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341. Push vs. Pull Factors of Capital Flows Revisited: A Cross-country Analysis

Author:
Tae Soo Kang and Kyunghun Kim
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Capital market integration contributes to economic growth and it can be more beneficial for emerging market economies (EMEs, hereafter) at their early stages of development where the capital is relatively insufficient. An open capital market also enables investor to share the country-specific risks by holding foreign assets. However, there are also some negative side effects of capital market integration. Financial shocks originating in the center coun-try can be quickly propagated through the integrated financial market. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC, hereafter) is a good example of the contagion of the financial crisis. Volatile cross-border capital inflows and outflows nega-tively affect financial stability, which eventually lowers economic growth by causing financial crises. Despite of these negative side effects, capital market integration has been an inevitable long-term trend for many EMEs over the past few decades (Aizenman et al. 2010). There have been continuous capital flows to EMEs, which started even before GFC and this trend has been more pronounced during the U.S. zero-interest rate period (Ahmed and Zlate 2014). Though some monetary authorities in EMEs tried to moderate the procyclicality of credit flows by implementing policy instruments such as capital controls or macro-prudential policy measures after GFC (Kim and Mehrotra 2018), the common factors in the global financial market still play a crucial role in de-termining capital inflows to EMEs. The relationship between the global financial condition and its impact on capital inflows to EMEs, has been a long-debated issue. This issue concerns whether push or pull factors are the major determinant of capital flows. The push factor represents the common factor that exists in the global financial market or center countries, which influences capital inflows to peripheral countries. These factors are interest rates and GDP growth rates of advanced economies (AEs, hereafter), global risk factors such as VIX (S&P 500 Volatili-ty Index), and the commodity price index. The pull factor denotes domestic factors that attract funds from the global financial market to domestic finan-cial markets. These factors are domestic interest rates, domestic GDP growth rates, and other country-specific characteristics such as exchange rate regime, degree of the capital account openness, institutional quality, and stages of economic development. In previous literature, many scholars have found strong evidence for push factors being the major determinant of capital movement. The interest rates of mature economies and VIX are significant determinants of capital inflows to EMEs. However, there is only some evidence that higher domestic interest rates and higher domestic GDP growth rates pull capital from the center countries to individual EMEs (Koepke 2015). Related to this long-debated issue in academia, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Jerome H. Powell recently stated, "... I will argue that, while global factors play an important role in influencing domestic financial conditions, the role of U.S. monetary policy is often exaggerated." With this statement, he also pointed out that the slowdown in capital inflows to EMEs which has been happening ever since 2011 has been mainly due to the narrowing of GDP gaps between AEs and EMEs, i.e., the recent decrease in capital in-flows to EMEs can be attributed to the decline in EMEs' GDP growth rates given the fact that the U.S. GDP growth rate has picked up. In this paper, we revisit this issue of push and pull factors of capital inflows. To this end, we consider the heterogeneity that exists in EMEs by dividing them into four subgroups. We investigate which is the main driver of capital inflows between push and pull factors across country groups. Categorizing subgroups is important for two reasons. First, EMEs are so heterogeneous that we make subgroups which share similar economic fundamentals by re-gions. Second, making subgroups across EMEs is an effective way to indi-rectly consider the regional contagion effect. With this cross-country analysis, we can figure out the differing effects of push and pull factors across country groups, and this can eventually lead to the development and implementation of appropriate policy instruments. Our empirical finding shows that the push and pull factors play a different role in determining capital inflows to AEs and EMEs. The major drivers of capital inflows to AEs are both push and pull factors, but push factors turn out to be the main determinant of capital inflows to EMEs. When EMEs are divided into four subgroups, we find sizable heterogeneity across subgroups. In Asian countries, both push and pull factors are significant, which is similar to AEs, but only U.S. interest rate plays a major role in Eastern Europe. Some pull factors are important in Latin American countries and other EMEs, but these are not robust to alternative empirical models and measures.
Topic:
Capital Flows, Economic Policy, Push Factor, and Pull Factor
Political Geography:
Global Focus

342. A Modern Army Reserve for a Multi-Domain World: Structural Realities and Untapped Potential

Author:
Lewis G. Irwin
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph identifies challenges and opportunities in today’s US Army Reserve. Since its inception in 1908, the Army Reserve has made important, diverse, and cost-effective contributions to the Army and the Joint Force and has shown the ability to adapt in profound ways to meet emerging requirements. In the context of emerging requirements driven by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the Army is developing its thinking on multi-domain operations and evolving complex threats in the strategic and operational environments. To meet these emerging, complex challenges, the Army Reserve must adapt again. Accordingly, the monograph offers an honest and direct assessment of the modern Army Reserve’s structural realities, institutional limitations, and untapped potential, while proposing a series of “quick wins,” “heavy lifts,” and “deep” reforms aimed at adapting the institution to meet our nation’s twenty-first century needs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

343. Systems Thinking for Peacebuilding and Rule of Law (French) (Penseé Systémique Pour la Consolidation de la Paix et L’état de Droit en Soutien de Réformes Complexes dans des Environnements Touchés par les Conflits)

Author:
Philippe Leroux-Martin and Vivienne O'Connor
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Ce rapport invite les spécialistes oeuvrant à la consolidation de la paix à intégrer les principes de la pensée systémique et de la théorie de la complexité dans la façon dont ils conçoivent, mettent en oeuvre et évaluent leurs interventions. En se fondant sur les études réalisées au cours des dix dernières années à l’USIP et en s’appuyant sur la littérature d’autres domaines – comme le développement organisationnel, le management situationnel, la gestion du changement et la psychologie – les auteurs prônent des approches plus personnalisées et flexibles dans la consolidation de la paix et de l’État de droit.
Topic:
Conflict, Rule of Law, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

344. Injecting Humanity: Community-Focused Responses for People Exiting Violent Extremist Conflict

Author:
Chris Bosley
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Communities worldwide face the challenge of reintegrating people exiting violent extremist conflicts. This report draws on established programs and the recommendations of authoritative bodies to examine community-based approaches to their rehabilitation. Given that criminal justice responses may not always be possible or appropriate, recovery-focused approaches such as resocialization and reconciliation are recommended to minimize risk and foster resilience.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Islamic State, Conflict, Criminal Justice, Risk, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Middle East and Global Focus

345. Rural Electricity Supply: Commodity or Entitlement?

Author:
Johannes Urpelainen, Brian Blankenship, and Jason Wong
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy
Abstract:
Quality of electricity service remains poor in many developing countries. Reforms to distorted pricing mechanisms involving citizens increasing their payments in exchange for better service must be done carefully to avoid political backlash and persistent theft. Are people not willing to pay for better electricity quality because they feel entitled to electricity provision, or is it because they do not trust one another to also do their part? In a survey conducted in rural Uttar Pradesh, India, we examine factors that influence stated willingness to pay for better service (i.e., more hours of power per day) among rural households. Our results indicate that the general levels of trust are low, and that entitlement plays less of a role as to whether households are willing or not to contribute to improved electricity quality. Low willingness to pay remains a major obstacle to pricing reform. Generalized trust is strongly associated with higher willingness to pay for better electricity. Delays in service improvements and a lack of community support for pricing reform reduce willingness to pay for better quality. To better foster public support for increasing payments in return for better service, we provide three recommendations as follows. Building trust within the community, across agents, and with utilities could help achieve better rural electricity outcomes. Citizens are unlikely to be willing to contribute or make efforts to participate if the background level of trust remains low. Utilities can help by making credible promises and reducing service delay, or first deliver service improvements before collecting increased payments, as to build upon the trust with the community members, who will in turn be more willing to pay. Properly reducing incentives for theft is important for rural electricity reform. 76 percent of the respondents reported theft as an important obstacle to proper electricity supply, and based on what is observable and on the survey results, we estimate a lower-bound usage rate of illegal night lines to be 20 percent. While proper enforcement can be difficult, a potential solution is to focus on the katiyamen and on the officials who check the villages for theft activities. To disincentivize katiyamen, perhaps a training conversion into a utility company position can reduce katiya spread and actually help convince local residents to join the legal grid system. With officials who neglect theft through night lines or meter tampering, a proper incentive scheme should be in place to prevent accepting bribes. Currently, the incentive structures are set up such that the offending households have an incentive to bribe or bypass the proper process, creating these collected rents—the gap between the willingness to accept illegal payments and the punishment for the resident. Further policy should properly reduce incentives for theft, not only from the household perspective but also from a systems perspective. Poverty alleviation must be taken into account in electricity reform policies. The average willingness to pay for extra hours of electricity tends to be very low—at 40 rupees for four more hours, on average. Continued poverty remains a significant obstacle for proper electricity reform in rural India, and national policy should take into account the impact of income when designing policies to improve electricity outcomes.
Topic:
Poverty, Infrastructure, Rural, and Electricity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

346. Engaging State-Owned Enterprises in Climate Action

Author:
Philippe Benoit
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy
Abstract:
Policy makers, academics, and others have devoted significant effort over the past three decades to considering how best to incentivize households and private companies to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. There has been much less discussion about how best to incentivize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) -- companies that are either wholly or majority owned by a government -- to cut emissions. Yet when it comes to energy sector GHGs, these state companies are among the world’s leading emitters. They are major emitters at both the country and global levels, notably from electricity generation. In the aggregate, they emit over 6.2 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year in energy sector GHGs, which is more than every country except China. Public sector companies are also major providers of low-carbon alternatives, such as renewables and nuclear power, and importantly, they often operate under incentives that are quite different from those facing their private sector counterparts. Given the emissions profile of SOEs, the nature of their corporate mandates, and their ownership structure, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy undertook research to examine how best to engage these companies in efforts to lower greenhouse gas emissions as part of its ongoing work on climate change. The paper explores the role of these public sector companies in climate change, examines the effectiveness of market-oriented solutions such as carbon taxes in changing SOE behavior, and evaluates some other potential strategies for reducing their emissions. In short, the paper finds the following: The state-ownership structure of SOEs allows governments to exercise shareholder power to press for the implementation of their climate policy preferences. Providing public sector financing and making associated infrastructure improvements are other ways that a government can encourage its SOEs to invest in low-carbon alternatives. In contrast, many SOEs operate with nonfinancial mandates, market protections, and other conditions that limit their responsiveness to carbon pricing mechanisms that are effective in changing private sector behavior. There are other ways to alter public sector companies so that they embrace a greener pathway without being directed, especially if a firm’s management determines the pathway will serve its corporate interests. This can be especially important for state-owned companies that have the political weight to resist government climate policy pressures. In emerging economies with large SOE emissions and with governments willingly direct their SOEs, using these companies to reduce emissions is a policy tactic that can present implementation and other advantages because it requires the government to target a limited number of companies that the state already owns and controls. How much a government prioritizes climate change relative to other goals is the most critical factor that will determine the extent to which its SOEs prioritize low-carbon investments. Successfully merging climate goals into growth objectives, at both the broader economic and the SOE-company levels, increases the likelihood that a state company will engage in the low-carbon transition in a sustained manner.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

347. Low-Carbon Heat Solutions for Heavy Industry: Sources, Options, and Costs Today

Author:
Julio Friedman
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy
Abstract:
Recent studies indicate there is an urgent need to dramatically reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from heavy industrial applications (including cement, steel, petrochemicals, glass and ceramics, and refining). Heavy industry produces roughly 22 percent of global CO₂ emissions. Of these, roughly 40 percent (about 10 percent of total emissions) is the direct consequence of combustion to produce high-quality heat, almost entirely from the combustion of fossil fuels. This is chiefly because these fuels are relatively cheap, are widely available in large volumes, and produce high-temperature heat in great amounts. Many industrial processes require very large amounts of thermal energy at very high temperatures (more than 300°C and often more than 800°C). For example, conventional steel blast furnaces operate at about 1,100°C, and conventional cement kilns operate at about 1,400°C. In addition, many commercial industrial facilities require continuous operation or operation on demand. The nature of industrial markets creates challenges to the decarbonization of industrial heat. In some cases (e.g., steel, petrochemicals), global commodity markets govern product trade and price. Individual national action on the decarbonization of heavy industry can lead to trade disadvantage, which can be made acute for foundational domestic industries (in some cases, with national security implications). This can also lead to offshoring of production and assets, leading to carbon “leakage” as well as local job and revenue loss (with political consequences). In many cases, lack of options could lead to dramatic price increases for essential products (e.g., cement for concrete, an essential building material). Risk of carbon leakage, price escalation, and trade complexity limits the range of policy applications available to address this decarbonization need. To explore the topic of industrial heat decarbonization, the authors undertook an initial review of all options to supply high temperature, high flux, and high volume heat for a subset of major industrial applications: cement manufacturing, primary iron and steel production, methanol and ammonia synthesis, and glassmaking. From the initial comprehensive set of potential heat supply options, the authors selected a subset of high relevance and common consideration: Biomass and biofuel combustion Hydrogen combustion (including hydrogen produced from natural gas with 89 percent carbon capture (blue hydrogen) and hydrogen produced from electrolysis of water using renewable power (green hydrogen) Electrical heating (including electrical resistance heating and radiative heating (e.g., microwaves) Nuclear heat production (including conventional and advanced systems) The application of post-combustion carbon capture, use, and storage (CCUS) to industrial heat supply and to the entire facility, as a basis for comparison The authors focus on substitutions and retrofits to existing facilities and on four primary concerns: cost, availability, viability of retrofit/substitution, and life-cycle footprint. In short, the paper finds: All approaches have substantial limitations or challenges to commercial deployment. Some processes (e.g., steelmaking) will likely have difficulty accepting options for substitution. All options would substantially increase the production cost and wholesale price of industrial products. For many options (e.g., biomass or electrification), the life-cycle carbon footprint or efficiency of heat deposition are highly uncertain and cannot be resolved simply. This complicates crafting sound policy and assessing technical options and viability. Most substitute supply options for low-carbon heat appear more technically challenging and expensive than retrofits for CCUS. Even given the uncertainties around costs and documented complexities in applying CO₂ capture to industrial systems, it may prove simpler and cheaper to capture and store CO₂. CCUS would have the added benefit of capturing emissions from by-product industrial chemistry, which can represent 20–50 percent of facility emissions and would not be captured through heat substitution alone. Critically, CCUS is actionable today, providing additional GHG mitigation to industrial heat and process emissions as other options mature and become economically viable. Hydrogen combustion provided the readiest source of heat of all the options assessed, was the simplest to apply (including retrofit), and was the most tractable life-cycle basis. Today, hydrogen produced from reforming natural gas and decarbonized with CCUS (blue hydrogen) has the best cost profile for most applications and the most mature supply chain, and it would commonly add 10–50 percent to wholesale production costs. It also could provide a pathway to increase substitution with hydrogen produced by electrolysis of water from carbon-free electricity (green hydrogen), which today would increase costs 200–800 percent but would drop as low-carbon power supplies grow and electrolyzer costs drop. Hydrogen-based industrial heat provides an actionable pathway to start industrial decarbonization at once, particularly in the petrochemical, refining, and glass sectors, while over time reducing cost and contribution of fossil sources. However, substitution of hydrogen will prove more difficult or infeasible for steel and cement, which might require more comprehensive redesign and investment. Most of the other options appear to add substantially to final production costs—commonly twice that of blue hydrogen substitution or CCUS—and are more difficult to implement. However, all options show the potential for substantial cost reductions. An innovation agenda remains a central important undertaking and likely would yield near-term benefits in cost reduction, ease of implementation, and a lower life-cycle carbon footprint. Prior lack of focus on industrial heat supplies as a topic leave open many possibilities for improvement, and dedicated research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) programs could make substantial near-term progress. To avoid commercial and technical failure, government innovation programs should work closely with industry leaders at all levels of investigation. New policies specific to heavy industry heat and decarbonization are required to stimulate market adoption. Policies must address concerns about leakage and global commodity trade effects as well as the environmental consequences. These policies could include sets of incentives (e.g., government procurement mandates, tax credits, feed-in tariffs) large enough to overcome the trade and cost concerns. Alternatively, policies like border adjustment tariffs would help protect against leakage or trade impacts. Because all options suffer from multiple challenges or deficiencies, innovation policy (including programs that both create additional options and improve existing options) is essential to deliver rapid progress in industrial heat decarbonization and requires new programs and funding. As a complement to innovation policy and governance, more work is needed to gather and share fundamental technical and economic data around industrial heat sources, efficiency, use, and footprint.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

348. Electric Vehicle Penetration and Its Impact On Global Oil Demand: A Survey of 2019 Forecast Trends

Author:
Marianne Kah
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy
Abstract:
Columbia University’s Center for Global Energy Policy is undertaking a multiyear study on the prospects for and timing of peak oil demand. An essential piece of the puzzle is understanding what happens to global oil demand in the passenger vehicle sector, since it is the sector with the largest oil demand use today. Policy makers in a growing number of countries are supporting passenger vehicle electrification or a phaseout of fossil fuel passenger vehicles to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve urban air quality. To understand the trajectory of oil demand in this sector, it is important to comprehend the magnitude and timing of electric vehicle (EV) penetration. The pace of demand growth matters. If the world doesn’t move off oil at a rapid rate, it is important that policy makers recognize the need for investment in new oil supplies to prevent supply shortages and accompanying oil price spikes. Numerous studies analyzing the impact of EVs on oil demand have been published. It is difficult to compare these studies because they do not define the passenger vehicle sector the same way or provide underlying assumptions on a comparable basis. Last year, the author conducted a survey of all available global electric passenger vehicle penetration forecasts to compare underlying assumptions and the impact on oil demand. The author conducted a similar survey in 2019 to understand how views on EV penetration are changing. This report describes the results from the 2019 survey and indicates how views have changed since last year. Rationale for Studying the Passenger Vehicle Sector As shown in figure 1, the passenger vehicle sector is the largest sector of oil use, representing about one-quarter of the oil demand barrel. The passenger vehicle sector is a target for policy makers because full penetration of EVs could ultimately take nearly 25 million barrels per day of oil use out of the market. However, it is important to understand the other 75 percent of the oil demand barrel before assessing the prospects of peak oil demand. It should be noted that the passenger vehicle sector gets a disproportionate amount of attention from policy makers and the media because of the current focus on electrification and the greater ease of electrifying passenger cars versus other modes of transportation. For example, it is easier to electrify a passenger car than a heavy-duty truck, where the large and costly batteries required will reduce cargo carrying capacity due to weight limits on roads. It is also more challenging to electrify airplanes than passenger cars.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

349. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Perception Survey of Asian Opinion Leaders

Author:
Pradumna B. Rana, Chai Wai-Mun, and Ji Xianbai
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), officially unveiled in 2013, is China’s landmark foreign and economic policy initiative to achieve improved connectivity, regional cooperation, and economic development on a trans-continental scale. China has promoted the BRI as a cooperative initiative that will lead to a win- win situation for both China and BRI partner countries. However, there are many different views and pushbacks against the BRI and suspicions of China’s underlying intentions. Impacts of the BRI can be assessed either through a model-based quantitative study or through a broadly representative survey. Our paper used the latter approach as we were not aware of any such study in the past. We implemented an online survey from 20 June to 19 July 2019 which over 1,200 Asian opinion leaders responded to. Asian opinion leaders were defined as policy makers, academics, businesses, and media practitioners from 26 Asian countries that have signed a BRI agreement with China. Stakeholders’ perspectives on the following issues were solicited: (i) why China might have been interested in launching the BRI; (ii) perceived benefits and risks to countries participating in the BRI; and (iii) policies that the stakeholders would like to recommend both to China and their own governments. Though mixed views on the specifics of the BRI emerged, respondents generally felt that the BRI was a positive development facilitating international economic cooperation and development. The recommendations of this survey should be of some use in making the BRI a truly win-win initiative for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Economic Policy, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

350. Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War

Author:
Neta C. Crawford
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:
If climate change is a “threat multiplier,” as some national security experts and members of the military argue, how does the US military reduce climate change caused threats? Or does war and the preparation for it increase those risks?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Climate Change, War, International Security, Military Spending, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America