Search

Begin New Search Topic Fiscal Deficit Political Geography Germany

1. The Cyclical Behaviour of Government Spending for Social Protection: Is the OECD Methodology Robust?

Author:
Aleksandr Arsenev, Philipp Heimberger, and Torben Schütz
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Spending elasticities measure the reaction of different government spending components to the business cycle. They are important inputs for fiscal forecasts, and they are particularly relevant in the context of European Union (EU) fiscal rules, as elasticity estimates enter the estimation of fiscal space. This paper analyses the sensitivity of the estimation method used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission to obtain government spending elasticities by focusing on 11 EU countries in the 1995-2020 period. Our results suggest that spending elasticities are sensitive to small variations in data and model specification. For most EU countries, we reject the assumption that only unemployment spending responds to cyclical variations. While unemployment spending is indeed a major driver of counter-cyclical social spending, other categories of social spending also show signs of responding to the business cycle.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Finance, Macroeconomics, Public Debt, Social Spending, Public Spending, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, France, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Romania, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Austria, and Czechia

2. The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules: How Ideational Ambiguity Has Facilitated Social Democratic Parties’ Support of Structural Deficit Rules in the Eurozone

Author:
Andreas Eisl
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
In recent years, all eurozone member states have introduced national fiscal rules, which put limits on public deficits and debt. Fiscal rules reduce the fiscal policy discretion of politicians and affect their capacity to use public budgets for macroeconomic steering and redistribution. While such institutional discretion constraints run against the traditional policy preferences of social democratic parties, it is puzzling why they supported national fiscal rule reforms during the European debt crisis. This paper argues that the concept of structural deficit rules, central to reform efforts across the eurozone, allowed for the formation of an ambiguous consensus between center-right and center-left parties. While conservative and liberal parties are generally supportive of institutional discretion constraints, structural deficit rules – in contrast to nominal deficit rules – allowed social democratic and other left-wing parties to link such rules with their broader policy preferences of Keynesian countercyclical policymaking and the protection of tax revenues across the economic cycle to ensure the state’s capacity for redistribution. Drawing on three country case studies (Germany, Austria, France), this paper shows how the concept of structural deficit rules facilitated – at least discursively – the support for discretion-constraining institutions among social democratic and other left-wing parties. In theoretical terms, this study also advances research on the role of ambiguity in political decision-making, (re-)conceptualizing three forms of ambiguity underlying ambiguous consensus: textual ambiguity, institutional ambiguity, and ideational ambiguity
Topic:
Economics, Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, Eurozone, Political Parties, Public Debt, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
France, Germany, and Austria