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31. Countering global oil theft: responses and solutions

Author:
Etienne Romsom
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This second of two papers on global oil theft discusses ways to reduce oil theft, misappropriation, and fraud. At US$133 billion per year, oil is the largest stolen natural resource globally, while fuel is the most smuggled natural resource. Oil theft equates to 5–7 per cent of the global market for crude oil and petroleum fuels. It is so engrained in the energy supply chain that thefts are priced in by traders and tolerated by many shipping companies as petty theft. Oil theft and related insecurity have substantial negative economic effects on developing countries, whether they produce oil or not. In 2012, non-oil-producing Benin saw a 28 per cent drop in taxable income after a spate of oil tanker hijacking incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in 2011. In Nigeria, the oil capacity shut-in and amount of oil deferred is more than twice the amount estimated as stolen, with a US$20 billion annual loss in petroleum profit tax—63 per cent of total government tax revenue in 2019. Organized oil crime syndicates are often transnational and conduct theft and fraud professionally, exploiting gaps in jurisdiction and adapting their practices when law enforcement becomes more effective. They evolve from ship piracy to stealing tanker cargoes to kidnapping tanker crews; from physical ransom of assets to digital hijacking via ransomware. The proceeds of oil theft often finance other organized crime, and it triggers violence against the community and in crime-on-crime activities. Twelve commonalities in oil theft and fraud have been identified that can direct international solutions, in three target areas: stolen oil volumes, stolen oil transport, and stolen oil money. Prosecution for acts of bribery offers opportunities for action: transport of or payment for illegal oil could constitute a bribe under the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act if government officials were involved in the transaction or shipment. Bribe charges could be raised for paid ‘services’ that facilitate oil theft (through action or non-action).
Topic:
Corruption, Oil, Piracy, Cybersecurity, Fossil Fuels, Tax Evasion, and Theft
Political Geography:
Global Focus

32. The future of assistance to law enforcement in an end-to-end encrypted world

Author:
Tom Uren
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Domestic telecommunications companies assist law enforcement by the lawful interception of otherwise private communications when presented with a valid warrant. This has been a powerful tool to combat crime. In the 2019–20 financial year, for example, 3,677 new warrants for telecommunications interception were issued, and information gained through interception warrants was used in 2,685 arrests, 5,219 prosecutions and 2,652 convictions. That was in the context of 43,189 custodial sentences in the same year. But law enforcement and security officials assert that the usefulness of ‘exceptional access’, as it’s called in this paper, has declined over time as strong encryption has become increasingly common. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director-General Michael Burgess has stated that encryption ‘damages intelligence coverage’ in 97% of ASIO’s priority counter-intelligence cases. The problem of increasingly powerful encryption degrading the usefulness of exceptional access is often referred to as ‘going dark’. The Australian Government has committed to the reform of Australia’s electronic surveillance legislative framework.5 Although its discussion paper mentions encryption only in passing,6 we can expect that encryption and going dark will be a topic of debate as reform is considered. This paper contributes to that debate by examining how firms that provide digital communications services can provide assistance to law enforcement even as strong encryption is increasingly common. Although exceptional access is primarily concerned with evidence collection, it may be better in some cases to focus on crime prevention, when it comes to achieving society’s broader aim of safety and security. This may be especially true for serious offences that cause significant harms to individuals, such as child exploitation and terrorism.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, Cybersecurity, Police, and End-to-End Encryption
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

33. Understanding Global Disinformation and Information Operations: Insights from ASPI’s new analytic website

Author:
Jacob Wallis and Albert Zhang
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has launched the Understanding Global Disinformation and Information Operations website alongside this companion paper. The site provides a visual breakdown of the publically-available data from state-linked information operations on social media. ASPI’s Information Operations and Disinformation team has analysed each of the data sets in Twitter’s Information Operations archive to provide a longitudinal analysis of how each state’s willingness, capability and intent has evolved over time. Our analysis demonstrates that there is a proliferation of state actors willing to deploy information operations targeting their own domestic populations, as well as those of their adversaries. We find that Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China and Venezuela are the most prolific perpetrators. By making these complex data sets available in accessible form ASPI is broadening meaningful engagement on the challenge of state actor information operations and disinformation campaigns for policymakers, civil society and the international research community
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Information
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

34. The Cyber Sea: Conflict and Security

Author:
Kevin Doherty
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The interchange that drives world economics in the past now intersects with and will rest on the electromagnetic spectrum’s (EMS) structure that includes cyberspace. Historically, the world’s oceans played this crucial role in great power competition, but today that key geography now sits within the EMS’s exponential exchange in services between nations for maximal productivity output in free and open markets. The U.S. military must help sustain these crucial lines of communication to channel the spirit and capacity of their nation’s people into the new activities that war calls for and efficiently employ them against a threat. Sea lines of communication were of foremost importance in this regard until now, when the EMS, tapped by cyberspace, connects the most amount of people and their productivity to win the next conflict. Cyberspace has consumed the sea.
Topic:
Communications, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Seapower, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

35. Like the Sea, So Cyberspace: A Brief Exploration of Establishing Norms through a Maritime Lens

Author:
Travis D. Howard and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article compares the history of establishing maritime laws, norms, customs, and standards of conduct with the rise of cyberspace as an artificial domain akin to a digital sea. A brief history of how humanity established enduring norms and standards at sea is described, followed by a comparative analysis of the world’s physical maritime domain to digital cyberspace. Recommendations are made for contextualizing cyber threats and policy issues within a naval framework. Finally, the authors offer some brief conclusions.
Topic:
Piracy, Cybersecurity, Maritime, Norms, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

36. Intelligent terrorism as a security threat to critical infrastructure

Author:
Ossi Heino
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper considers terrorism as potentially ‘intelligent’, as a threat capable of abusing the critical infrastructures of societies and the related methods for knowledge production. Respectively, it sees critical infrastructures as attractive mediums for terrorist influence. The paper describes the contrast between the logic of providing security and certainty for critical infrastructures and the threat of terrorism, which is evolving in terms of its systemic capacities and intelligence. The way security is provided within critical infrastructures and the way intelligent terrorism could operate seem to separate from each other, thereby creating vulnerability. The paper seeks to enhance the conceptual understanding of this question by describing and closing the gap created by the intellectual separation. By doing so, the article will shed light on the conceptual dimension of the (in)security that has gone unnoticed in the interface between critical infrastructures and terrorism. It outlines the aforementioned dilemma and provides conceptual understanding that makes it easier to grasp and communicate further. The paper shows that the intellectual separation has weakened the possibilities for theoretically understanding and practically recognising terrorism as a phenomenon that is becoming systemically more conscious, more intelligent and potentially increasingly capable in a form of violence that exploits the basic structures of societies and the related knowledge methods for its own purposes. As a conclusion, the paper stresses the importance of profoundly critical tools. Such tools are often perceived as being undesirable or even counter-productive in figuring out the mechanism through the very means utilised in providing for security.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Rationality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

37. The role of citizens and geoinformation in providing alerts and crisis information to the public

Author:
Fatime Balog and Tibor Babos
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Mankind has been facing constant threats and challenges from natural and civilisational disasters for centuries. The fundamental responsibility of states is to protect the lives, health, and property of their citizens. However, protection against natural and civilisational disasters is a complex task in which the population also has to take part, and the availability of geoinformation is a prerequisite for effective protection. The aim of this study is to demonstrate the combined power of both citizens and technology in the task of alerting and informing the public of the opportunities offered by virtual crowdsourcing, Web 2.0, the role of geoinformation, crisis maps, and drones through the application of a qualitative method, by analysing case studies and by searching for internal connections between different phenomena. Citizens around the world can collaborate and contribute to the sharing and collection of geoinformation to create real-time, interactive maps. These so-called crisis maps support intervention organisations in obtaining information, and they can also be used as sources of information. The use of Web 2.0, crisis maps and drones, as well as the emergence of digital humanitarian volunteering, have fundamentally changed the role of the public when it comes to responding to disasters, including alerting them using geoinformation.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Citizenship, Crisis Management, and Crowdsourcing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

38. Assessing military cyber maturity: strategy, institutions and capability

Author:
Greg Austin and Jason Blessing
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms to their military cyber forces must be made. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by international circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, or whether they warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. One of the most profound influences on the evolution of a country’s military cyber forces and strategies is politics. This paper offers insights into how the governance and organisational factors of domestic politics facilitate or inhibit the dissemination of cyber concepts and capabilities throughout military forces beyond the main signals or cyber intelligence agency. There are at least three reasons to analyse military cyber maturity. The countries currently pursuing such capabilities are not satisfied with the development levels in policy and strategy they have so far reached. There is increasing potential for crippling cyber attacks on key elements of military capability or supporting infrastructure. And no country has yet succeeded in the broad dissemination of cyber capabilities through its armed forces in ways that leading military planners would like. Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms in the armed forces must be made to satisfy national security needs. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by inter-national circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, akin to artillery or submarines; or whether they are sufficiently transformative of military power to warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. This paper provides an impact matrix which can be used by governments, their armed forces and research analysts to understand the ways in which military cyber reforms can be facilitated or inhibited by governance and organisational processes.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

39. Exfiltrate, encrypt, extort

Author:
Rachael Falk and Anne-Louise Brown
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As the Covid-19 pandemic has swept across the world, another less visible epidemic has occurred concurrently—a tsunami of cybercrime producing global losses totalling more than US$1 trillion. While cybercrime is huge in scale and diverse in form, there’s one type that presents a unique threat to businesses and governments the world over: ransomware. Some of the most spectacular ransomware attacks have occurred offshore, but Australia hasn’t been immune. Over the past 18 months, major logistics company Toll Holdings Ltd has been hit twice; Nine Entertainment was brought to its knees by an attack that left the company struggling to televise news bulletins and produce newspapers; multiple health and aged-care providers across the country have been hit; and global meat supplies were affected after the Australian and international operations of the world’s largest meat producer, JBS Foods, were brought to a standstill. It’s likely that other organisations have also been hit but have kept it out of the public spotlight. A current policy vacuum makes Australia an attractive market for these attacks, and ransomware is a problem that will only get worse unless a concerted and strategic domestic effort to thwart the attacks is developed. Developing a strategy now is essential. Not only are Australian organisations viewed as lucrative targets due to their often low cybersecurity posture, but they’re also seen as soft targets. The number of attacks will continue to grow unless urgent action is taken to reduce the incentives to target Australian companies and other entities.
Topic:
Crime, National Security, Cybersecurity, Internet, Information Technology, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

40. Digital government services. Building for peak demand.

Author:
Tom Uren
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Early in the Covid-19 pandemic, the myGov website was overwhelmed by a demand surge from citizens seeking to rapidly access digital services. In 2016, the online Census (eCensus) suffered a series of relatively small distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. While they didn’t overwhelm the platform, the attacks ultimately resulted in the eCensus being taken offline. What do these two examples have in common, and what lessons should we learn to ensure more robust digital government services? To answer those questions, this paper will examine five points: The nature of the DDoS attacks The CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) triad model for digital security How to predict demand How to respond to unpredictable demand The structure of reliable data systems
Topic:
Government, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus