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Begin New Search Topic Compliance Political Geography Global Focus

1. Design of Partial Population Experiments with an Application to Spillovers in Tax Compliance

Author:
Guillermo Cruces, Dario Tortarolo, and Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
We develop a framework to analyze partial population experiments, a generalization of the cluster experimental design where clusters are assigned to different treatment intensities. Our framework allows for heterogeneity in cluster sizes and outcome distributions. We study the large-sample behavior of OLS estimators and cluster-robust variance estimators and show that (i) ignoring cluster heterogeneity may result in severely underpowered experiments and (ii) the cluster-robust variance estimator may be upward-biased when clusters are heterogeneous. We derive formulas for power, minimum detectable effects, and optimal cluster assignment probabilities. All our results apply to cluster experiments, a particular case of our framework. We set up a potential outcomes framework to interpret the OLS estimands as causal effects. We implement our methods in a large-scale experiment to estimate the direct and spillover effects of a communication campaign on property tax compliance. We find an increase in tax compliance among individuals directly targeted with our mailing, as well as compliance spillovers on untreated individuals in clusters with a high proportion of treated taxpayers.
Topic:
Tax Systems, Randomized Controlled Trials, Compliance, Spillovers, Cluster Experiments, and Two-Stage Designs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. El control del cumplimiento en la Policía

Author:
Manuel Martín Fernández
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
La actividad policial de hoy va más allá de la mera aplicación de las normas penales. El concepto de compliance implica tener bien definidos y normativizados los objetivos, misión y deontología que afecte a la organización de que se trate. La principal diferencia de la compliance respecto a otros sistemas como transparencia, asuntos internos, rendición de cuentas, y similares es que se establecen normativamente los compromisos asumidos frente a la sociedad, se asignan responsabilidades y se concretan las consecuencias del incumplimiento. En cualquier propuesta de compliance en la Policía, es fundamental el compromiso y la motivación de todos los integrantes de la organización. Los perfiles de cumplimiento son una estrategia de cumplimiento por fases o madurez. Como parte del perfil de cumplimiento, la declaración de aplicabilidad es el conjunto de medidas que son de aplicación para el cumplimiento.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Police, Compliance, and Social Responsibility
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Trust as state capacity: The political economy of compliance

Author:
Timothy Besley and Sacha Dray
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This paper explores the link between trust in government, policy-making, and compliance. It focuses on a specific channel whereby citizens who are convinced that a policy is worthwhile are more motivated to comply with it. This in turn reduces the government’s cost of implementing a policy and may also increase the set of feasible policies. Thus, state capacity is greater when citizens trust their government. The paper discusses alternative approaches to modelling the origins of trust, especially the link to the design of political institutions. We then provide empirical evidence consistent with the model’s findings that compliance is increasing in trust using the Integrated Values Survey and voluntary compliance during COVID-19 in the UK. We also show that countries with high levels of citizen trust in government were more likely to implement policies requiring voluntary compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper suggests that trust in government can play a role in building and expanding state capacities.
Topic:
Government, Political Economy, Capacity, Compliance, and Trust
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Compliance in “exceptional” trade disputes: a set-theoretical approach

Author:
Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
This article uses the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method to examine the combinations of conditions that explain the length of World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes that invoke General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs’ (GATT) General Exceptions (Article XX). Using the Brazil-EC controversy over retreaded tires as an example, the work underscores the importance of the mobilization of civil society organizations such as NGOs and think tanks in association with power asymmetry and/or veto players. The article contributes to understanding the causal complexity and empirical heterogeneity of “exceptional” disputes (disputes in which a party invokes GATT’s General Exceptions).
Topic:
Civil Society, World Trade Organization, Domestic Politics, Trade Wars, and Compliance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Compliance shocks under low bureaucratic capacity

Author:
Daniel Tanis
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
There is a general consensus on the negative e€ects of corruption on state capacity and welfare, but there is little understanding of how anti-corruption initiatives a€ect other areas of policy making. This paper frames anti-corruption policies as a delegation problem and examines the e€ects of enforcement shocks on bureaucratic action. As politicians increase the oversight of the bureaucracy to ensure that their actions are more compliant, bureaucrats react to a higher risk of punishment and choose safer actions. This model shows, however, that under low policy capacity an increase in oversight may in fact distance the bureaucratic action from the political preferences if punishment is highly asymmetrical. I test this hypothesis using data from the Brazilian random audit programme and detailed records of municipal spending during 2006-2012. I show that being audited substantially increases the chances that bureaucrats will face legal sanctions for the policies they attempt to deliver, but there are no corresponding sanctions for under-delivery. As a result, I nd that a random audit increases the gap between the budget planned by politicians at the beginning of the year and the resources actually spent by bureaucrats. This is a sizable e€ect where bureaucrats spend 1.5-2% less of the average municipal budget and 10-15% less of the discretionary expenses. This e€ect is disconnected from the political cycle and the reported corruption risk. The results suggest important insights for the design of anti-corruption policies: if the size and threat of punishment is large enough, not delivering policies may be a safer strategy than risking non-compliance. Hence, combining an increase in the risk of punishment with higher incentives for policy delivery could mitigate the potential side e€ects of audit-based anti-corruption programmes.
Topic:
Corruption, Political Economy, Bureaucracy, and Compliance
Political Geography:
Brazil and Global Focus