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21. Pugwash Note on Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
In early 2021 there is every reason to say that the global arms control and disarmament process, despite earlier achievements, has reached a critical point. The complete or de facto demise of key arms control treaties (such as the ABM Treaty, the CFE Treaty, and the INF Treaty) has left a vacuum in the arms control architecture, thus triggering new challenges for crises and global stability. The Open Skies Treaty is facing an existential threat. The Chemical Weapons Convention is also in a difficult situation, particularly in relation to the Syrian problem and the alleged poisoning of certain Russian personalities. The CTBT, concluded 25 years ago, is shamefully not yet in force. The only existing arms control treaty between the US and Russia is now New START, which was due to expire on 5 February 2021 since its renewal had proved to be impossible under the Trump Administration. But now it is well-known that the prospects for this treaty are much better (see below). The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is also under serious threat. And this is not only just because of the poor situation with respect to the implementation of Article VI which requires “each of the parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. There are also some unresolved crisis situations: a very important one is around the Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA), and more generally about the issue of the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (see On the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle East Security, December 2020). Moreover, there is the very critical situation on the Korean Peninsula and the problem of creating a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (see Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, January 2021). On the other hand, imminent extension of the New START Treaty will be a very positive signal, including for the NPT Review Conference. Pugwash also welcomes very much the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021 (see Pugwash Note on the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 21 January 2021). But it is also clear that, for some time to come, it will have to exist without any of the states which possess nuclear weapons (or even those that host American nuclear weapons), and more generally probably without any state allied to a nuclear-weapon state. This situation could generate another line of tension within the NPT. As a result, the NPT Review Conference, now rescheduled for August 2021, will be very relevant and care should be exercised in order to avoid concerning results.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Stronger International Safeguards as a Condition of Supply to Nuclear Energy Programs: Coming to Consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Author:
Matt Bowen
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Nations that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but are not allowed nuclear weapons under the treaty (“non-nuclear-weapon states”) must have international safeguards applied to civil nuclear energy facilities if they pursue such programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies these safeguards and conducts inspections on nuclear energy programs, and determined in the 1990s that it needed additional capabilities to verify states were not engaging in secret (i.e., undeclared) nuclear activities. Subsequently, the IAEA developed a set of stronger safeguards measures, known as the Model Additional Protocol (“Additional Protocol”), which was approved in 1997. Today, most nations have an Additional Protocol in force, but a few dozen do not. The nations that do not may pose a concern if they pursue nuclear energy as a means of addressing energy and environmental challenges, such as decarbonization to meet climate goals. The greater reporting requirements and inspection measures in the Additional Protocol give the international community assurance that a nation’s declarations about its civil nuclear program are both correct and complete. The enhanced inspections in turn provide greater deterrence against states pursuing illicit nuclear activities. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—which comprises 48 governments, including those representing the major reactor vendor countries—maintains guidelines governing the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The NSG has been considering modifying those guidelines for many years to support more universal adoption of the Additional Protocol. But adoption has been hard to come by, in part because of potential disruptions to existing supply relationships given that not all countries participating in the NSG have Additional Protocols in force and some client states of countries participating in the NSG also do not have these upgraded inspections in place. There may be room for consensus building among NSG states, however, since most support requiring an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to further the nonproliferation regime. The remaining governments may agree if measures are proffered to address challenges that have blocked acceptance to date. This commentary discusses a history of related policy developments in the NSG, examines some of the group’s roadblocks to consensus, and suggests options for making progress on adding stronger international safeguards as a condition of supply to nuclear energy programs.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Sometimes, slow, steady changes produce revolutionary results. A case in point is missile and space technologies, which Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits will examine. Long-range missiles, satellites, and space launch vehicles used to be high technology exclusive to the superpowers. Now, scores of states have both. As for ballistic missiles and drones, even non-state actors have them, and these systems are far more accurate than anything the superpowers had even at the height of the Cold War. Then, long-range missiles could only be certain of destroying their targets if they were nuclear-armed and wiped out areas as large as cities. Now, drones are so accurate they can pinpoint and kill single individuals. As for space satellite launchers, they originally were derived from nuclear delivery missiles. None were privately owned. Similarly, almost all space satellites were government property and, until 1965, the owners were only American and Soviet. Now, the French, Chinese, Japanese, British, Indians, Israelis, Ukrainians, Iranians, and North Koreans have all launched satellites of their own. In addition, more than 60 nations own and operate their own satellites and increasingly, satellites are launched, owned, and operated entirely by private entities. These developments are nontrivial. They will define the military competitions with China, Russia, and other hostile states for the next two to three decades. Will the spread of accurate missiles embolden weak actors – small states and terrorist organizations – to threaten stronger states with missile attacks against key civilian targets (dams, reactors, petrochemical plants)? Will weak actors be tempted to use accurate drones to assassinate their adversaries’ key leaders? Will such attacks catalyze war, producing modern Sarajevos that draw in nuclear-armed states (e.g. Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, or the superpowers)? With so many new space actors, will anyone be able to attribute hostile actions in space? Will states attack satellites mostly in low Earth orbit or geosynchronous orbit? Will the most important attacks come from antisatellite systems based on Earth, in low Earth orbit, or on or near the moon? This volume is designed to answer these questions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Drones, Nonproliferation, Space, Missile Defense, Satellite, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. A Gender Framework for Arms Control and Disarmament

Author:
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jana Wattenberg
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
I n recent years, gender has come up in arms control and disarmament deliberations. Ireland, for example, submitted working papers on gender to preparatory committee meetings of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) Review Conferences. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) emphasizes that nuclear weapons use affects men and women differently and calls for equal representation in disarmament negotiations. However, such references to gender are so far the exception rather than the rule in arms control and disarmament talks. We argue that a systematic inclusion of gender perspectives advances arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations in four main ways. First, a gender lens calls attention to the human and gendered consequences of the development and use of weapons. Second, it exposes arms control and disarmament agreements that lack gender provisions. Third, a gender lens highlights the absence of diversity in arms control and disarmament communities.3 Fourth, gender perspectives help reveal hierarchical power structures and encourage critical reflections on the legitimacy of established processes and agreements. In sum, the inclusion of a gender perspective produces more humane, effective, legitimate and sustainable agreements.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Women, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. Reinforcing the Global Norm Against Chemical Weapons Use

Author:
Julia Masterson
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In recent years, the global norm against chemical weapons use has eroded, and it is critical that responsible states take action to reinforce it. Systematic violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the malign use of chemical agents have continued for nearly a decade without adequate accountability. These incidents risk growing in severity and becoming more widespread for as long as the issue remains unaddressed. Reinforcing the norm against chemical weapons use necessitates a unified global effort to utilize all CWC provisions and to strengthen the consequences that violators face under the treaty and in accordance with international law.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Law, Weapons, Norms, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

26. Nuclear Challenges for the New U.S. Presidential Administration: The First 100 Days and Beyond

Author:
Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Upon taking office, the new presidential administration of Joseph Biden will confront a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Tensions between the world’s nuclear-armed states are rising; the risk of nuclear use is growing; billions of dollars are being spent to replace and upgrade nuclear weapons; and key agreements that have kept nuclear competition in check are gone or are in serious jeopardy. The situation has been complicated by the neglect and poor policy choices of President Donald Trump and his administration. Over the past four years the Trump administration made nearly every nuclear policy challenge facing the United States worse. Fortunately, Biden has a long and distinguished track record when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons-related security issues. Unlike his predecessor, Biden possesses a strong personal commitment to effective nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament that dates back to his early days in the Senate and continued through his last days as vice-president under President Barack Obama. In this analysis we have outlined what we believe to be the five most important sets of nuclear weapons policy challenges and decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days and beyond, along with recommendations for effectively dealing with each of these policy challenges: Reviving and Advancing the Nuclear Arms Control Enterprise Reducing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Excess Stabilizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jump-starting Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy with North Korea Restoring U.S. Leadership on Multilateral Nonproliferation and Disarmament If pursued, these actions and decisions would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons. These initial steps would also put the administration in a better position to pursue more lasting and far-reaching nuclear risk reduction and elimination initiatives over the next four years.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, Denuclearization, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

27. Toward a More Proliferated World? The Geopolitical Forces that Will Shape the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Eric M. Brewer, Ilan Goldenberg, Joseph Rodgers, Maxwell Simon, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and the international community have been relatively successful at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but there are new reasons to question whether this track record will last into the future. Working with partners, the United States has steadily built a framework of disincentives and barriers to prevent proliferation. These include: 1) international treaties and agreements that have erected legal, political, and normative barriers to the bomb; 2) U.S. security commitments to allies that dampen their own perceived need for nuclear weapons; and, 3) a set of tough penalties (e.g., sanctions) for those who get caught trying to build the bomb. In other words, the barriers to entry to the nuclear club are high, and those countries that want the ultimate weapon need to be willing to accept significant risks. This helps explain why, although many countries have explored or pursued nuclear weapons, only nine states have them today. But several trends are eroding the foundation on which this formidable set of barriers rests. These trends are rooted in, and being shaped by, changes to the nature and structure of the international system: namely, the decline of U.S. influence and its gradual withdrawal from the international order that it helped create and lead for more than 70 years, and the concurrent rise of a more competitive security environment, particularly among great powers. These trends (detailed below) will have three broad implications for proliferation and U.S. policy. First, they stand to increase pressures on countries to seek nuclear weapons or related capabilities as a hedge. Second, they will almost certainly challenge the U.S. ability to effectively wield the traditional “carrots and sticks” of nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy and dilute the effectiveness of those tools. Finally, they could increasingly pit U.S. nonproliferation goals against other policy objectives, forcing harder tradeoffs.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Nonproliferation, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

28. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume III, South Asian Perspectives

Author:
Peter Topychkanov, Sanatan Kulshrestha, Yanitra Kumaraguru, Malinda Meegoda, Kritika Roy, Saima Aman Sial, Dmitry Stefanovich, and Maaike Verbruggen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This edited volume is the third in a series of three. The series forms part of a SIPRI project that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in artificial intelligence could have on nuclear weapons and doctrines, as well as on strategic stability and nuclear risk. This volume assembles the perspectives of eight experts on South Asia on why and how machine learning and autonomy may become the focus of an arms race among nuclear-armed states. It further explores how the adoption of these technologies may have an impact on their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional and transregional levels.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disarmament, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, East Asia, and Global Focus

29. Towards Greater Nuclear Restraint: Raising the Threshold for Nuclear Weapon Use

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report focuses on the risks that a lack of nuclear restraint pose for international security. On the one hand, the problem has to do with uncertainty regarding the first use of nuclear weapons, which has increased in recent years as a result of technological developments, political tensions, and the deadlock in nuclear arms control. On the other hand, there is a longer-term trend of a lowering nuclear threshold in response to WMD proliferation threats by non-nuclear weapon states. After identifying some of the most problematic aspects of the current nuclear policies of the five nuclear weapon states (NWS), the report makes the case for greater restraint, including recommendations for reducing doctrinal ambiguity and more credible assurances that the threshold for nuclear weapon use remains high. The report also seeks to provide conceptual tools for a broad international dialogue on nuclear doctrines, based on a recent agreement by the NWS to pursue such dialogue in the 1968 Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) context.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Global Focus

30. Post-INF Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific: Political Viability and Implementation Challenges

Author:
Tanya Ogilvie-White
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Collaborative efforts to build a new arms-control architecture are urgently needed following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) – especially in the Asia-Pacific, where arms-racing pressures are unbridled. High-level discussions within the Trump administration on deploying previously prohibited ground-based INF-range (500–5,500 kilometres) missiles in the Asia-Pacific could hamper progress; rather than convincing Beijing to engage in (as-yet-unspecified) trilateral arms-control negotiations, they could increase strategic risks, strain relations between the United States and its allies in the region (Australia, Japan and South Korea) and encourage closer Sino–Russian military cooperation. Efforts to create arms-control momentum are welcome, but to be politically viable, new initiatives need to be fair, equitable and underpinned by strategic empathy, reciprocity and mutual restraint. A more constructive approach would see the US and its Asia-Pacific allies using their combined diplomatic capital to push for a formal regional arms-control dialogue, which could initially focus on confidence building and strategic-risk reduction, and over the longer term help lay the foundations for a new arms-control regime.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
Global Focus