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21. Mapping Cyber-related Missile and Satellite Incidents and Confidence-building Measures

Author:
Lora Saalman, Larisa Saveleva Dovgal, and Fei Su
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Cyber incidents that—whether due to human error, system malfunction or intentional targeting—impact satellite and missile systems extend beyond the ongoing war in Ukraine. These systems are essential to civilian and military operations and disrupting them has the potential to elicit conventional or even nuclear retaliation. Due to the centrality of satellite and missile-related infrastructure, cyber incidents impacting the functionality of such infrastructure have served as a catalyst for previous confidence-building measures (CBMs) that may provide a template for future ones. This paper builds on SIPRI work to map cyber-related missile and satellite incidents, as well as unilateral, bilateral and multilateral CBMs to provide takeaways meant to foster greater predictability and stability in cyberspace.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Weapons, Cyberspace, Confidence Building Measures, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Ukraine and Global Focus

22. AI Startups and the Fight Against Mis/Disinformation Online: An Update

Author:
Anya Schiffrin, Hiba Beg, Pablo Eyzaguirre, Zachey Kliger, Tianyu Mao, Aditi Rukhaiyar, Kristen Saldarini, and Ojani Walthrust
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The events following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have shown again the power of online mis/disinformation. As it continues to grow and spread, there are new and continuing attempts to address this problem. These include supply-side and demand-side fixes (including media-literacy programs, fact-checking and, in Europe, new regulations) but few of these have scaled. This paper looks at one kind of supply-side attempt to tackle the prevalence of online mis/disinformation: the market for tech-based solutions that use some form of artificial intelligence (AI) machine/deep learning for content moderation, media integrity, and verification. This paper presents the findings of interviews of 20 niche firms that use AI to identify online mis/disinformation, many of which were previously surveyed for a 2019 paper on the role of AI startups in the fight against disinformation. These companies did not release their revenue figures but it seems that the market for their services is smaller than many entrepreneurs had originally hoped, and that Google and Facebook are not relying on such firms for help in identifying online mis/disinformation. The cost of the services provided by these startups and the desire to keep things in-house and protect their activities from outside scrutiny are part of why the tech giants do not rely on small startups for help with screening online mis/disinformation. This may be why funding for these startups does not seem to have grown significantly and so more than half of them are now focusing on the business-to-business market, selling mis/disinformation mitigation services to, for example, insurance companies, large public entities, and governments, among others. There also appears to be a limited market for business-to-consumer solutions for detecting mis/disinformation. However, continuing advances in AI as well as forthcoming regulation by the European Union and the United Kingdom will continue to spur innovation, which may stimulate demand. University initiatives, academics, journalism organizations, and cybersecurity experts are all also trying to come up with ways to identify and control the spread of mis/disinformation. Ultimately, despite its advances, technology alone will not solve the online mis/disinformation problem. Giant social media platforms have few financial incentives to crack down on this—quite the opposite, in fact. To push social media platforms to act against online mis/disinformation and illegal speech, regulation must deftly address the issue while preserving freedom of expression. There is a further problem in the form of the political polarization that has intensified in the United States and other parts of the world. Fixing this is likely to be well beyond the role of business and technologists.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Startup
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:
Merle Maigre
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:
NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

24. AI Audit-Washing and Accountability

Author:
Ellen P. Goodman
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
We are still some distance from a worldwide robot takeover, but artificial intelligence (AI)—the training of computer systems with large data sets to make decisions and solve problems—is revolutionizing the way governments and societies function. AI has enormous potential: accelerating innovation, unlocking new value from data, and increasing productivity by freeing us from mundane tasks. AI can draw new inferences from health data to foster breakthroughs in cancer screening or improve climate modeling and early-warning systems for extreme weather or emergency situations. As we seek solutions to today’s vexing problems—climate disruption, social inequality, health crises—AI will be central. Its centrality requires that stakeholders exercise greater governance over AI and hold AI systems accountable for their potential harms, including discriminatory impact, opacity, error, insecurity, privacy violations, and disempowerment. In this context, calls for audits to assess the impact of algorithmic decision-making systems and expose and mitigate related harms are proliferating1 , accompanied by the rise of an algorithmic auditing industry and legal codification. These are welcome developments. Audits can provide a flexible co-regulatory solution, allowing necessary innovation in AI while increasing transparency and accountability. AI is a crucial element of the growing tech competition between authoritarian and democratic states—and ensuring that AI is accountable and trusted is a key part of ensuring democratic advantage. Clear standards for trustworthy AI will help the United States remain a center of innovation and shape technology to democratic values. The “algorithmic audit” nevertheless remains ill-defined and inexact, whether concerning social media platforms or AI systems generally. The risk is significant that inadequate audits will obscure problems with algorithmic systems and create a permission structure around poorly designed or implemented AI. A poorly designed or executed audit is at best meaningless and at worst even excuses harms that the audits claim to mitigate. Inadequate audits or those without clear standards provide false assurance of compliance with norms and laws, “audit-washing” problematic or illegal practices. Like green-washing and ethics-washing before, the audited entity can claim credit without doing the work. To address these risks, this paper identifies the core questions that need answering to make algorithmic audits a reliable AI accountability mechanism. The “who” of audits includes the person or organization conducting the audit, with clearly defined qualifications, conditions for data access, and guardrails for internal audits. The “what” includes the type and scope of audit, including its position within a larger sociotechnical system. The “why” covers audit objectives, whether narrow legal standards or broader ethical goals, essential for audit comparison. Finally, the “how” includes a clear articulation of audit standards, an important baseline for the development of audit certification mechanisms and to guard against audit-washing. Algorithmic audits have the potential to transform the way technology works in the 21st century, much as financial audits transformed the way businesses operated in the 20th century. They will take different forms, either within a sector or across sectors, especially for systems which pose the highest risk. But as algorithmic audits are encoded into law or adopted voluntarily as part of corporate social responsibility, the audit industry must arrive at shared understandings and expectations of audit goals and procedures. This paper provides such an outline so that truly meaningful algorithmic audits can take their deserved place in AI governance frameworks.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Regulation, Accountability, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. Cybersecurity in the Humanitarian Sector: New Challenges and Solutions

Author:
Christopher Chen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
On 3 November 2022, the International Committee of the Red Cross released its report, “Digitalising the Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal Emblems: Benefits, Risks and Possible Solutions.” It was in response to cyber intrusions the movement faces. As the humanitarian sector integrates digital technologies into its operations, it faces significant cyber risks. How should the sector navigate this increasingly complex space?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, NGOs, Humanitarian Crisis, and Digital Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

26. Hard Choices in a Ransomware Attack

Author:
Emily Harding and Harshana Ghoorhoo
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Ransomware attacks started as a novelty but have now become a clear and present danger to entities of every size and function. The number of ransomware attacks and the price of demanded ransoms have escalated steeply since 2018. Legislation and policy have not kept up. Policymakers have sought to shape the incentive structure for victims to incentivize defense and disincentivize ransom payments. While they are sympathetic to businesses who fall victim to these attacks, which can sometimes be existentially threatening, few policymakers (or their staff) have ever experienced the shock of an attack firsthand and, as a result, are searching with incomplete information for the right combination of carrots and sticks that will help victims and hurt attackers. This report aims to put the reader in the shoes of the victim—the shocking, powerless moment of realization of a ransomware attack. It walks through a set of decisions that victim must make on their worst day and in the weeks to follow. How well an entity succeeds in navigating that peril depends on decisions made well before an attack, so the report also makes recommendations for both government and industry on how to encourage preparation and simple defensive steps.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

27. The First Space-Cyber War and the Need for New Regimes and Policies

Author:
Eytan Tepper
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Many dubbed the Gulf War of 1991 the “first space war” due to the US Armed Forces’ extensive use of satellites. The cyberwar in Ukraine, although it is mostly playing out in the shadows, may be remembered as the first space-cyber war. This policy brief makes the case that states should adopt national policies to defend against threats to space-based assets and applications, such as communications satellites, that are both vital to national security and economic security and increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. It is time to explore and identify principles for responsible space-cyber behaviour that would represent a broad multilateral consensus. Identifying these principles may not prevent space-cyber hostilities but could provide “rules of the game.” States would also benefit from encouraging a space-cyber security industry that, beyond protecting against space-cyber threats, has the potential to be a significant growth engine.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Space, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Securing the energy transition against cyber threats

Author:
Atlantic Council Task Force on Cybersecurity and the Energy Transition
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
As the US energy sector’s reliance on digitalization grows, its vulnerability to cyberattacks also increases. To better understand current and future threats, the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center convened the Atlantic Council Task Force on Cybersecurity and the Energy Transition to develop a cybersecurity framework designed to protect US energy infrastructure—and by extension, national security—against cyberattacks. Former Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former General Wesley Clark served as co-chairmen of the task force, which produced this report, “Securing the Energy Transition against Cyber Threats.” The task force found that existing efforts to strengthen cybersecurity are insufficient to meet the demands the energy transition will bring. The fragmented, sometimes rivalrous set of institutions regulating and coordinating current cyber defenses leaves many gaps, ambiguities, and weak links. This report recommends a suite of key actions that government can take to shore up the US energy sector against future cyber threats.
Topic:
Environment, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29. China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

Author:
Bulelani Jili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives. For the Chinese government, investment in surveillance technologies advances both its ambitions of becoming a global technology leader as well as its means of domestic social control. These developments also foster further collaboration between state security actors and private tech firms. Accordingly, the tech firms that support state cyber capabilities range from small cyber research start-ups to leading global tech enterprises. The state promotes surveillance technology and practices abroad through diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs. These efforts encourage the dissemination of surveillance devices, but also support the government’s goals concerning international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions. The proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and cyber tools and the associated linkages between both state and private Chinese entities with those in other states, especially in the Global South, is a valuable component of Chinese state efforts to expand and strengthen their political and economic influence worldwide. Although individual governments purchasing Chinese digital tools have their local ambitions in mind, Beijing’s export and promotion of domestic surveillance technologies shape the adoption of these tools in the Global South. As such, investigating how Chinese actors leverage demand factors for their own aims, does not undercut the ability of other countries to detect and determine outcomes. Rather it demonstrates an interplay between Chinese state strategy and local political environments. This paper specifically focuses on key features in China’s surveillance ecosystem, while the companion to this report will focus on the key ‘pull factors’ from African countries and their significance for US interests.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

30. Creating Accountability for Global Cyber Norms

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The year 2021 saw all UN member states agree in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, based on norms developed in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2015.1 The OEWG formalized global agreement on the 2015 norms. This consensus agreement means that the framework for responsible state behavior is now politically binding for all member states. Global agreement on the obligations for responsible state behavior is a substantial step forward in building international cybersecurity in a rules-based environment. Unfortunately, international experience since 2015 has shown that agreement on norms, even when politically binding, is by itself not enough to ensure their observation or create stability in cyberspace. This has shifted discussion from what norms are needed to how to build accountability and what to do when norms are ignored. While the norms agreed to by all member states will ultimately reinforce international stability, to make progress, it will be necessary to develop a collective diplomatic strategy to improve the observation of norms and increase accountability when they are ignored. A strategy of sustained engagement and the imposition of consequences is necessary for norms to have effect. Our assumption is that accountability for malicious cyber actions can only be strengthened if there are consequences for a state’s decision not to observe norms. If nothing else, a failure to take action in response to transgressions seems to only encourage opponents. An immediate task is to define the conditions for collective action. There has been an initial and informal agreement among like-minded democratic nations that accountability requires the imposition of consequences for a failure to observe norms, but several issues must be addressed. These include agreement on standards for attribution of the source of a malicious action and agreement on a proportional, lawful, and effective response. A collective approach is essential if efforts to create accountability are to succeed, and any response to a cyber incident will require political heft and sustained engagement.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, Accountability, Transparency, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus