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1. Horror or Hype: The Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Lasha Giorgidze and James K. Wither
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials attract the attention of terrorists motivated to inflict mass casualties and create mass panic. CBRN includes a wide array of materials, some of them very difficult to acquire, although others are of a dual-use nature. Dualuse materials can be used to construct CBRN weapons, but also have licit civilian applications. Though not all CBRN weapons are weapons of mass destruction, they can still cause massive disruption and fear in a targeted society. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the potential threat from terrorists’ use of CBRN weapons. It discusses the technical opportunities and constraints of each type of weapon and presents relevant historical and contemporary examples and case studies involving terrorist use of CBRN. The paper also assesses the contemporary threat. It examines how CBRN-related information is shared via terrorist propaganda on the internet and messaging applications, why terrorists might be motivated to use CBRN materials, and the constraints on their ambitions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Internet, Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Bio Plus X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies

Author:
Kolja Brockmann, Sibylle Bauer, and Dr Vincent Boulanin
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Technological advances in the biological sciences have long presented a challenge to efforts to maintain biosecurity and prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. The convergence of developments in biotechnology with other, emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence and robotics has increased the possibilities for the development and use of biological weapons. This report, written by SIPRI experts on technology and arms control, provides a nuanced picture of the risks and challenges posed by this convergence. It analyses the extent to which concerns arising from new technological developments can be dealt with through existing governance mechanisms. Based on the limitations identified, the authors recommend the action that needs to be taken by national governments, international organizations, academia, the private sector and the DIY community.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Affairs, Arms Trade, Biological Weapons, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Why Chemical Weapon Is More Dangerous Than Nuclear

Author:
Andrei Kortunov
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
Today chemical weapons pose a more challenging and dangerous threat than even nuclear ones. Recent events in the UK’s Salisbury and Syrian city of Duma make one reassess the problem of chemical weapons.
Topic:
Intelligence, Science and Technology, Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Syria, and Global Focus

4. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. October 2017 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Derek Henry Flood, John Mueller, Rajan Basra, Peter R. Neumann, Andrew Zammit, and Columb Strack
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our October cover article, Rajan Basra and Peter Neumman explore the strong nexus between crime and jihadism in Europe. With a significant proportion of European foreign fighters having criminal backgrounds, they outline how the Islamic State is going out of its way to depict crime as helpful to its cause and to recruit criminals for terrorist enterprises. Our interview this month is with Lisa Monaco, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor during his second term. In July, police in Sydney, Australia, discovered alleged plots by two brothers to detonate a bomb on a passenger jet and release poison gas on a target such as public transportation. Andrew Zammit outlines why it set off alarm bells in counterterrorism agencies worldwide. An Islamic State cybercoach in Syria allegedly arranged for a partially constructed bomb with military-grade explosives to be air-mailed to the plotters from Turkey and provided sufficient instructions for them to build a fully functioning device. This ‘IKEA-style’ approach to terrorism could be a game-changer because untrained Western extremists have hitherto found it difficult to make high explosives. The Islamic State cybercoach also transmitted know-how on making a poison gas dispersal device to the Australian cell. Columb Strack looks at the evolution of the Islamic State’s chemical weapons efforts in Syria and Iraq and the possibility that the group could export chemical terror to the West. John Mueller examines the degree to which the cybercoaching of terrorists should be cause for concern, arguing that in many cases cybercoaches have little control over their amateurish charges. Finally, Derek Flood, recently back from the frontlines, outlines how the capture of Hawija, the Islamic State’s last remaining urban stronghold in northern Iraq, exposed faultlines between Baghdad and Erbil, which set the stage for the dramatic events unfolding in the Kirkuk area.
Topic:
Crime, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Homeland Security, Jihad, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Global Focus

6. Emerging Satellites for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Verification

Author:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
he project’s final report is now available for free release. The final report discusses these particular development trends in the commercial EO domain. This is followed by an examination of how such capabilities might apply to observing nuclear fuel cycle or weapon development facilities, using facilities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a case study. Treaty verification requirements are primarily examined in the contexts of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). New EO capabilities are also examined in the context of the United Nations Security Council nuclear-related sanctions implementation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. The report identifies opportunities, obstacles and future considerations for the application of emerging types of commercial EO satellite data in various treaty verification domains.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, Nonproliferation, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. Las armas biológicas. Perspectivas de futuro

Author:
Nieva Machín
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La valoración de bajo riesgo de sufrir un ataque con armas biológicas realizada por la estrategia nacional de seguridad resulta errónea ya que España como miembro de la OTAN debería recoger en su estrategia nacional de seguridad del año 2013 esta amenaza ya considerada como tal por la OTAN en el año 2002. Para una valoración efectiva del nivel de esta amenaza resulta preciso considerar que esta ha trascendido el ámbito militar. En el presente artículo se presentará la vulnerabilidad de España derivaba de las políticas y protocolos de seguridad de carácter reactivo y no preventivo establecidas en España así como aspectos mutidimensionales que requieren un replanteamiento y mejoras acordes a una valoración de riesgo más precisa.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Chemical Weapons, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Global Focus