation of propaganda in the months running up to its territorial collapse. Utilizing a range of materials collected in eastern Syria during the first nine months of 2018, namely audio-visual records and interviews, the authors inspected the administrative structure undergirding the group’s Central Media Directorate. Key responsibilities of this entity included interdepartmental oversight and monitoring, as well as media production and distribution. Focusing primarily on infrastructure concerning security and production, the study examines how the Islamic State cultivated a high degree of operational security, fluidity, and effectiveness. By assessing these trends during a period of existential external and internal pressure, the report demonstrates how the group ensured the continuance of its influence operations. Beyond highlighting the utility of its guiding methodology and the operational value of its findings, this investigation enabled the authors to outline how the Islamic State might traverse the post-proto-state phase of its history. Among other things, the report draws attention to the increasing ascendency of diwan al-amn al-‘am (Directorate of General Security), especially regarding its role in instilling operational opacity, maintaining archives, and managing personnel. Taken altogether, the findings show how the Islamic State sought to navigate through critical trade-offs, such as efficiency and security, particularly in the context of its media operations.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Media, Islamic State, Propaganda, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and Global Focus