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5901. Mega-Sporting Events as Experience Goods

Author:
Malte Heyne, Wolfgang Maennig, and Bernd Suessmuth
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg
Abstract:
This paper tests the hypothesis that a nation’s hosting of a mega-sporting event is an experience good for its residents. Applying data from an ex-ante and ex-post query based on contingent valuation methods, we use the Soccer World Cup 2006 as a natural experiment. The significant ex-post increase in valuation is shown to be due to adventitious citizens requiring an involving experience, rather than to an updating of a-prior assessment.
Topic:
Economics, Sports, World Cup, Cotingent Valuation Method, and Experience Goods
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5902. Arenas vs. Multifunctional Stadia – Which Do Spectators Prefer?

Author:
Arne Feddersen and Wolfgang Maennig
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg
Abstract:
Large sports stadia construction follows two different general concepts: (1) Mono-functional arenas which are specially suited for one sport exclusively and which are characterised by the absence of an athletic track. (2) Multifunctional sports stadia which can be used for different sporting or cultural events. Officials of clubs often argue that the atmosphere in an arena is significantly better than that of a multipurpose facility and that spectators prefer such an atmosphere. Estimated panel regressions with fixed effects show a significant positive effect of a mono-functional soccer stadium on spectator demand. Controlling for other demand determinants in the German professional soccer league, Bundesliga, an isolated effect of around 4,800 additional spectators a game can be found. This translates into a substantial increase of about 18.7% against the mean value of 25,602 spectators per Bundesliga game.
Topic:
Economics, Sports, Soccer, and Stadiums
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5903. The UN Security Council’s Response to Terrorism: Before and After September 11, 2001

Author:
Hilde Haaland Kramer and Steve A. Yetiv
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
HILDE HAALAND KRAMER and STEVE A. YETIV argue that the UN Security Council’s response to global terrorism has been more forceful and comprehensive since September 11 and that it has broken some new ground. The authors posit that although the UN remains controversial in the United States, Washington benefited from its response to September 11, as imperfect as it was.
Topic:
Terrorism, United Nations, 9/11, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

5904. Who Failed Whom? Assessing the UN's Human Rights Efforts

Author:
Balakrishnan Rajagopal
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Several months ago, during the finalization of the plan to replace the United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights with the new UN Human Rights Council, John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, said with characteristic flourish, “We want a butterfly. We’re not going to put lipstick on a caterpillar and declare it a suc- cess.” Is the new UN Human Rights Council a butterfly or a cater- pillar (with or without lipstick)? Bolton’s pungent remark rests on three underlying assumptions: first, UN reform was urgently needed in the human rights field because its predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights, was a failure; second, the cause of failure was the takeover of the Commission by undemocratic and repressive states and the resultant hijacking of the human rights agenda; third, the best way to make the UN effective and legitimate in the human rights field was to restrict the membership of its premier body, i.e., the Council, to a handful of liberal democratic states and have them act as the custodians and enforcers of human rights. Bolton’s critique of the Commission (if not his lan- guage) and his vision to go forward have been shared widely by many academics, policy specialists, and western international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that specialize in human rights advocacy.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Cooperation, United Nations, and NGOs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5905. Thinking About Rogue Leaders: Really Hostile or Just Frustrated?

Author:
Akan Malici
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
When the Cold War came to an end almost two decades ago, scholars contemplated that we might soon miss it.1 The reason for such a counterintuitive feeling is simple: with the move from bipolarity to unipolarity, security threats no longer emanate from the rivalry of two superpowers but rather from the existence of rogue states. Rogue states are said (or partly known) to sponsor or practice international terrorism and to engage in the acquisition and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.2 Their leaders are said to be genuinely belligerent and hostile, and sometimes they are even described as crazy.3 In thinking about rogue states and their leaders, scholars, security analysts and observers of international politics have two fundamental options. The first option is to join the conventional wisdom, which is attractive because of its apparent plausibility. However, there is also a danger to this option. Judgments are often made on a purely descriptive basis without sufficient effort towards critically asking why rogue leaders behave in the ways they do. Simply asserting that they are crazy or irrational is too simple and, indeed, wrong. Too often labels and slogans are substituted for reflection and actual analysis. This, in fact, helps perpetuate our crises with rogue states rather than ameliorate them.
Topic:
Leadership, Psychology, and Rogue States
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5906. Energy, Cities, and Security: Tackling Climate Change and Fossil Fuel Risk

Author:
Peter Droege
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
The world economy is based on cities: cities are its very home. Global financial flows are structured within urban systems; city networks physically articulate national and international markets. Historically, cities have been built around markets, too. Founded on trade routes, they formed growing economies in themselves; they gave rise to and nurtured the dynasties and institutions that manage the decisions that guide national economies. Cities are settings of political command and control, and centres of culture. Here society’s leading images and messages are produced and packaged, shaping social reality and articulating aspirations. The great urban centers of yore were the main stages of their respective political settings. Democracy was developed by urban societies, and it was shaped and supported in the public spaces and institutions of major cities. Today, most population growth occurs in urbanized areas, with half of the world’s population dwelling here. But cities, their form, economies, and growth dynamics have also been very much defined by the energy systems dominating their eras. The manner of this interaction helps define the security profile of an age, a nation, or the balance of global relations. Global trade, sprawling cities, or periods of large-city formation are not new historical phenomena. The stories of hegemonic urban networks involving Babylon of the 18th century BC, Angkor of the 12th century AD, or London of the late 18th century are testimony to this fact. But the speed and sheer mass of the current urbanization wave, and the formation of super and mega-sized cities as a widespread, simultaneous, indeed, global phenomenon is unprecedented; it has only been acknowledged as a significant force during this past half-century. While rampant urbanization had not found wide recognition prior to the 1970s, it has also not been particularly well understood in the time since. The massive explosion of the world’s urban population is relatively new, gathering momentum in the first half of the 20th century and accelerating from the 1950s on. From the 1970s, a burgeoning research literature genre formed to give meaning and voice to this phenomenon.1 Since then, these urban centers have been described as world cities, global cities, megacities, or referred to broadly as the global urban system. Regardless of the label used, this conception connotes primacy of global markets, corporate control, seats of national power, homes to regional security apparatuses and, above all, the agency and relevance of technological innovation in surface, air & sea transport, defense, and the advent of advanced telecommunications.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Economy, Fossil Fuels, Cities, and Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5907. Brand USA: Democratic Propaganda in the Third Social Space

Author:
Belinda H. Y. Chiu
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Traditional approaches to foreign relations are being replaced by marketing strategies to brand nations by enhancing their image and reputation. No longer is this responsibility limited to government tourism boards. Rather, because “every nation is already a brand,”1 the responsibility to create positive perceptions of the nationstate has fallen on the shoulders of departments of foreign affairs and diplomacy. As an increasingly important tool to promote foreign interests and to attract allies—or in marketing terms, loyal customers—branding allows nation-states to craft and influence how others perceive its political, economic, and social systems & values. Branding is everywhere. But what is it? Brand equity of a product or service is the set of value-added assets that is communicated and strengthened by building name recognition, customer loyalty, and perceived quality. Although it had its beginnings in the consumer product industry, it is no longer restricted to the CocaColas and Proctor & Gambles of the world. Branding has become a tool of public diplomacy. Citizens and leaders of foreign nations have existing ideas about other countries, be they positive or negative. In a technologically-advanced and globalized world, the branded nation has added pressure to be strongly aware of its own brand.2 A nation’s brand can be strengthened by favorable policies, such as debt relief and foreign aid, or conversely, compromised by economic embargoes and declarations of war. Like consumer goods, smart brand management is essential to maintaining a positive impression and build loyal followers. However, as with consumer goods, smart brand management can only sell the product. While branding can change perceptions about the product, it cannot change the product itself. This paper will first briefly discuss the “third social space” in a democracy, the public space for media and marketing. According to Habermas, this third social space sits between the first (the state), and the second (the market, or private sector). Second, it will explore the characteristics of nation branding and its importance to foreign relations, examining the case of Brand USA, with a particular focus on the Shared Values Initiative targeted toward the Arab and Muslim worlds. Finally, it will discuss whether branding has democratic appeal or propagandistic flavor. While there exists skepticism that this process has too much of a Machiavellian feel to it, branding nations is a useful public diplomacy and relations tool, as long as it does not misrepresent facts.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Soft Power, Propaganda, and Marketing
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

5908. Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way? Untangling Ownership and Political Will in Post-Conflict Stability and Reconstruction Operations

Author:
Derick W. Brinkerhoff
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
How best to assist fragile and post-conflict states to improve conditions for their citizens and to establish the policies, institutions, and governance procedures that will lead to socio-economic development has constituted an enduring set of questions for international assistance agencies. These questions have taken on renewed urgency in today’s world where concerns about transnational terrorism, intrastate conflict, and state failure have led to an intersection among the policy, research, and programmatic agendas of the international development, humanitarian, security, and diplomatic communities. The World Bank’s list of fragile states grew from seventeen to twenty-six during the years 2003 to 2006, confirming that the problem of addressing the needs of low-income countries affected by poor governance, persistent poverty, and weak economic growth is becoming ever more difficult and complex.1 While definitions of fragile states vary, all concur that state fragility is directly related to capacity deficits. Fragile states have governments that are incapable of assuring basic security for their citizens, fail to provide basic services and economic opportunities, and are unable to garner sufficient legitimacy to maintain citizens’ confidence and trust. When these capacity deficits are large enough, states move toward failure, collapse, crisis, and conflict. In post-conflict countries, the recovery process—often supported by international donor assistance—involves rebuilding capacity and filling deficits, though backsliding is an ever-present risk. As Collier et al. note, countries that have experienced violent conflict face a 40 percent risk of renewed violence within five years.2
Topic:
Foreign Aid, Reconstruction, Fragile States, Political stability, and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5909. Rethinking “Nation-Building:” The Contradictions of the Neo-Wilsonian Approach to Democracy Promotion

Author:
Roberto Belloni
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
International intervention in weak states is the post–Cold War response to fragmentation and conflict. International operations have been deployed across much of the world, from Afghanistan to Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq, and Somalia, to cite just a few of the most prominent cases. These operations have taken place in different circumstances, with some of them justified in the name of the War on Terror, and others more broadly conducted in view of implementing recently achieved peace agreements. All of these operations face similar constraints and dilemmas. The context in which international intervention takes place is one of extreme political, economic, and social instability. Years of war destroy physical and economic infrastructure, provoke massive human displacement, and leave the population traumatized. Moreover, rarely does war end with a clear victory for one of the parties involved. Instead, conflicts frequently terminate with the signing of a peace agreement, which reflects a difficult and unstable compromise. Perhaps unsurprisingly, half of the countries emerging from conflict revert to violence within five years. Even when a return to violence is averted, these countries remain politically, economically, and socially volatile. Accordingly to one estimate, at present around seventy current or potential conflicts exist across the world.1 This situation calls for both a theoretically informed understanding of the goals, possibilities, and limits of international intervention in support of peace processes as well as country-specific knowledge to tailor such intervention so as to maximize its effectiveness. Unfortunately, even the basic vocabulary used to describe international involvement is contested and confusing, with analysts using terms such as “peace-building,” “nation-building,” and “state-building” to describe the same general phenomenon of international intervention in weak states. This paper begins with a brief attempt at conceptual clarification. Second, it explores the limits of the template adopted by international interveners. Wilsonianism, named after the American President who argued that democracy and self-determination are necessary conditions for domestic and international peace and stability, offers a basic model for contemporary international missions. While Wilsonianism was generally successful in the aftermath of World War I and World War II, this has not been the case for more recent attempts. Contemporary neo-Wilsonianism focuses on political and economic liberalization as means to build viable democracies. As increasingly highlighted by a new generation of democracy analysts, such a formula is often unsuitable for war-torn countries plagued by scarce domestic resources and continuing competition between groups wishing to control the state. At least in the short term, liberalization dangerously heightens competition among groups, thus increasing the possibility of a relapse into war. Third, this paper investigates the less often noted contradictions of neo-Wilsonianism. Not only do political and economic liberalization risk promoting further conflict, they are also at odds with other important goals of international intervention in weak states; in particular, the attempt to uphold individual and group rights. In addition, the potentially positive impact of international intervention is limited by the need to demonstrate concrete and visible results in a very short time frame. The paper concludes with a brief exploration of the alternatives to the prevailing practice of international intervention, with particular reference to the newly created United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.
Topic:
Fragile States, Intervention, Post-Cold War, and Nation-building
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5910. Fixing Failing States: The New Security Agenda

Author:
Pauline H. Baker
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
Weak and failing states rank among the world’s greatest threats to international peace and security today. While major threats to world peace used to come mainly from ideological, military, or economic competition among competing states, in modern times lethal threats are growing within states from communal tensions among rival factions, extremists groups with radical political agendas, and faltering regimes clinging to power and asserting militaristic ambitions. These are the driving forces of a growing world disorder.1 Recent events highlight this paradigm shift in the strategic environment. North Korea is a failing state with an inward-looking regime and a negative view of the world. Its own insecurities, including its fear of a US invasion, are motivating it to pursue nuclear capabilities that have increased its isolation further and exacerbated tensions.2 Lebanon is a weak state that successfully cast off fifteen years of Syrian military occupation, but was unable to assert its sovereignty and fill the vacuum left behind. Hezbollah used that opportunity to assert itself as a “state within a state,” with dual power bases in the government and in the south, where its autonomous security forces launched a devastating war with Israel in July 2006. Then there is Sudan, a country with the highest risk of internal violence that has stonewalled effective international action to stop the continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, described by the US State Department as genocide. 3 Internal weaknesses within these states have increased the threat of nuclear proliferation, precipitated an interstate war, and worsened an ongoing humanitarian crisis, respectively. Though the origins of state weakness go back decades, the curtain was raised on the era of failing states—if one can call it that—by the tragedy of September 11, 2001. One year after the biggest terrorist attack on the US in history, the 2002 US National Security Strategy stated that America is threatened more by failing states than it is by conquering states, overturning decades of US national security thinking. Overnight, we went from looking at security through a “big power” lens to seeing it from a “small power” lens. Much of the rest of the world has come to see security challenges from that perspective as well.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Fragile/Failed State, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America