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61. The Élysée Treaty and European Integration Theory

Author:
Yannis Karagiannis
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
German Politics and Society
Institution:
German Politics and Society Journal
Abstract:
According to neoliberal institutionalism, states create international institutions to limit information asymmetries, monitor compliance, and ensure the credibility of commitments to agreed-upon policies-in short, to minimize transaction costs. Although this view can help explain the delegation of powers to supranational bodies such as the European Commission, it cannot account for the signature of the Élysée Treaty between France and Germany in January 1963, which reversed the logic of supranational delegation. Understanding the causes and the consequences of this apparently anomalous event is therefore a major challenge facing scholars of international organizations, European integration, and German foreign policy alike. To start addressing the issue, this article develops an explanation based on incomplete contracts theory. In a nutshell, I argue that the Élysée Treaty aimed at securing the equal treatment of French and German interests in the process of European integration, thereby allowing the deepening of European integration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

62. German policies and practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina - A promising future and a lack of initiative -

Author:
Susanna Thiel
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the tragic Yugoslav dissolution wars from 1992 to 1995, the international community has taken new interest in the region of former Yugoslavia and its people. The big amount of foreign aid as well as the multitude of international actors and organisations bears witness to that: Lana Pasic finds that until 2005 at least 9.9 billion dollars have been sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as international humanitarian aid and reconstruction purposes, which is not taking into account the ongoing support from private donors and NGOs.1 In addition to that, a country profile on BiH drafted by the Michigan State University in March 2012 mentions the impressive amount of 15 billion US-Dollars of international aid being given to BiH for a vast variety of purposes since the end of the war until the beginning of 2012, such as humanitarian aid, de-mining and the improvement of Bosnian infrastructure.2 Germany's contribution to this foreign aid sums up to about 680 million Euros between 1995 and 2012.3 This sum provides an idea of how relevant BiH is to German politics – and gives an impression of how relevant Germany might be within BiH and the first decades of this state. It leads to the assumption that Germany is taking great interest in the new Bosnian state and is politically active for this purpose. For the newly united Germany after 1990 that was indeed the case: it was of high relevancy during and after the dissolution wars. It was the first country to recognise the states of Croatia and Slovenia and took in at least 345,000 refugees from BiH from 1992 until 1996. Also, it initiated the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe4 and portrays itself as one of the leading partners of BiH's way to accessing the EU.5 This approach is based on a long, multi-faceted relationship between Germany and the region of BiH: for example, immigrants from German territories settled on Bosnian ground as early as the 13th century6 , the two World Wars had a deep impact on the region – e.g. for the Titoist partisan founding myth – and guest workers came to Germany after the German-Yugoslav guest worker contract in 1968.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, History, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Aid, Culture, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Yugoslavia, Germany, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

63. Middle East Security Report : Syria's Armed Opposition

Author:
Joseph Holliday
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The rebels will have to rely on external lines of supply to replenish their arms and ammunition if they are to continue eroding the regime's control. The emergence of al-Qaeda-linked terrorist cells working against the regime poses risks to the United States and a challenge to those calling for material support of the armed opposition. As the militias continue to face overwhelming regime firepower the likelihood of their radicalization may increase. Moreover, the indigenous rebels may turn to al-Qaeda for high-end weaponry and spectacular tactics as the regime's escalation leaves the rebels with no proportionate response, as occurred in Iraq in 2005-2006. Developing relations with armed opposition leaders and recognizing specific rebel organizations may help to deter this dangerous trend. It is imperative that the United States distinguish between the expatriate political opposition and the armed opposition against the Assad regime on the ground in Syria. American objectives in Syria are to hasten the fall of the Assad regime; to contain the regional spillover generated by the ongoing conflict; and to gain influence over the state and armed forces that emerge in Assad's wake. Therefore, the United States must consider developing relations with critical elements of Syria's armed opposition movement in order to achieve shared objectives, and to manage the consequences should the Assad regime fall or the conflict protract.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, United States, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Germany, and Syria

64. US Presidents and Foreign Policy Mistakes

Author:
Özden Zeynep Oktav
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Insight Turkey
Institution:
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
Abstract:
Socrates' pupil Chaerephon once asked an oracle “who is the wisest of all men?” The oracle responded that Socrates is the wisest of all because of his self-awareness. According to philosophers from Socrates to Montaigne, Spinoza, Kant, true wisdom and full knowledge may be a utopian fantasy. In a world of uncertainty where mistakes are unavoidable facts of daily life for citizens and politicians alike, how politicians will be able to avoid foreign policy mistakes is the main concern of this book. There are some other questions of crucial importance which the book deals with: What are foreign policy mistakes and how and why do they occur? The answers to those questions are available in this book and it concentrates on the concept of power. Regarding the concept of power, the main question is “kto-kovo?” (Lenin's famous question, “who controls whom?”) The answers to the question “what are foreign policy mistakes?” and conceptualizing foreign policy mistakes are quite blurry and complicated. There may be lots of different kinds of mistakes, such as violating moral rules, lack of cognitive judgment, and policies costing too much and having unanticipated and undesirable results. The mistakes can be classified as omission (too little/too late) and commission (too much/too soon). For example, mistakes of omission are evident in the British policies towards Germany which failed to deter Germany's occupation of Sudetenland in 1938 and to reassure the Russians that they would negotiate an alliance against Germany. This failure of the British decision makers led to a non-aggression pact between Stalin and Hitler in 1939. The Katyn Forest massacre exemplifies best how Soviet Russia misperceived the gains in cooperating with Germany in the removal of Poland from the map of Europe because according to the authors, the Soviet decision to execute Polish POWs and bury them in the Katyn Forest is a foreign policy decision that falls into three domain; morality, intelligence and policy. It was a violation of international law, based on a diagnostic judgement blinded by ignorance of the future and by communist ideology, which led to a prescription for a policy action that alienated future allies.This, at the same time illustrates the mistake of commission (too much/too soon) and moral failure. Foreign policy choices are not only concerned with rational choices, but, as Axelrod and Jarwis clearly defined it, they also stem from some sources of mistakes such as subjective cognitive maps, heuristics, attribution errors, desires to maintain cognitive consistency and avoid cognitive dissonance, selective attention, and other emotional or cold cognitive biases. Khong explains why human beings are “creatures with limited cognitive capacities” by emphasizing that leaders, like every human, tend to turn to historical analogies for guidance when confronted with novel foreign policy challenges. However the issue is that the result is often a foreign policy mistake since this only helps the leaders “access analogies on the basis of surface similarities”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, United States, Europe, Poland, Soviet Union, and Germany

65. The Concept of "Normality" in German Foreign Policy since Unification

Author:
Hans Kundnani
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
German Politics and Society
Institution:
German Politics and Society Journal
Abstract:
In this paper I examine the use of the concept of "normality" in debates about German foreign policy since unification. In the early 1990s, left-wing intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas tended to criticize the idea of "normality" in favor of a form of German exceptionalism based on responsibility for the Nazi past. A foreign policy based on the idea of "normality" was associated above all with the greater use of military force, which the right advocated and the left opposed. Thus, "normality" became a synonym for Bündnisfähigkeit. Yet, from the mid 1990s onwards, some Social Democrats such as Egon Bahr began to use the concept of "normality" to refer instead to a foreign policy based on sovereignty and the pursuit of national interests. Although a consensus has now emerged in Germany around this realist definition of foreign-policy "normality," it is inadequate to capture the complex shift in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic since unification.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Germany

66. The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy

Author:
Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To an outside observer, Europe acts as a bloc with all 27 member states discussing issues and unanimously making decisions on foreign policy. But behind the scenes lies a tacit agreement that the largest member states with the most resources take the lead. Three of those states are in a category of their own: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

67. Berlin Reportedly Mulling New Approach To Stagnancy of Bosnia

Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
European Affairs
Institution:
The European Institute
Abstract:
In a succinct up-date report on Bosnia, the geo-political analysis website, Stratfor, predicts a German-led initiative on the Western Balkans. Here is an excerpt on Bosnia from the larger Stratfor analysis of the Balkans.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Bosnia and Germany

68. Don't Expect Much from Japan in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Japan is an Indian Ocean power of long standing. Ten years ago, in a post-9/11 show of solidarity with the United States and to exercise a more muscular foreign policy, Tokyo committed vessels of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF, or MSDF) to the coalition naval contingent supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. JMSDF tankers resupplied coalition warships, while Aegis destroyers guarded against air and surface threats in the Arabian Sea. Japanese seamen posted impressive statistics for this naval enterprise. The Japan Ministry of Defense reported that JMSDF vessels supplied about 137 million gallons of fuel oil and some 2.8 gallons of water to customers from about a dozen countries, including the United States, Pakistan, France, Britain, and Germany. Tokyo spent over $110 million on the logistics mission in its final two years according to Defense Ministry spokesmen, even as demand for such support dwindled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Britain, Afghanistan, United States, Japan, India, France, Arabia, Germany, and Tokyo

69. Energy Security: For a Stronger Foreign Policy and a Safer Nation

Author:
Robbie Diamond
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
Leading up to World War II, Japan and Germany were well aware that their ships, tanks and planes were completely dependent on oil. The Fischer- Tropsch process—invented in Germany some years earlier—allowed the Germans to produce 72,000 barrels a day of synthetic fuel from coal by 1940. However, the synthetic fuels were not enough and the principal goal of the march into the Soviet Union was the rich oilfields of Baku on the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and War
Political Geography:
Japan, Germany, and Caspian Sea

70. Getting along with Gulliver: A Review of Finnish-German Relations

Author:
Glenn R. Gassen
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Since Paavo Lipponen left the Prime Minister's Office in 2003, Finland's relationship with Germany seems to have grown more distant. While Lipponen had a markedly pro-German attitude, the present government has adopted a more sober and pragmatic approach. But does this change in rhetoric indicate a different approach? A decade ago, it seemed self-evident that for Finland, Germany was considered “as an important – if not the most important – partner in Europe.”1But what importance does Germany hold for Finland today?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Germany