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1. Assessing the Zeitenwende: Implications for Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic Security

Author:
John R. Deni, Marina E. Henke, Aylin Matlé, Sophia Besch, and Tim Bosch
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The essays in this volume analyze Germany’s Zeitenwende, a pivotal shift in security policy triggered by Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Key topics include national security strategy, defense policy, energy policy, industrial strategy, and international relations with Russia, China, the United States, NATO, and the EU. Regarding strategy, Germany’s approach lacks focus, offering broad goals without addressing trade-offs or specific threats. On defense policy, the Zeitenwende marked a renewed commitment to defense spending, bolstered by a €100 billion modernization fund. But delays in procurement, operational shortcomings, and an underfunded long-term defense budget hinder Germany. Similar challenges affect the defense industry, despite increased spending and exports. In energy policy, Germany rapidly diversified energy sources and expanded its liquefied natural gas infrastructure to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Still, achieving energy security, affordability, and sustainability remains complex. Internationally, Germany abandoned decades of Ostpolitik, prioritizing Ukraine over ties with Russia. Germany’s evolving China policy focuses on derisking and maintaining economic ties, raising questions about whether Berlin has reduced vulnerabilities. Though Washington supports Germany’s strategic shift, concerns remain about its sustainability, particularly in Germany’s NATO and EU commitments. Each chapter concludes by identifying the implications for the United States as well as the steps to overcome identified challenges.
Topic:
NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Energy Security, Burden Sharing, and Zeitenwende
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Germany, and United States of America

2. The German 'Schuldenbremse' crisis: a symptom to be taken seriously in Europe

Author:
Clara Bösche
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The priority to be given to the ecological transition and its practical implementation are dividing Germany and Europe. The European Union is being accused of making the conditions of production for farmers even more difficult: the number of demonstrations across the European Union has been rising after the Germans began their protests on 15 January 2024, as they denounced the ambitions of the European Green Deal, as well as the human and financial costs. At the start of 2024, the German coalition government (SPD, Greens and FDP Liberals) led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) is struggling, since its draft budget has been cut by around €60 billion. The origins of the budget cuts to which the government has had to resort lie in a decision taken by the Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe dated 15 November 2023. The latter censured the decision to reallocate 60 billion €, initially intended to cushion the economic impact of the pandemic crisis, to a special fund for the transformation of the economy and the climate. For two months now, opposition has been growing in Germany over the resources allocated, the priorities to be defined and the rules governing public debt. The constitutional appeal was lodged by CDU-CSU members of parliament, who denounced the government's "sleight of hand". As Germany enters a recession, the debate is whether or not it is still appropriate to limit public debt to 0.35% of GDP. Current circumstances no longer justify bending the rule: the pandemic crisis is over, and the exceptional funds earmarked should not be used for the economy or the environment. As a result, since the Constitutional Court's ruling against the federal budget, in addition to opposition over the priority to be given to the green transition in economic and agricultural life, further opposition has emerged: regarding whether the constitutional principle of the debt brake (Schuldenbremse) should be reformed or not. This principle is firmly defended by Friedrich Merz, leader of the CDU and of the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag. In his view, the debt brake is the only way to avoid saddling future generations with debt, and he fears that lifting it might have a knock-on effect in terms of the financial stability of other European Union countries. Within the government, the SPD and the Greens (led by the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for the Economy, Robert Habeck), would like to reform the debt brake to facilitate the necessary investments, in line with the European Green Deal. However, within the same government, the FDP Liberals, led by Finance Minister Christian Lindner, have long refused to challenge this constitutional principle, in the same way as the CDU/CSU opposition. Christian Lindner is therefore in a difficult situation, caught between traditional positions, his coalition partners and the opposition. A hard-won agreement on the 2024 budget, on 13 December 2023, provides for cuts that will result, in particular, in the reduction of tax relief on diesel on agricultural machinery - the main focus of demonstrations in Germany – but also in a postponement of the “climate bonus”. Priorities have had to be set because of this cutback, but they are the source of dissatisfaction both on the part of the farmers, as well as the promoters of the European Green Deal. The debate on Germany's levels of debt, in the light of the demonstrations now rocking the country, is further weakening the coalition - the aim in this paper is not to take position on this - but above all, to consider the problem of the priorities to be identified, not only in Germany but also in Europe.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Tax Systems, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3. Germany’s Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy: Balancing Sustainable Development and Energy Security

Author:
Jeanette Süß
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
With the war in Ukraine, Germany’s “traffic light” coalition government has had to adapt its climate policy to the upheavals caused by this war, which has turned its economic, energy, and military model upside down. Against a backdrop of high energy costs and increasing calls for reshoring in Europe, German industry is looking at how to maintain its competitiveness while decarbonizing its industry. To combat climate change and find new forms of energy cooperation that are more sustainable for the planet, the federal government has set up a Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy bringing together its collaborative actions with partner countries. Climate, energy, and development partnerships play a vital role in this context, and emerging countries are key partners for climate initiatives. They have a high demand for energy and exploit resources, though without always respecting environmental, social, and governance standards. Their renewable energy (RE) production potential is significant, and there are major opportunities for CO2 reduction thanks to modernization technologies that Germany is seeking to transfer to its partners. To this end, Germany is using a multitude of diplomatic tools and is leveraging a unique network of international agencies, chambers of commerce and climate finance players.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Sustainable Development Goals, Renewable Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

4. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:
Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

5. German Industrial Competitiveness and the Metaverse

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Robert Baker
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The metaverse is the next iteration of the internet as an immersive, 3D, virtual, shared world where activities can be carried out with the help of extended reality services. But it is much more than headsets and virtual games. The metaverse is increasingly conceptualised in tandem with other advanced technologies, including AI, IoT, automation, and blockchain. Combined, these Industrie 4.0 innovations will be at the centre of German productivity growth over the next decade. The IMF and the OECD both expect Germany to be the worst-performing leading economy in the world in 2023. Beyond recent shocks, German competitiveness is being “steadily eroded” by structural factors like “rising labour costs and a lack of digitisation” (Arnold, 2023). In this context of sclerotic growth, immersive technologies show much promise. The economic dimension of the new Digital Strategy should be guided by three simple “I’s” – immersive, industrial productivity, and internationalisation of German technologies. Specifically, the metaverse is driving productivity gains in manufacturing, engineering, financial services and retail – it could add €71 billion to German GDP by 2035. As well as enhancing the productivity of existing operations, immersive technologies and smart factories can enable the reshoring of profitable activities back to the German economy, particularly in technology and engineering. But these economic gains are not inevitable. Neglecting immersive technologies would have a significant effect on Germany’s remaining competitive advantages. For example, late adoption of the metaverse and digital twins by the German auto industry would lead to a 10% loss in exports, equating to more than €12 billion each year. The costs of late adoption are only underscored by the current salience of global competition. US firms have a strong track record of successfully integrating internet products into industry, while China and its own technology giants are developing strategic initiatives to capitalise on the metaverse. While much of the metaverse remains under development, companies are already showcasing a range of commercial partnerships and innovative use cases. German companies like Siemens are at the forefront of digital twins which allow automakers and other manufactures to replicate their physical facilities in virtual worlds, drawing on real-time data and simulations to optimise their operations. In insurance, the same digital twins are facilitating underwriting and expedited claims via remote monitoring. Meanwhile, in medical devices and healthcare, a metaverse of medical technology and AI (MeTAI) is facilitating the refinement of AI-based medical practices. This is the future of medical imaging technology, diagnosis, and therapy.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

6. Your Turn, Berlin: A German Strategy for Europe

Author:
Josef Janning
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The Zeitenwende has made Europe’s status quo impossible to maintain. Although the imperative of transforming the EU into a geopolitical actor is widely understood, the direction of new policy to achieve that goal is unclear. Europe is not moving so Germany must move Europe. As detailed here, German policymakers must spell out the Europe they want and act to make it a reality, working to overcome disagreement and against resistance from those who prefer to wait things out.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, International Order, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

7. EU-China Trade Relations: Where Do We Stand, Where Should We Go?

Author:
Alexander Sandkamp
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
• In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s share in European trade has fallen continuously. Nevertheless, the country remains the EU’s largest source of imports (20.5 percent in 2023) and its third largest export destination (8.7 percent). • This apparent dominance of China is put into perspective when incorporating intra-EU trade. For example, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – sent 6.1 percent of its ex-ports to China, but 55 percent to EU members states. For imports, the Chinese and Euro-pean shares are 11.5 percent and 52.7 percent, respectively. • Decoupling the EU from China (i.e. almost eliminating bilateral trade) would permanent-ly reduce European real income by 0.8 percent in the long-run. In terms of gross domes-tic product in 2023, the EU would forego 136 billion EUR of value added every year. Short-term effects are likely to be stronger. • China dominates global production of important products such as laptops and mobile phones as well as raw materials including Germanium and Gallium that are critical for the green energy transition. A trade disruption might thus both delay the energy transi-tion and increase its costs. • To reduce specific dependencies, the EU should intensify its efforts to diversify procure-ment by increasing the attractiveness of alternative suppliers. Finding the courage to move forward in the negotiation of free trade agreements with potential strategic part-ners such as Australia and the Mercosur countries would strengthen the EU’s geopolitical position and increase prosperity among partners.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Germany

8. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

9. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

10. Supply Chain Risks in EU-South Korea Relations: Semiconductor Industries

Author:
Sunkung Choi
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Recent geopolitical crises and the Covid-19 pandemic have exposed weaknesses in global supply chains, leading to disruptions in the flow of goods and creating shortages. The semiconductor shortage crisis between 2020-2021 exacerbated these issues, particularly affecting industries reliant on chips. This crisis prompted governments and industries to prioritise resilience and independence in supply chains. This paper examines the causes, effects and implications of the supply chain crisis, focusing on the economic relations between the EU and South Korea. Both parties recognise the importance of addressing supply chain vulnerabilities and have initiated collaborative efforts to strengthen critical industries like batteries and semiconductors. Moving forward, strategic collaboration between the EU and South Korea will be crucial for effectively addressing the supply chain crisis. Measures such as enhancing supply chain resilience, investing in research and development and fostering technological cooperation are essential for ensuring economic stability and navigating future challenges.
Topic:
European Union, Trade, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Germany